Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was one of the most significant political leaders of the twentieth century. He rose from obscure origins to become the founder of the new Republic of Turkey out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire and go on to radically transform Turkish society. How should one understand Atatürk and his legacy? In this book, George Gawrych studies Atatürk’s career in detail, showing how Atatürk married the traits of the classic military man-of-action with those of the intellectual, theorist and pragmatist as a statesman. Gawrych places Atatürk in the context of his times to reveal how he harnessed wider forces to set Turkey on a path of secular nationalism and comprehensive modernization. His legacy can be seen everywhere in Turkey today, from the role and rights of women in society to the struggle for developing a democracy in the Republic. Gawrych addresses the costs of Atatürk’s policies, including the suppression of minorities and the imposition of a cult of personality and authoritarian rule in the name of ‘Turkification’. The book presents a nuanced analysis of a complex figure who consciously created a living legacy that still casts a shadow over Turkey’s political and intellectual discourse.

By 1990, the Cold War was over and many Americans talked of the "peace dividend" that would befall the country once military spending and commitments could be reduced in what some referred to as the New World Order. Instead, world affairs proved as dangerous and intractable as ever, even more so perhaps than during the period 1945-1990 when the two competing superpowers managed to hold various tribal, ethnic, religious, and political conflicts around the world somewhat in check. Driving home how dangerous the world remained in the 1990s, the US military found itself fighting one major war, Operation Desert Storm, and participating in a variety of other military activities, including three major interventions: Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. The Combat Studies Institute has published scholarly accounts of the Gulf War (Lucky War), the Somalian venture ("My Clan Against the World"), and the involvement in Haiti (Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion"). The publication of Armed Peacekeepers in Bosnia adds another case study to the Institute's coverage of these post-Cold War US military operations. With the aid of a generous grant from the US Institute of Peace, Robert Baumann, George Gawrych, and Walter Kretchik were able to access and examine relevant documents, interview numerous participants, and visit US and NATO forces in Bosnia. As a result of their labors, they have provided the reader an analytical narrative that covers the background to the crisis in Bosnia, the largely ineffectual efforts of the UN Protection Force to stop the civil war there between 1992 and 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 that produced a framework for ending the civil war and consolidating the peace, the frenetic planning that led to the deployment of US forces as part of the NATO-led multinational force (Operation Joint Endeavor), and the transition of that Implementation Force to the Stabilization Force a year later. The authors shed light on several of the critical military lessons that have emerged from the US experience in Bosnia-an involvement that continues as of this writing. In general, these cover the cooperation and contention present in virtually any coalition undertaking; the complexity of the local situation and the way in which strictly military tasks have political, social, economic, and cultural ramifications that the military cannot ignore or avoid; the inevitable adjustments peacekeepers have to make to dynamic and precarious situations; and the often unaccommodating role history plays when confronted with concerns about force protection, "mission creep," "end states," and early exits. In Bosnia, as in countless other operations, a US military force trained and equipped to fight a highly technological, conventional war found itself making adjustments that resulted in performing tasks that many officers considered unconventional and unorthodox. The ability to make these adjustments and to perform these tasks has thus far leant to the success of the US/NATO involvement in Bosnia. Now the United States is engaged in the Global War on Terror and, in the process, has already embarked on stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The case of Bosnia is, of course, unique but the general lessons it provides are relevant to US officers fighting in the current war and should not be overlooked.

The authors were able to access and examine relevant documents, interview numerous participants, and visit U.S. and NATO forces in Bosnia in order to provide readers with an analytical narrative that covers the background to the crisis in Bosnia, the largely ineffectual efforts of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to stop the civil war there between 1992 and 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 that produced a framework for ending the civil war and consolidating the peace, the frenetic planning that led to the deployment of U.S. forces as part of the NATO-led multinational force (Operation Joint Endeavor), and the transition of that Implementation Force (IFOR) to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) a year later. The authors shed light on several of the critical military lessons that have emerged from the U.S. experience in Bosnia.

Published by the Combat Studies Institute Press."With the aid of a generous grant from the US Institute of Peace, Robert Baumann, George Gawrych, and Walter Kretchik were able to access and examine relevant documents, interview numerous participants, and visit US and NATO forces in Bosnia. As a result of their labors, they have provided the reader an analytical narrative that covers the background to the crisis in Bosnia, the largely ineffectual efforts of the UN Protection Force to stop the civil war there between 1992 and 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 that produced a framework for ending the civil war and consolidating the peace, the frenetic planning that led to the deployment of US forces as part of the NATO-led multinational force (Operation Joint Endeavor), and the transition of that Implementation Force to the Stabilization Force a year later."

The essays in this volume on the subject of equality are the work of scholars at Bard College and West Point. Their research falls within the areas of history, religion, legal theory, social science, ethics and philosophy. The regions covered include the Middle and Far East, Europe, and America; the time periods studied are both contemporary and historical. Each essay is a well-detailed exploration which assumes the reader has no prior acquaintance with the topic. Together, the studies reveal both conflicting standards of equality as well as patterns of pernicious inequality. In an ideal world, equality and inequality among humans would vary in acceptable proportion, increase of the one ensuring decrease of the other. Unfortunately, as the studies illustrate, any such expectation of progress in the real world is almost routinely thwarted. Despite the wide variety of topics, a common thread binds these essays. Human nature seems to harbor a moral deficiency lying deeper than any written laws and those traditional customs which promote inequality and breed injustice. The fault is prominent in those who champion unjust laws or who willingly enforce discrimination but it is no less active in the silent many who condone the practice. The essays reveal the same persistent and unappealing trait which social groups from the remote past to the present manifest in various ways: blind determination to perpetuate whatever advantages one group believes it enjoys over another, convinced that its own members are more equal than theirs. Being made unequal, the others too easily become targets who are considered less worthy, sometimes even less human.

Mustafa Kemal - latterly and better known as Ataturk - is without doubt the towering figure of modern Turkish history. But what was his path to power? And how did his early career as a soldier in the Ottoman army affect his later decisions as President? The Young Ataturk tracks the lesser covered period of Kemal's life - from the War of Independence to the founding of the Republic - and shows that it is only by understanding Kemal's military career that one can fully comprehend how he evolved as one of the twentieth century's most extraordinary statesmen. Delving into Kemal's military writings, orders, and political decisions, speeches, proclamations and private correspondences, this book provides a rounded and nuanced portrait of the making of a major statesman.

In 1967, the Israeli Defense Forces defeated the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in a mere six days. This remarkable military accomplishment would, however, have the ultimate effect of creating an albatross around the neck of the Israeli Army, as Israelis would now expect the next conventional war with the Arabs to achieve similar results: a quick, decisive victory with relatively few casualties. Although Egyptian forces were militarily inferior to those of Israel, President Anwar Sadat developed a successful limited war strategy designed to exploit this unrealistic expectation. Rather than aiming to achieve a military victory or to seize strategic terrain, Sadat merely sought to break a diplomatic stalemate with a major military operation designed to soften Israeli intransigence toward negotiations and to force a change in U.S. foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. In support of these political aims, the Egyptian Armed Forces set out to discredit the Israeli Army's prowess by inflicting heavy casualties in a limited war. Sadat's success in regaining the entire Sinai without another armed struggle holds an important lesson for the United States. After its dramatic victory in Desert Storm, American armed forces feel compelled to win the next conventional war quickly, decisively, and with relatively few casualties, much like the challenge that faced Israel after the 1967 war.