How much are we morally required to do to help people who are much worse off than us? Philosophers have often raised this question in assessing the plausibility of particular moral theories. But it is a pressing question whatever one's moral outlook. Any plausible moral outlook should recognize requirements of beneficence -- requirements grounded directly in other people's need for assistance. Given this, there is a forceful case for thinking that we are morally required -- not only collectively, but also as individuals -- to devote a substantial proportion of what we have to helping the poor.
One way to present this case is by means of a simple analogy: an analogy between giving money to an aid agency and rescuing a needy person directly. Part I of Garrett Cullity's book examines this analogy in detail, discussing the ways in which it is politically and metaphysically simplistic. However, there remains an important truth in the simple analogy. It is that we are morally required to help.
In one way, our world imposes a radical separation between its rich and poor inhabitants: our material circumstances are starkly different. In another way, however, it does not: the human experiences and fulfillments of rich and poor are fundamentally the same. This is an important part of the case for thinking that their welfare grounds requirements of beneficence on us to help them. But Part II shows that it is also part of the case for limiting those requirements. Drawing attention to the range of goods that ground requirements on us to help each other, Cullity argues that these requirements only make sense on the assumption that a life of a certain kind -- a life that is not restricted in an extremely demanding way -- is one that it is not wrong for us to live.

How much are we morally required to do to help people who are much worse off than us? Philosophers have often raised this question in assessing the plausibility of particular moral theories. But it is a pressing question whatever one's moral outlook. Any plausible moral outlook should recognize requirements of beneficence -- requirements grounded directly in other people's need for assistance. Given this, there is a forceful case for thinking that we are morally required -- not only collectively, but also as individuals -- to devote a substantial proportion of what we have to helping the poor.
One way to present this case is by means of a simple analogy: an analogy between giving money to an aid agency and rescuing a needy person directly. Part I of Garrett Cullity's book examines this analogy in detail, discussing the ways in which it is politically and metaphysically simplistic. However, there remains an important truth in the simple analogy. It is that we are morally required to help.
In one way, our world imposes a radical separation between its rich and poor inhabitants: our material circumstances are starkly different. In another way, however, it does not: the human experiences and fulfillments of rich and poor are fundamentally the same. This is an important part of the case for thinking that their welfare grounds requirements of beneficence on us to help them. But Part II shows that it is also part of the case for limiting those requirements. Drawing attention to the range of goods that ground requirements on us to help each other, Cullity argues that these requirements only make sense on the assumption that a life of a certain kind -- a life that is not restricted inan extremely demanding way -- is one that it is not wrong for us to live.

Three things often recognized as central to morality are concern for others' welfare, respect for their self-expression, and cooperation in worthwhile collective activity. When philosophers have proposed theories of the substance of morality, they have typically looked to one of these three sources to provide a single, fundamental principle of morality - or they have tried to formulate a master-principle for morality that combines these three ideas in some way. In Concern, Respect, and Cooperation, Garrett Cullity urges us to think of them instead as three independently important foundations of morality. The overall aim is to illuminate the structure of morality by showing how its complex content is generated from a relatively simple set of underlying elements - with the complexity resulting from the various ways in which one part of morality can derive from another, and the various ways in which they can interact. Plural-foundation moral theories are sometimes criticized for having nothing helpful to say about cases in which their fundamental norms conflict. Responding to this, Cullity concludes with three detailed applications of his theory: to the questions surrounding paternalism, the use of others as means, and our moral responsibilities as consumers.

These thirteen new, specially-written essays by a distinguished international line-up of contributors, including some leading contemporary moral philosophers, give a rich and varied view of current work on ethics and practical reason. The three main perspectives on the topic, Kantian, Humean, and Aristotelian, are all well represented. The editors' introduction provides a valuable introductory survey of the topic, putting the individual essays in context. Ethics and Practical Reason will be essential reading for scholars, postgraduates, and upper-level undergraduates working in this area.