Der Band versammelt fruhe Aufsatze aus der Zeit von 1897 bis 1904, die ursprunglich vorwiegend in der Zeitschrift 'Mind' veroffentlicht wurden. Diese Schriften Moores werden bis heute in der philosophischen Diskussion immer wieder zitiert und haben ihre philosophische Aktualitat nicht verloren. Darunter befinden sich die Aufsatze: 'In welchem Sinn, wenn uberhaupt, existieren Vergangenheit und Zukunft?', 'Freiheit', 'Das Wesen des Urteils', 'Notwendigkeit', 'Der Wert der Religion', 'Identitat', 'McTaggarts Studies in Hegelian Cosmology ', 'Erfahrung und Empirismus', 'McTaggerts Ethik', und 'Kants Idealismus'."

Der vorliegende Band vereint Aufsatze Moores, die zwischen den Jahren 1903 und 1922 entstanden sind. Sie alle verdeutlichen Moores Bemuhen, vom common sense ausgehend Antworten auf die sich ihm stellenden philosophischen Probleme zu finden. Dabei kann sein Stil auch heute noch als Musterbeispiel an Einfachheit, Klarheit und Prazision gelten. Sein in diesem Band vorgelegtes Themenspektrum ist immens, und umfasst neben seiner beruhmten Kritik am Idealismus und diversen historischen Untersuchungen zur Philosophie David Humes und William James weitere Uberlegungen zu verschiedenen Problemstellungen der Metaphysik und Epistemologie. Abgerundet wird die Sammlung durch zwei metaethische Aufsatze, die nach der Moglichkeit intrinsischer Werte fragen und das Wesen grundlegender moralischer Begriffe zum Thema haben. Der Band eignet sich sowohl fur den Moore-Experten, der tiefere Einblicke in dessen philosophische Entwicklung erhalten mochte als auch den Studenten der Philosophie, der hier eine hervorragende Einfuhrung in die Denk- und Argumentationsmuster analytischen Philosophierens erhalt."

Der vorliegende Band ist die schriftliche Fassung einer Vorlesung, die Moore im Wintersemester 1910/11 an der Cambridge University als Einfuhrung in die Philosophie gehalten hat und erst 1956, zwei Jahre vor seinem Tod, veroffentlicht wurde. Nach einer ausfuhrlichen Erklarung dessen, was Philosophie uberhaupt ist, was der Gegenstand und die Aufgabe der Philosophie ist, fuhrt Moore im Ausgang von unseren sinnlichen Erfahrungen in das Gesamtgebiet der Philosophie ein. Behandelt werden Themen wie Existenz, materielle Dinge, Dinge in Raum und Zeit, Propositionen, Wissen und Erkennen, die Philosophie David Humes und weitere Themen. Der vorliegende Band ist sowohl fur Philosophiestudenten und interessierte Laien zur Einfuhrung in die Philosophie gut geeignet, als auch fur den philosophischen Experten, der sich eingehender mit Moores Philosophie beschaftigen mochte."

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PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Those of the papers in this volume, which have been previously published originally appeared as follows I. The Refutation of Idealism in Mind, N. S. Vol. xii, 1903. II. The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception in Pro ceedings oj the Aristotelian Society, 1905-6. III. Professor James Pragmatism in Proceedings of the Aris totelian Society, 1907-8. IV. Humes Philosophy in The New Quarterly, November, 1909. V. The Status of Sense-Data in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1913-14. VI. The Conception of Reality in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1917-18. VII. Some Judgments of Perception in Proceedings of the Aris totelian Society 1918-19. IX. External and Internal Relations in Proceedings of the ArisL telian Society, 1919-20. PREFACE ALL the papers contained in this volume, except the two ethical ones VIII and X, have been previously published and of tho e which have been previously published all, except that on External and Internal Relations IX, are here re-printed without change. They were written at various dates between 1903 and 1921, and all are here printed in the order in which they were written, except that VIII on The Conception of Intrinsic Value, which was written earlier than VI and VII, has been moved out of its proper place in order to bring it nearer to IX and X, to both of which it is closely related in subject. All, except IV and X, were primarily intended for an audience familiar with the writings of philosophers but I hope that they may nevertheless prove intelligible even to those who have read little or no philosophy, since I make little use of technical terms, and, where I have clone so, have done my best to explain inordinary language exactly what I mean by them. The tone of X is . somewhat different from that of the res I, because it was written as a lecture for the Leicester J liilossphical Society, with regard to which I was informed that I must not assume any previous acquaintance with philosophy in most of the audience. It according bears marks throughout of the kind of audience for which it was intended. An attentive reader will easily discover that some of the views expressed in some of the papers are inconsistent with views expressed in others. The fact is that some of the views expressed in some of the earlier ones are views with which I no longer agree and I feel that some apology is needed for nevertheless republishing them exactly as they stood. In all cases, except one, my excuse is that the mistaken views in question are so embedded in the form and substance of the papers in which they occur, that it would have been impossible to correct them without practically substituting new papers for the old ones and that, in spite of these mistakes, the old papers, as they stand, still seem to me, on the whole, to say things which are worth saying in a form which, however defective it may viii Preface be, I doubt my own ability to improve upon. The only case in which I doubt whether this excuse applies is that of the first paper The Refutation of Idealism. This paper now appears to me to be very confused, as well as to embody a good many down-right mistakes so I am doubtful whether I ought tohave included it. But in this case I have another excuse namely that it is a paper to which a good many allusions have been made by contemporary writers on philosophy and I was told that, for some readers atall events, it would be a convenience that it should be reprinted along with the rest, if only for the sake of reference. I said above that the only one of the previously published papers, in which changes have been made, is IX on External and Internal Relations...

