First published in 1982, this book explores how Khrushchev and Brezhnev manipulated their policies and personal images as they attempted to consolidate their authority as leader. Central issues of Soviet domestic politics are examined: investment priorities, incentive policy, administrative reform, and political participation. The author rejects the conventional images of Khrushchev as an embattled consumer advocate and decentraliser, and of Brezhnev's leadership as dull and conservative. He looks at how they dealt with the task of devising programs that combined the post-Stalin elite's goals of consumer satisfaction and expanded political participation with traditional Soviet values.

Examining the strategies employed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin to build leadership authority, George Breslauer focuses on the power of ideas, as leaders use them to mobilize support and to craft an image as effective problem solvers, indispensable consensus builders, and symbols of national unity. Throughout the book, Breslauer compares Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and Khrushchev and Brezhnev, analyzing the changes in policy, the strategies, and the political dilemmas that are common to all four administrations. He addresses such questions as: Could Yeltsin have pursued a more beneficial path to a market economy, despite Western advisors and actions of the International Monetary Fund? For the chapters about Gorbachev, Breslauer was able to interview former members of the leader's politburo, including those who plotted Gorbachev's overthrow. Interested in how leaders make changes, Breslauer looks at how these leaders justified their actions and outflanked their opponents. Breslauer sheds new light on the end of Soviet communism and Russia's transition to a market economy. George W. Breslauer, is Dean of Social Sciences and Professor at the University of California, Berkeley. He has written and edited ten books about Soviet and post-Soviet politics and foreign policy, including Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton University Press, 1996) and Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982). In 1998, he was awarded the Chancellor's Professorship for combining excellence in research, teaching, and university service and was most recently appointed Dean of Social Sciences at Berkeley.

Few regions of the world are as politically turbulent as the Middle East, and nowhere is the potential for superpower conflict greater. How does the Soviet Union view the Middle east conflict? Can the USSR play a constructive role in the peace process? In this volume, first published in 1990, these questions and others central to an understanding of Soviet strategy in the region are addressed. Previous analysts of Soviet-Middle Eastern relations have tended to emphasize either the cooperative or the competitive aspects of Soviet behaviour. Breslauer instead offers the multidimensional concept of 'collaborative competition' to describe the mixed motives, ambivalence, and sometimes conflicting perspectives that have informed Soviet strategy in the region. In such an unstable environment. this strategy of collaborative competition has in turn encouraged 'approach-avoidance' behaviour; for example, while the Soviets may seek to moderate their radical allies, they remain fearful that these allies, once moderated, might defect to US patronage. Under Gorbachev, the Kremlin continues to pursue this same strategy but with increased attention to improving collaboration, redefining the nature of the competition, and easing the approach-avoidance dilemma. Breslauer argues that these changes could lead to more flexible Soviet behaviour in the region. This volume combines new, in-depth research on Soviet policy with new interpretations, including insights drawn from relevant theories of international relations.

Few regions of the world are as politically turbulent as the Middle East, and nowhere is the potential for superpower conflict greater. How does the Soviet Union view the Middle east conflict? Can the USSR play a constructive role in the peace process? In this volume, first published in 1990, these questions and others central to an understanding of Soviet strategy in the region are addressed. Previous analysts of Soviet-Middle Eastern relations have tended to emphasize either the cooperative or the competitive aspects of Soviet behaviour. Breslauer instead offers the multidimensional concept of 'collaborative competition' to describe the mixed motives, ambivalence, and sometimes conflicting perspectives that have informed Soviet strategy in the region. In such an unstable environment. this strategy of collaborative competition has in turn encouraged 'approach-avoidance' behaviour; for example, while the Soviets may seek to moderate their radical allies, they remain fearful that these allies, once moderated, might defect to US patronage. Under Gorbachev, the Kremlin continues to pursue this same strategy but with increased attention to improving collaboration, redefining the nature of the competition, and easing the approach-avoidance dilemma. Breslauer argues that these changes could lead to more flexible Soviet behaviour in the region. This volume combines new, in-depth research on Soviet policy with new interpretations, including insights drawn from relevant theories of international relations.

First published in 1982, this book explores how Khrushchev and Brezhnev manipulated their policies and personal images as they attempted to consolidate their authority as leader. Central issues of Soviet domestic politics are examined: investment priorities, incentive policy, administrative reform, and political participation. The author rejects the conventional images of Khrushchev as an embattled consumer advocate and decentraliser, and of Brezhnev's leadership as dull and conservative. He looks at how they dealt with the task of devising programs that combined the post-Stalin elite's goals of consumer satisfaction and expanded political participation with traditional Soviet values.

A concise, readable, and novel interpretation of the history of communist states. Sixteen states came to be ruled by communist parties during the 20th century. One, the Soviet Union, was geographically the largest nation in the world and a superpower. Another, China, had the world's largest population. At communism's high point, its adherents envisioned global triumph. Today, however, only five communist regimes remain in power. Why? In The Rise and Demise of World Communism, George Breslauer, a specialist who has spent decades observing the evolution of communist states, provides a sweeping history of the world communist movement, focusing in particular on what communist states shared in common and why they began to differ from each other over time. Throughout, Breslauer explores the relations among communist states as well as the relations between those states and the world of increasingly affluent, and militarily formidable, democratic-capitalist powers. He finds that these regimes all came to power in the context of warfare or its aftermath, followed by the consolidation of power by a revolutionary elite that valued "revolutionary violence" as the preferred means to an end, based upon Marx's vision of apocalyptic revolution and Lenin's conception of party organization. As Breslauer shows, all these regimes went on to "build socialism" according to a Stalinist template and were initially dedicated to "anti-imperialist struggle" as members of a world communist movement. But their common features gave way to diversity, difference, and defiance after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953. For many reasons, and in many ways, those differences soon blew apart the world communist movement and eventually led to the collapse of European communism. Even though a few communist regimes still remain in power, the dream of world communism is dead. But the future of the remaining communist regimes is uncertain. An accessible history of one of the most important political phenomena of the past 150 years, The Rise and Demise of World Communism provides readers with a crisp account of the entire movement-from the theories of Marx and Lenin to the on-the-ground policies of Stalin, Mao, Gorbachev, Deng, and other communist leaders-that culminates in our own era.

Examining the strategies employed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin to build leadership authority, George Breslauer focuses on the power of ideas, as leaders use them to mobilize support and to craft an image as effective problem solvers, indispensable consensus builders, and symbols of national unity. Throughout the book, Breslauer compares Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and Khrushchev and Brezhnev, analyzing the changes in policy, the strategies, and the political dilemmas that are common to all four administrations. He addresses such questions as: Could Yeltsin have pursued a more beneficial path to a market economy, despite Western advisors and actions of the International Monetary Fund? For the chapters about Gorbachev, Breslauer was able to interview former members of the leader's politburo, including those who plotted Gorbachev's overthrow. Interested in how leaders make changes, Breslauer looks at how these leaders justified their actions and outflanked their opponents. Breslauer sheds new light on the end of Soviet communism and Russia's transition to a market economy. George W. Breslauer, is Dean of Social Sciences and Professor at the University of California, Berkeley. He has written and edited ten books about Soviet and post-Soviet politics and foreign policy, including Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (Princeton University Press, 1996) and Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders (London: Allen and Unwin, 1982). In 1998, he was awarded the Chancellor's Professorship for combining excellence in research, teaching, and university service and was most recently appointed Dean of Social Sciences at Berkeley.