'Lloyd George at War, 1916-1918' provides a much needed re-evaluation of this charismatic prime minister's wartime leadership. Calling on a wide range of primary sources and focussing on Lloyd George's role in the war cabinet, Cassar compellingly argues that George's reputation as the "man who won the war" was wholly unmerited. Instead Cassar shows that Lloyd George's heavy handed leadership was often detrimental to the Allied cause. From his wholehearted support for the disastrous Nivelle offensive, to his pursuit of a peripheral strategy that diverted troops away from the critical theatre of war on the Western Front, Cassar shows that Lloyd George consistently bucked the advice of his generals in preference for ineffectual and dangerous military strategies. Cassar's approach also differs from that of other studies of Lloyd George by adopting a thematic approach in preference to a chronological narrative, thereby allowing a closer evaluation of Lloyd George's handling of complex issues.

'Lloyd George at War, 1916-1918' provides a much needed re-evaluation of this charismatic prime minister's wartime leadership. Calling on a wide range of primary sources and focussing on Lloyd George's role in the war cabinet, Cassar compellingly argues that George's reputation as the "man who won the war" was wholly unmerited. Instead Cassar shows that Lloyd George's heavy handed leadership was often detrimental to the Allied cause. From his wholehearted support for the disastrous Nivelle offensive, to his pursuit of a peripheral strategy that diverted troops away from the critical theatre of war on the Western Front, Cassar shows that Lloyd George consistently bucked the advice of his generals in preference for ineffectual and dangerous military strategies. Cassar's approach also differs from that of other studies of Lloyd George by adopting a thematic approach in preference to a chronological narrative, thereby allowing a closer evaluation of Lloyd George's handling of complex issues.

This book covers the tenure of Kitchener as Proconsul in Egypt in the years preceding the First World War. Based mostly on unpublished sources - including government records and private papers - it not only fills a gap in the life and career of Kitchener, the most famous soldier in Britain since Wellington, but it also deals with an important but practically unknown period in Egyptian history. George Cassar shows Kitchener to be an ardent imperialist, but one who had a sense of responsibility to the country he governed. Exchanging his field marshal's uniform for the dress of a statesman, he arrived in Egypt when British prestige was at a low point on account of his predecessor's policies. He restored political stability, created conditions that bolstered the economy, and introduced a wave of reforms. Kitchener as Proconsul of Egypt, 1911-1914 reveals how Kitchener's interest extended beyond Egypt, and how throughout these years he worked quietly to prepare the ground in an attempt to create an Arab Empire under Britain's suzerainty.

This book covers the tenure of Kitchener as Proconsul in Egypt in the years preceding the First World War. Based mostly on unpublished sources - including government records and private papers - it not only fills a gap in the life and career of Kitchener, the most famous soldier in Britain since Wellington, but it also deals with an important but practically unknown period in Egyptian history. George Cassar shows Kitchener to be an ardent imperialist, but one who had a sense of responsibility to the country he governed. Exchanging his field marshal's uniform for the dress of a statesman, he arrived in Egypt when British prestige was at a low point on account of his predecessor's policies. He restored political stability, created conditions that bolstered the economy, and introduced a wave of reforms. Kitchener as Proconsul of Egypt, 1911-1914 reveals how Kitchener's interest extended beyond Egypt, and how throughout these years he worked quietly to prepare the ground in an attempt to create an Arab Empire under Britain's suzerainty.

No campaign in the Great War has been the subject of such intense and prolonged attention and controversy as the one in the Dardanelles. The general perception is that it was an operation involving troops from Britain and the Empire. The role of the French is barely mentioned if at all. As junior partners the French contribution does not compare to that of the British, but it was nevertheless significant. Over the course of the ten-month operation, the French government sent to the Dardanelles six pre-dreadnought battleships, four cruisers, and a host of auxiliary vessels that included minesweepers and submarines. Additionally, it supplied a total of 79,000 troops, supported by artillery and high explosive shells. The purpose of this study is to concentrate on the activity of the French so as give a more rounded picture of the story. The main factor influencing the French decision to join the British-led expedition to the Dardanelles was to protect their interest in the Near East. France's economic and cultural ties in the Ottoman Empire were deep and of long standing, and it wanted to ensure that the British did not establish themselves in an area it coveted. Assuming that victory was a forgone conclusion, the Allies focused their early attention on the future dismemberment of Turkey rather than on attending to the needs of the campaign itself. It was a lesson for which they would pay dearly. The French were involved in the major naval attack on 18 March 1915 during which they engaged the Turkish forts at close range and, in the process, the battleship Bouvet ran into an undetected minefield and sank with the loss of over 600 of its crew. The failure of the Allied ships to force a passage through the straits prompted the British to send in the army to seize control of the Gallipoli Peninsula. In the first landing on 25 April, British and Australian forces managed to secure the beaches but were unable to advance far inland. By contrast the French contingent's feint at Kum Cale achieved its purpose, as it was intended to delay Turkish Asiatic troops from crossing the waterway to reinforce their comrades on the peninsula during the early clash of battle. Thereafter French forces were transferred to Cape Helles and placed at the eastern end of the British line, where their efforts in the three battles of Krithia were thwarted by the terrible configuration of the ground, compounded by flanking fire from the enemy batteries in Asia. In all the military action, the number of French killed, wounded or missing in action was placed at 27,000, disproportionately higher than the British (70,000). The French were content to play second fiddle until August when, frustrated at the lack of progress on the western front, they decided to augment their forces in the Dardanelles where they would play a commanding role and spearhead the next offensive. The government's objective touched off a sharp struggle with General Joffre who objected to the withdrawal of major forces from his front. At length the government found the courage to overrule Joffre, but just as the troops were ready to leave for the Dardanelles, the Central Powers attacked Serbia. Almost overnight, the French cabinet reversed its decision and instead proposed to transfer its troops to the Balkans to assist Serbia, without consulting London. The French did not have enough troops to complete the mission and consequently tried to browbeat the British to follow suit. The British already had their hands full with commitments elsewhere and were adamantly opposed to becoming involved in another operation, especially one which they judged was doomed to fail. They held out for weeks but ultimately gave way to avoid straining, or even possibly fracturing, the Alliance. Lacking the resources to sustain two fronts in the east, the British were compelled to evacuate the Gallipoli Peninsula which remarkably was carried out without the loss of a single man.

