This concise volume guides public health advocates on how to successfully advocate for their cause, strengthen their messaging and communication strategies, build coalitions, and gather political allies. In the book, the author shares lessons learned from an exploratory study in which key legislators from the Massachusetts General Court (legislature) were interviewed to determine their level of awareness and knowledge regarding health disparities. Racial and ethnic disparities in health are a major concern for citizens, states, and the nation and are important to study and understand to strategically address and eliminate such inequities. Through these lessons, public health advocates gain an understanding of whether and how factors affect knowledge and awareness of health disparities and learn to communicate more effectively with legislators, key stakeholders, and other decision-makers. The brief also features "Notes from the Field" from those working in the "trenches" that highlight different perspectives on health disparities and provide first-hand advice for advocates hoping to close the disparities gaps and create a more equitable nation for all. Successful Public Health Advocacy is a relevant resource for advocates, as well as students, in public health, public policy, and related fields who wish to gain a better understanding on how legislators gather their health information for policy-making or constituent work and apply this data to develop and implement effective public health advocacy campaigns.

The academic biomedical research community is a hub of employment, economic productivity, and scientific progress. Academic research institutions are drivers of economic development in their local and state economies and, by extension, the national economy. Beyond the economic input that the academic biomedical research community both receives and provides, it generates knowledge that in turn affects society in myriad ways. The United States has experienced and continues to face the threat of disasters, and, like all entities, the academic biomedical research community can be affected. Recent disasters, from hurricanes to cyber-attacks, and their consequences have shown that the investments of the federal government and of the many other entities that sponsor academic research are not uniformly secure. First and foremost, events that damage biomedical laboratories and the institutions that house them can have impacts on the safety and well-being of humans and research animals. Furthermore, disasters can affect career trajectories, scientific progress, and financial stability at the individual and institutional levels. Strengthening the Disaster Resilience of the Academic Biomedical Research Community offers recommendations and guidance to enhance the disaster resilience of the academic biomedical research community, with a special focus on the potential actions researchers, academic research institutions, and research sponsors can take to mitigate the impact of future disasters. Table of Contents Front Matter Summary PART I: OVERVIEW OF DISASTERS AND THE ACADEMIC BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH COMMUNITY 1 The Academic Biomedical Research Community - Vital to the Nation 2 Impacts of Prior Disasters on the Academic Biomedical Research Community 3 Defining the Academic Biomedical Research Community in the Context of Disaster Resilience PART II: THE PROCESS FOR ADVANCING DISASTER RESILENCE 4 Foundations in Community Resilience and the National Preparedness System 5 Prevention, Protection, and Mitigation Planning 6 Response and Recovery Planning PART III: SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS 7 Disaster Resilience and Animal Research Programs 8 A Resilient Built Environment for the Research Enterprise 9 Funding a Resilient Mission 10 The Essential Role of Research Sponsors APPENDIXES Appendix A: Study Methods Appendix B: Partnerships and Peer Networks Appendix C: Laws, Regulations, and Standards Related to Academic Research Institutions and Disaster Resilience Appendix D: Guidance Documents Appendix E: Florida International University: Disaster Resilience and Hurricane Matthew Appendix F: Committee Biographical Sketches

To mitigate the risks posed by microbial threats of public health significance originating abroad, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) places small groups of staff at major U.S. airports. These staff, their offices, and their patient isolation rooms constitute quarantine stations, which are run by CDC's Division of Global Migration and Quarantine (DGMQ). Congress began to allocate funds in fiscal 2003 for the establishment of new quarantine stations at 17 major U.S. ports of entry that comprise airports, seaports, and land-border crossings. In a significant departure from the recent past, both the preexisting 8 quarantine stations and the new 17 are expected to play an active, anticipatory role in nationwide biosurveillance. Consequently, DGMQ asked the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to convene an expert committee to assess the present CDC quarantine stations and recommend how they should evolve to meet the challenges posed by microbial threats at the nation's gateways. DGMQ specifically requested "an assessment of the role of the federal quarantine stations, given the changes in the global environment including large increases in international travel, threats posed by bioterrorism and emerging infections, and the movement of animals and cargo." To conduct this assessment and provide recommendations, IOM convened, in October 2004, the Committee on Measures to Enhance the Effectiveness of the CDC Quarantine Station Expansion Plan for U.S. Ports of Entry. At the sponsor's request, the committee released the interim letter report Human Resources at U.S. Ports of Entry to Protect the Public's Health in January 2005 to provide preliminary suggestions for the priority functions of a modern quarantine station, the competences necessary to carry out those functions, and the types of health professionals who have the requisite competences (Appendix A). This, the committee's final report, assesses the present role of the CDC quarantine stations and articulates a vision of their future role as a public health intervention. Table of Contents Front Matter Executive Summary 1 Introduction 2 Context and Content of the CDC Quarantine Station Expansion Plan 3 Today's CDC Quarantine Stations at U.S. Ports of Entry 4 Bridge from Present to Future: Vision and Recommendations Appendix A: Human Resources at U.S. Ports of Entry to Protect the Public's Health: Interim Letter Report Appendix B: Agendas of Open Sessions of Committee Meetings Appendix C: Methodology Used by the Division of Global Migration and Quarantine to Select Sites for New Quarantine Stations Appendix D: Commissioned Paper on US Seaports and the CDC Quarantine Station System Appendix E: Microbial Threats of Public Health Significance Originating in Animals or Animal Products at U.S. Ports of Entry Appendix F: International Legal Considerations for the Quarantine Station Expansion Appendix G: Excerpts from a Standard Memorandum of Agreement Between CDC and Local Hospitals Appendix H: Committee Biographies

A nuclear attack on a large U.S. city by terrorists-even with a low-yield improvised nuclear device (IND) of 10 kilotons or less-would cause a large number of deaths and severe injuries. The large number of injured from the detonation and radioactive fallout that would follow would be overwhelming for local emergency response and health care systems to rescue and treat, even assuming that these systems and their personnel were not themselves incapacitated by the event. The United States has been struggling for some time to address and plan for the threat of nuclear terrorism and other weapons of mass destruction that terrorists might obtain and use. The Department of Homeland Security recently contracted with the Institute of Medicine to hold a workshop, summarized in this volume, to assess medical preparedness for a nuclear detonation of up to 10 kilotons. This book provides a candid and sobering look at our current state of preparedness for an IND, and identifies several key areas in which we might begin to focus our national efforts in a way that will improve the overall level of preparedness. Table of Contents Front Matter Workshop Report Appendix A: Workshop Agendas Appendix B: Registered Workshop Attendees Appendix C: Biographical Sketches of Workshop Speakers and Panelists Appendix D: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members, Consultant, and Staff