The three basic elements in preparing for, responding to and recovering from any catastrophic disaster are (1) leadership; (2) capabilities; and (3) accountability. Leadership in the form of legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood in order to facilitate rapid and effective decision making. Developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters should be part of an overall national effort designed to integrate and define what needs to be done, where, by whom, and how well. Ensuring needed capabilities are ready requires effective planning and coordination, plus robust training and exercises in which the capabilities are realistically tested, problems identified, and subsequently addressed in partnership with federal, state, local, and non-governmental stakeholders.

Full color interior enhanced with text analytics by PageKicker Robot Jellicoe. To improve the construction quality of ships delivered to the Navy, GAO is recommending, among other things, that the Navy clarify policy on when deficiencies should be addressed, provide guidance on contract quality requirements, and assess applicability of certain commercial practices to Navy shipbuilding. DOD agreed with two recommendations and partially agreed with three, stating for example that current policy is adequate but that the Navy would monitor deficiency trends. GAO believes that the recommendations remain valid as discussed in the report.

Our approach in Principles is to lay a foundation with text discussion, using specific legal authorities to illustrate the principles discussed, their application, and exceptions. These authorities include GAO decisions and opinions, judicial decisions, statutory provisions, and other relevant sources. We would encourage users to start with at least a brief review of Chapter 1, which provides a general framework and context for all that follows. Chapter 1 includes a note regarding citations to GAO case law and other relevant GAO material and an explanation of those other materials.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) emerged in southern China in November 2002 and spread rapidly along international air routes in early 2003. Asian countries had the most cases (7,782) and deaths (729). SARS challenged Asian health care systems, disrupted Asian economies, and tested the effectiveness of the International Health Regulations. GAO was asked to examine the roles of the World Health Organization (WHO), the U.S. government, and Asian governments (China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) in responding to SARS; the estimated economic impact of SARS in Asia; and efforts to update the International Health Regulations.

GAO/RCED-95-17, Hazardous Waste Incinerators: EPA's and OSHA's Actions to Better Protect Health and Safety Not Complete. In 1990, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) became concerned about workers' safety at hazardous waste incinerators because of the possibility that waste handling operations could pose a significant health threat to employees. As a result, EPA requested assistance from and established a joint task force with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to evaluate compliance with relevant health and safety requirements at hazardous waste incinerators. The task force's 1991 report summarized the results of inspections at 29 such facilities and made five recommendations to EPA and four to OSHA.1 These recommendations were intended as follow-through measures to correct violations detected during the inspections, educate the combustion industry, improve the coverage of inspections, educate compliance officials, and prompt EPA to conduct research and revise incinerators' permits as necessary. In response to your request for information on whether hazardous waste incineration facilities are following federal health and safety requirements, we determined (1) what the status of the task force report's recommendations is, (2) what the results of subsequent inspections and enforcement actions at the 29 facilities have been, and (3) whether EPA or OSHA have taken other actions beyond those recommended by the task force to better protect health and safety at hazardous waste incineration facilities. EPA and/or OSHA have fully implemented three of the task force's recommendations: EPA and OSHA have followed up on violations found during the task force's inspections, EPA and OSHA have educated the combustion industry, and EPA has taken additional steps to educate compliance officials. EPA has not fully implemented other recommendations to (1) improve the coverage of EPA's inspections and (2) conduct research on the use of certain operating equipment and revise incineration facilities' permits, as necessary, to limit the use of this equipment. OSHA has not fully implemented the recommendations that it (1) educate compliance officials and (2) improve the coverage of its inspections. Subsequent to the task force's inspections, EPA and the states inspected the facilities but did not detect the same pattern of violations. OSHA did not schedule further inspections for these facilities because the agency judges the relative health and safety risk of working at incineration facilities to be lower than the risk of working in other types of industries. Therefore, OSHA has assigned incinerators a low priority for inspections. EPA and OSHA have taken several actions beyond those recommended by the task force to protect health and safety at incineration facilities. However, one of these actions-OSHA's plan to require facilities to have accredited training programs for workers who handle hazardous waste-may not achieve its intended result because OSHA does not have a viable plan to ensure that all hazardous waste facilities submit their programs for accreditation.

GAO reported on (1) the extent to which transportation planners considered ecosystem conservation in planning, (2) the effects of such consideration, and (3) the factors that encourage or discourage such consideration. GAO contacted 36 planning agencies, as well as officials in 22 resource agencies that maintain ecological data and administer environmental laws. Their findings are detailed within this document.

"Although the probability of a domestic bioterrorist attack has been considered to be low, some characteristics of biological agents may make them appealing to terrorist. The information for the production of agents is readily available on the Internet, and the agents are relatively easy to grow and conceal. According to intelligence agencies, the possibility that terrorists may use chemical or biological materials may increase over the next decade." - Results in Brief, BIOTERRORISM: The National Preparedness & Activities Despite federal efforts, significant concerns exist regarding preparedness at the state and local levels. As a result, the Federal Government is involved in a range of research activities related to the public health and medical consequences of a bioterrorist attack on the civilian population. BIOTERRORISM: THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS & ACTIVITIES is part of studies being done to enable the rapid identification of biological agents in a variety of settings: to develop new vaccines, antibodies, and to improve treatment for infectious diseases caused by biological agents, including developing and testing emergency response equipment. The GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) is an agency that works for Congress and the American people. Congress asks GAO to study the programs and expenditures of the Federal Government. The GAO, commonly called the investigative arm of Congress or the "congressional watchdog," is independent and non-partisan. For information on the GAO and its activities, please visit: http: //www.gao.gov/index.html

Cutting off terrorists' funding is essential to deterring terrorist operations. The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to access and share financial information regarding terrorist investigations, but terrorists may have adjusted their activities by increasing use of alternative financial mechanisms.- Why GAO Did This Study, Terrorist FinancingThis report originally issued by the U.S. General Accounting Office finds that terrorists use many alternative-financing mechanisms to earn, move, and store assets. They earn assets by selling contraband cigarettes and illicit drugs, by misusing charitable organizations that collect large donations, and by other means.Topics in TERRORIST FINANCING include: .Terrorists use of various alternative financing mechanisms and the extent of use.Key U.S. government entities responsible for deterring terrorist financing.Challenges that impede U.S. monitoring of terrorists' use of financing mechanisms.U.S. Agency comments and evaluations, including conclusions and recommendations for U.S. Executive ActionIn conducting this review, the General Accounting Office examined and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies, including the Departments of Justice, the Treasury, Homeland Security, State, and Defense, as well as form the intelligence community. Also information was assessed information provided from various non-governmental organizations, industry and charitable associations, researchers in the field, and the United Nations.

This report details (1) the extent to which Mexican-domiciled commercial trucks are likely to travel beyond the U.S. border commercial zones once the border is fully opened, (2) U.S. government agencies' efforts to ensure that Mexican commercial carriers meet U.S. safety and emissions standards, and (3) how Mexican government and private sector efforts contribute to ensuring that Mexican commercial vehicles entering the United States meet U.S. safety and emissions standards. To address these objectives, we met with and obtained documents from a wide variety of officials from the U.S. and Mexican governments and industry representatives.

Report to the Secretary of Transportation detailing continued weaknesses in FAA Computer Security

This report details the case study approach supplemented by a review of FAA's and Department of Defense's (DOD) aviation safety oversight processes and related interdepartmental communication efforts to (1) examine different responses by FAA and DOD/military services to similar aviation safety concerns and (2) assess the processes used by FAA and DOD to communicate information about similar aviation safety concerns.