The importance of the Italian front in the First World War is often overlooked. Nor is it realised that British troops fought in Italy. The Forgotten Front demonstrates Italy's vital contribution to the Allied effort, including Lloyd George's plan to secure overall victory by an offensive on this front. Although his grand scheme was frustrated, British troops were committed to the theatre and played a real part in holding the Italian line and in the final victory of 1918. George H. Cassar, in an account that is original, scholarly and readable, covers both the strategic considerations and the actual fighting.
Faced by stalemate on the Western Front, Lloyd George argued strongly in 1917 for a joint Allied campaign in Italy to defeat Austria-Hungary. Knocking Germany's principal ally out of the war would lead in turn to the collapse of Germany itself. While his plan had real attractions, it also begged many questions. These allowed Haig and Robertson to join the French high command to thwarting it. The disastrous Italian defeat at Caporetto in October 1917 led, however, to the deployment of a British corps in Italy under Sir Herbert Plumer, which bolstered the Italians at a critical juncture. Subsequently led by the Earl of Cavan, British troops fought gallantly at the battle of Asiago in February to March 1918 and contributed significantly to the final defeat of Austria-Hungary at Vittorio Veneto in October.

Asquith was at the pinnacle of his success when the course of his life and that of his country was changed by the outbreak of the First World War. Instead of being over by Christmas 1914, the war became a stalemate, with opposing trenches extending from the Channel coast to the Swiss border. During the initial stages of the war Asquith's oratory, tact and skill, combined with his imperturbability and prestige, made him indispensable. As the war dragged on, his failure to show the ruthlessness needed to win at any cost made him ill-suited to direct the nation in total war. In December 1916 Asquith was manoeuvred out of Downing Street by Lloyd George. Asquith as War Leader is the first comprehensive study of this exceptionally talented Prime Minister's war record. In a thorough examination of British war policy, with its evolutionary shifts and internal dissensions, George H. Cassar has defined the precise nature of Asquith's involvement and responsibility. He describes Asquith's part in bringing Britain into the war, in shaping war aims and strategy, and in mobilising the nation's resources. Because he was not the Prime Minister who won in 1918, Asquith's achievements in dealing with the problems of fighting a war on an unprecedented scale have been insufficiently recognised.

On 22 April 1915, the men of the 1st Canadian Division faced chlorine gas, a new lethal weapon against which they had no defence. In defiance of a particularly horrible death, or, at the very least, severe lung injury, these untested Canadians fought almost continuously for four days, often hand-to-hand, as they clung stubbornly against overwhelming odds to a vital part of the Allied line after the French units on their left fled in panic. By doing so, they saved 50,000 troops in the Ypres salient from almost certain destruction, and, in addition, prevented the momentum of the war from tipping in favour of the Germans. In this new, deeply researched account, the distinguished military historian George H. Cassar skillfully blends into the history of the battle the graphic and moving words of the men on the front line. Illustrated with outstanding photographs and numerous maps, and drawing from diaries, letters, and documents from every level of planning, Hell in Flanders Fields is an authoritative, gripping drama of politics, strategy, and human courage.

Without the advantage of birth or social connections, Horatio Herbert Kitchener rose rapidly in the Army, from obscure subaltern to the most acclaimed soldier in Britain. In August 1914, in the hour of his country's greatest need, he dutifully responded to the call to serve as secretary for war. George Cassar's study focuses on Kitchener's role in recognizing and framing the larger issues of the war facing his countrymen and the Allies. From the beginning he appreciated the complexities and demands of the global conflict, understanding that it would last at least three years and require the deployment of a mass army. His recruiting campaign, highlighted by the famous poster"Your Country Needs You," brought in nearly three million volunteers, a feat that no other belligerent nation came close to matching. Kitchener's strategy was twofold. First, to defeat Germany and preserve Britain's independ-ence, Kitchener understood that the key to victory was to treat the western and eastern fronts as one. Thus he worked closely with, and supplied armaments to, the Russian army, while pursuing careful attrition in France. His second aim was to enhance the security of Britain and its empire in a postwar world, not just against enemies but also against allies. Drawing upon a variety of unpublished sources, ranging from government documents to the private papers of leading generals and politicians, the author sheds new light on Kitchener's controversial role in the Dardanelles campaign and the munitions crisis, his efforts to organize an Arab revolt against Turkey, his supervision of operations in Africa, and his relations with colleagues and Allied leaders. This highly readable book refutes many myths about Kitchener, which his detractors circulated after his death in 1916, and makes a powerful case that without his leadership the Entente would not have won the war.