Drawing on records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, this work focuses on Britain's role in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna, and British policy towards the Soviet Union and its satellites. British reactions to detente between the superpowers are charted.

This volume documents the British Government's response from mid-1946 to early 1948 to the twin challenges of economic recovery and the search for a meaningful Western security framework in the face of the increasing polarisation of Europe into Eastern and Western spheres of influence. Although relations between the wartime Big Three allies, the UK, US and USSR, had begun to fracture even before the end of hostilities in 1945, it was during 1947 that the postwar division of Europe became sufficiently alarming to prompt decisive action, under American and British leadership, to promote European economic reconstruction and thereby increase Western security. American leadership took the form of two initiatives, enabled by US economic and military strength: the Truman Doctrine for aid to Greece and Turkey, announced in March 1947, and the Economic Recovery Programme or Marshall Plan, first proposed in June 1947. British leadership, under the personal direction of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, was shown in two ways: in articulating Western Europe's need for US help in a way that enabled it to be recognised and then accepted; and in helping to coordinate the European response to the US initiatives to maximise their effectiveness. Documentation on the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan forms the core of the volume, but a wide range of material, including intelligence-related documents, has been chosen to illustrate the multiple challenges faced by the Attlee Government during this period. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, Cold War History, European History and International Relations.

The mysterious life and career of Desmond Morton, Intelligence officer and personal adviser to Winston Churchill during the Second World War, is exposed for the first time in this study based on full access to official records. After distinguished service as artillery officer and aide-de-camp to General Haig during the First World War, Morton worked for the Secret Intelligence Service from 1919-1934, and the fortunes of SIS in the interwar years are described here in unprecedented detail. As Director of the Industrial Intelligence Centre in the 1930s, Morton s warnings of Germany s military and industrial preparations for war were widely read in Whitehall, though they failed to accelerate British rearmament as much as Morton - and Churchill - considered imperative. Morton had met Churchill on the Western Front in 1916 and supported him throughout the wilderness years, moving to Downing Street as the Prime Minister s Intelligence adviser in May 1940. There he remained in a liaison role, with the Intelligence Agencies and with Allied resistance authorities, until the end of the war, when he became a troubleshooter for the Treasury in a series of tricky international assignments. Throughout Morton s career, myth, rumour and deliberate obfuscation have created a misleading picture of his role and influence. This book shines a light into many hitherto shadowy corners of British history in the first half of the twentieth century.

This book will be of great interest to scholars and informed lay readers with an interest in the Second World War, intelligence studies and the life of Winston Churchill.

The mysterious life and career of Desmond Morton (1891-1971), Intelligence officer and personal adviser to Winston Churchill during World War II, is exposed for the first time in this study based on full access to official records. After distinguished service as artillery officer and aide-de-camp to General Haig during World War I, Morton worked for the Secret Intelligence Service from 1919-1934, involved in fascinating operations against Bolshevik Russia and a resurgent Germany. The fortunes of SIS in the interwar years are described here in unprecedented detail. As Director of the Industrial Intelligence Centre in the 1930s, Morton's warnings of Germany's military and industrial preparations for war were widely read in Whitehall, though they failed to accelerate British rearmament as much as Morton-and Churchill-considered imperative. Morton had met Churchill on the Western Front in 1916 and supported him throughout the "wilderness years," moving to Downing Street as the Prime Minister's Intelligence adviser in May 1940. There he remained in a liaison role, with the intelligence Agencies and with Allied resistance authorities, until the end of the war, when he became a "troubleshooter" for the Treasury in a series of tricky international assignments. Throughout Morton's career, myth, rumor and deliberate obfuscation have created a misleading picture of his role and influence. The story of this "man of mystery" shines a light into many hitherto shadowy corners of British history in the first half of the 20th century. This book will be of great interest to scholars and informed lay readers with an interest in World War II, intelligence studies and the life of Winston Churchill.

This study draws on previously unpublished records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and other Whitehall Departments. It focuses on Britain's role in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Vienna, and British policy towards the Soviet Union and its East European satellites. British reactions to detente between the superpowers are charted, and the work reveals official unease over what this might mean for the future of Europe.

This volume documents the British Government's response from mid-1946 to early 1948 to the twin challenges of economic recovery and the search for a meaningful Western security framework in the face of the increasing polarisation of Europe into Eastern and Western spheres of influence. Although relations between the wartime Big Three allies, the UK, US and USSR, had begun to fracture even before the end of hostilities in 1945, it was during 1947 that the postwar division of Europe became sufficiently alarming to prompt decisive action, under American and British leadership, to promote European economic reconstruction and thereby increase Western security. American leadership took the form of two initiatives, enabled by US economic and military strength: the Truman Doctrine for aid to Greece and Turkey, announced in March 1947, and the Economic Recovery Programme or Marshall Plan, first proposed in June 1947. British leadership, under the personal direction of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, was shown in two ways: in articulating Western Europe's need for US help in a way that enabled it to be recognised and then accepted; and in helping to coordinate the European response to the US initiatives to maximise their effectiveness. Documentation on the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan forms the core of the volume, but a wide range of material, including intelligence-related documents, has been chosen to illustrate the multiple challenges faced by the Attlee Government during this period. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, Cold War History, European History and International Relations.

This is the story of one of the most enduring conspiracy theories in British politics, an intrigue that still has resonance almost a century later: the Zinoviev Letter of 1924. Almost certainly a forgery, no original has ever been traced, and even if genuine it was probably Soviet 'fake news'. Despite this, the Letter still haunts British politics nearly a century after it was written; it was the subject of major Whitehall investigations in the 1960s and 1990s, and cropped up in the media as recently as during the Referendum campaign and the 2017 general election. The Letter, encouraging the British proletariat to greater revolutionary fervour, was apparently sent by Grigori Zinoviev, head of the Bolshevik propaganda organization, to the British Communist Party in September 1924. Sent to London through British Secret Intelligence Service channels, it arrived during the general election campaign and was leaked to the press. The Letter's publication by the Daily Mail on 25 October 1924 just before the General Election humiliated the first ever British Labour government, headed by Ramsay MacDonald, when its political opponents used it to create a 'Red Scare' in the media. Labour blamed the Letter for its defeat, insisting there had been a right-wing Establishment conspiracy, and many in the Labour Party have never forgotten it. The Zinoviev Letter has long been a symbol of political dirty tricks and what we would now call 'fake news'. But it is also a gripping historical detective story of spies and secrets, fraud and forgery, international subversion and the nascent global conflict between communism and capitalism.

Former Whitehall insider Gill Bennett unravels the story of six crucial British foreign policy challenges since the Second World War, from the Korean War to the Falklands conflict, offering an inside account of episodes that shaped Britain's position in the world for decades to come - and in some cases still arouse controversy to this day. Lifting the lid on the making of British foreign policy from Clement Attlee to Margaret Thatcher, Bennett reveals each decision in a way that has never been done before: telling the story from the inside out and without hindsight. The result is a book that explains not just why these controversial decisions were taken, but one that shows us how history is actually made - and also just how difficult these big decisions really were. Gill Bennett considers exactly what ministers knew at the time; how personal experience, relationships, past events and prevailing circumstance influenced the decision-making process; and how the balance of history was tipped in each case: by argument, moral imperative, obligation - or even sheer force of personality.