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES Those of the papers in this volume, which have been previously published originally appeared as follows I. The Refutation of Idealism in Mind, N. S. Vol. xii, 1903. II. The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception in Pro ceedings oj the Aristotelian Society, 1905-6. III. Professor James Pragmatism in Proceedings of the Aris totelian Society, 1907-8. IV. Humes Philosophy in The New Quarterly, November, 1909. V. The Status of Sense-Data in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1913-14. VI. The Conception of Reality in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1917-18. VII. Some Judgments of Perception in Proceedings of the Aris totelian Society 1918-19. IX. External and Internal Relations in Proceedings of the ArisL telian Society, 1919-20. PREFACE ALL the papers contained in this volume, except the two ethical ones VIII and X, have been previously published and of tho e which have been previously published all, except that on External and Internal Relations IX, are here re-printed without change. They were written at various dates between 1903 and 1921, and all are here printed in the order in which they were written, except that VIII on The Conception of Intrinsic Value, which was written earlier than VI and VII, has been moved out of its proper place in order to bring it nearer to IX and X, to both of which it is closely related in subject. All, except IV and X, were primarily intended for an audience familiar with the writings of philosophers but I hope that they may nevertheless prove intelligible even to those who have read little or no philosophy, since I make little use of technical terms, and, where I have clone so, have done my best to explain inordinary language exactly what I mean by them. The tone of X is . somewhat different from that of the res I, because it was written as a lecture for the Leicester J liilossphical Society, with regard to which I was informed that I must not assume any previous acquaintance with philosophy in most of the audience. It according bears marks throughout of the kind of audience for which it was intended. An attentive reader will easily discover that some of the views expressed in some of the papers are inconsistent with views expressed in others. The fact is that some of the views expressed in some of the earlier ones are views with which I no longer agree and I feel that some apology is needed for nevertheless republishing them exactly as they stood. In all cases, except one, my excuse is that the mistaken views in question are so embedded in the form and substance of the papers in which they occur, that it would have been impossible to correct them without practically substituting new papers for the old ones and that, in spite of these mistakes, the old papers, as they stand, still seem to me, on the whole, to say things which are worth saying in a form which, however defective it may viii Preface be, I doubt my own ability to improve upon. The only case in which I doubt whether this excuse applies is that of the first paper The Refutation of Idealism. This paper now appears to me to be very confused, as well as to embody a good many down-right mistakes so I am doubtful whether I ought tohave included it. But in this case I have another excuse namely that it is a paper to which a good many allusions have been made by contemporary writers on philosophy and I was told that, for some readers atall events, it would be a convenience that it should be reprinted along with the rest, if only for the sake of reference. I said above that the only one of the previously published papers, in which changes have been made, is IX on External and Internal Relations...

La philosophie de la connaissance - l'enquete classique qui consiste a chercher a definir la notion de connaissance et a etablir ses sources et ses limites - connait, depuis une trentaine d'annees, un essor important, principalement dans la tradition anglophone de philosophie analytique. En reprenant l'entreprise du Theetete, et en reponse au defi du sceptique cartesien, les philosophes contemporains ont formule des theories rivales de la connaissance, tantot internalistes, tantot externalistes, alors que les tentatives de reponse au trilemme d'Agrippa ont donne naissance au debat entre les theories fondationnalistes et coherentistes de la justification des croyances. Des formes renouvelees de scepticisme ont vu le jour, en meme temps que des reponses fondees sur le sens commun, dans la tradition de Reid et de Moore. A travers la subtilite des arguments, l'inventivite des exemples et la complexite des definitions qui les distinguent, ces theories renouvellent radicalement les interrogations classiques et en eclairent les presupposes. Ce recueil a ete concu pour permettre l'acces du lecteur francais a un ensemble de textes contemporains representatifs de ce domaine.