In Kant and Theodicy: A Search for an Answer to the Problem of Evil, George Huxford proves that Kant's engagement with theodicy was career-long and not confined to his short 1791 treatise that dealt explicitly with the subject. Huxford treats Kant's developing thought on theodicy in three periods: pre-Critical (exploration), early-Critical (transition), and late-Critical (conclusion). Illustrating the advantage of approaching Kant through this framework, Huxford argues that Kant's stance developed through his career into his own unique authentic theodicy; Kant rejected philosophical theodicies based on theoretical/speculative reason but advanced authentic theodicy grounded in practical reason, finding a middle ground between philosophical theodicy and fideism, both of which he rejected. Nevertheless, Huxford concludes that Kant's authentic theodicy fails because it fails to meet his own definition of a theodicy.

In Kant and Theodicy: A Search for an Answer to the Problem of Evil, George Huxford proves that Kant's engagement with theodicy was career-long and not confined to his short treatise of 1791, On the Failure of All Attempted Philosophical Theodicies, which dealt explicitly with the subject. Huxford treats Kant's developing thought on theodicy in three periods, each with its own special character: pre-Critical (exploration), early-Critical (transition), and late-Critical (conclusion). Illustrating the advantage of approaching Kant through this innovative route, Huxford argues that Kant's stance developed through his career, from an essentially Leibnizian starting point to his own unique authentic theodicy; Kant rejected so-called philosophical theodicies based on theoretical/speculative reason but advanced authentic theodicy grounded in practical reason, finding a middle ground between philosophical theodicy and fideism, both of which he rejected; Kant's work in natural science and his Critical epistemology served to constrain his theodicy; and Metaphysical Evil conceived as limitation and Kant's Radical Evil perform the same function, namely providing the ground for the possibility of moral evil in the world. nevertheless, Huxford concludes that Kant's authentic theodicy fails because it fails to meet his own definition of a theodicy.