This broad, balanced introduction to organizational studies enables the reader to compare and contrast different approaches to the study of organizations. This book is a valuable tool for the reader, as we are all intertwined with organizations in one form or another. Numerous other disciplines besides sociology are addressed in this book, including economics, political science, strategy and management theory. Topic areas discussed in this book are the importance of organizations; defining organizations; organizations as rational, natural, and open systems; environments, strategies, and structures of organizations; and organizations and society. For those employed in fields where knowledge of organizational theory is necessary, including sociology, anthropology, cognitive psychology, industrial engineering, managers in corporations and international business, and business strategists.

Frank Kearns was the go-to guy at CBS News for dangerous stories in Africa and the Middle East in the 1950s, '60s, and early '70s. By his own account, he was nearly killed 114 times. He took stories that nobody else wanted to cover and was challenged to get them on the air when nobody cared about this part of the world. But his stories were warning shots for conflicts that play out in the headlines today. In 1957, Senator John Kennedy described America's view of the Algerian war for independence as the Eisenhower Administration's "head in the sand policy." So CBS News decided to find out what was really happening there and to determine where Algeria's war for independence fit into the game plan for the Cold War. They sent Frank Kearns to find out. Kearns took with him cameraman Yousef ("Joe") Masraff and 400 pounds of gear, some of which they shed, and hiked with FLN escorts from Tunisia, across a wide "no-man's land," and into the Aures Mountains of eastern Algeria, where the war was bloodiest. They carried no passports or visas. They dressed as Algerians. They refused to bear weapons. And they knew that if captured, they would be executed and left in unmarked graves. But their job as journalists was to seek the truth whatever it might turn out to be. This is Frank Kearns's diary.

The growing strategic demand for joint capability, and the expectation of less defense spending to acquire this capability, leads many to say that we need more joint acquisition programs. However, the 'joint acquisition' process is not always the most efficient way in which to develop and procure these capabilities. Historically, we have not fully realized the expected benefits from our joint acquisition programs. In fact, we have seen joint programs with troubled schedules and performance. While there have been some successful joint acquisition programs, many face several pitfalls not common to single service acquisition efforts. This paper looks at the history of jointness and joint programs within the acquisition community, some of the pitfalls of joint programs and also provides examples of joint programs that have struggled with these pitfalls. It argues the case that the single service acquisition process can provide capabilities that are interoperable within a joint environment. Ultimately, if we are going to continue forcing the use of the joint acquisition process, the paper provides some recommended changes that will set the conditions early for success and provide greater probability that we can gain the projected benefits of joint acquisition programs.