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Neglected Virtues
Glen Pettigrove, Christine Swanton
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R1,290
Discovery Miles 12 900
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Ships in 12 - 17 working days
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Much of the work that has been done on virtue has been devoted to
getting virtue ethics a seat at the theoretical table. It has been
concerned with showing that virtue ethics can provide a
satisfactory account of right action to rival accounts offered by
consequentialism and deontology. This volume of essays explores the
nitty-gritty details of particular virtues. It includes original
contributions from a number of leading scholars in virtue ethics.
Most of the virtues discussed – such as ambition, cheerfulness,
creativity, magnificence, pride, wit, and wonder – have been
almost wholly neglected by contemporary ethicists. The volume also
includes coverage of other virtues that have received a fair amount
of attention in recent years, such as charity, hope, justice,
practical wisdom, and temperance. Here the essays address largely
ignored dimensions of these virtues and show how these discussions
can enrich our understanding of neglected virtues. Neglected
Virtues is a welcome addition to the scholarly literature on virtue
ethics. Its focus on individual virtues, while not meant to be
exhaustive, will open new avenues for future research in this
rapidly growing area of ethics and moral philosophy.
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of
Forgiveness brings into conversation research from multiple
disciplines, offering readers a comprehensive guide to current
forgiveness research. Its 42 chapters, newly commissioned from an
internationally acclaimed group of scholars, are divided into five
parts: Religious Traditions Historic Treatments The Nature of
Forgiveness Normative Issues Empirical Findings While the principal
aim of the handbook is to provide a guide to the philosophical
literature on forgiveness that, ideally, will inform the
psychological sciences in developing more philosophically accurate
measures and psychological treatments of forgiveness, the volume
will be of interest to students and researchers with a wide range
of disciplinary backgrounds, including philosophy, psychology,
theology, religious studies, classics, history, politics, law, and
education.
Much of the work that has been done on virtue has been devoted to
getting virtue ethics a seat at the theoretical table. It has been
concerned with showing that virtue ethics can provide a
satisfactory account of right action to rival accounts offered by
consequentialism and deontology. This volume of essays explores the
nitty-gritty details of particular virtues. It includes original
contributions from a number of leading scholars in virtue ethics.
Most of the virtues discussed - such as ambition, cheerfulness,
creativity, magnificence, pride, wit, and wonder - have been almost
wholly neglected by contemporary ethicists. The volume also
includes coverage of other virtues that have received a fair amount
of attention in recent years, such as charity, hope, justice,
practical wisdom, and temperance. Here the essays address largely
ignored dimensions of these virtues and show how these discussions
can enrich our understanding of neglected virtues. Neglected
Virtues is a welcome addition to the scholarly literature on virtue
ethics. Its focus on individual virtues, while not meant to be
exhaustive, will open new avenues for future research in this
rapidly growing area of ethics and moral philosophy.
How do we punish others socially, and should we do so? In her 2018
Descartes Lectures for Tilburg University, Linda Radzik explores
the informal methods ordinary people use to enforce moral norms,
such as telling people off, boycotting businesses, and publicly
shaming wrongdoers on social media. Over three lectures, Radzik
develops an account of what social punishment is, why it is
sometimes permissible, and when it must be withheld. She argues
that the proper aim of social punishment is to put moral pressure
on wrongdoers to make amends. Yet the permissibility of applying
such pressure turns on the tension between individual desert and
social good, as well as the possession of an authority to punish.
Responses from Christopher Bennett, George Sher and Glen Pettigrove
challenge Radzik's account of social punishment while also offering
alternative perspectives on the possible meanings of our responses
to wrongdoing. Radzik replies in the closing essay.
How do we punish others socially, and should we do so? In her 2018
Descartes Lectures for Tilburg University, Linda Radzik explores
the informal methods ordinary people use to enforce moral norms,
such as telling people off, boycotting businesses, and publicly
shaming wrongdoers on social media. Over three lectures, Radzik
develops an account of what social punishment is, why it is
sometimes permissible, and when it must be withheld. She argues
that the proper aim of social punishment is to put moral pressure
on wrongdoers to make amends. Yet the permissibility of applying
such pressure turns on the tension between individual desert and
social good, as well as the possession of an authority to punish.
Responses from Christopher Bennett, George Sher and Glen Pettigrove
challenge Radzik's account of social punishment while also offering
alternative perspectives on the possible meanings of our responses
to wrongdoing. Radzik replies in the closing essay.
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