Three years ago, most authors contributing to this book gathered at the Heinrich Fabri Institute of the University of Tubingen at Blaubeuren near Ulm in Germany for the third conference on "Pineal Gland and Cancer." In 1987, the late Derek Gupta organized the second meeting and published the first book on the topic, 10 years after Vera Lapin, as part of the 25th anniversary celebrations of the Vienna Cancer Research Institute, had held the first meeting. It was in Vienna during the 1930s and 1940s that W. Bergmann and P. Engel demonstrated that pineal extracts possess growth inhibitory properties on experimental rodent tumors and R. Hofstatter reported favorable results when these extracts were given to cancer patients. In the 1970s, Vera Lapin and others reported that surgical removal of the pineal gland (pinealectomy) stimulates experimental tumor growth rendering fundamental support for an involvement of the pineal gland in malignancy. A focal question of past and present research in this field is whether the pineal gland exerts its tumor inhibitory activity primarily or exclusively via melatonin. Currently, it appears that the action of melatonin on experimental tumor growth criti cally depends on the circadian timing of its administration as weH as on the type and stage of cancer, and that primarily highly differentiated tumor ceHs are controHed. Initial clinical applications of the pineal hormone for incurable cancers raise hopes for a promising future use, particularly when combined with other therapies (e. g."

Ten hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, "another Pearl Harbor" of even more devastating consequence for American arms occurred in the Philippines, 4,500 miles to the west. On December 8, 1941, at 12.35 p.m., 196 Japanese Navy bombers and fighters crippled the largest force of B-17 four-engine bombers outside the United States and also decimated their protective P-40 interceptors. The sudden blow allowed the Japanese to rule the skies over the Philippines, removing the only effective barrier that stood between them and their conquest of Southeast Asia. This event has been called "one of the blackest days in American military history." How could the army commander in the Philippines-the renowned Lt. Gen. Douglas MacArthur-have been caught with all his planes on the ground when he had been alerted in the small hours of that morning of the Pearl Harbor attack and warned of the likelihood of a Japanese strike on his forces? In this book, author William H. Bartsch attempts to answer this and other related questions. Bartsch draws upon twenty-five years of research into American and Japanese records and interviews with many of the participants themselves, particularly survivors of the actual attack on Clark and Iba air bases. The dramatic and detailed coverage of the attack is preceded by an account of the hurried American build-up of air power in the Philippines after July, 1941, and of Japanese planning and preparations for this opening assault of its Southern Operations. Bartsch juxtaposes the experiences of staff of the U.S. War Department in Washington and its Far East Air Force bomber, fighter, and radar personnel in the Philippines, who were affected by its decisions, with those of Japan's Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo and the 11th Air Fleet staff and pilots on Formosa, who were assigned the responsibility for carrying out the attack on the Philippines five hundred miles to the south. In order to put the December 8th attack in broader context, Bartsch details micro-level personal experiences and presents the political and strategic aspects of American and Japanese planning for a war in the Pacific. Despite the significance of this subject matter, it has never before been given full book-length treatment. This book represents the culmination of decades-long efforts of the author to fill this historical gap.

During the first three days of the Japanese assault on American Pacific bases in December of 1941, the 24th Pursuit Group, the only unit of interceptor aircraft in the Philippine Islands, was almost destroyed as an effective force. Yet the group's pilots, doomed from the start by their limited training, an inadequate air warning system, and lack of familiarity with the few flyable pursuit aircraft they had left, fought on against immensely superior number of Japanese army and navy fighters.." . . bold drama, with almost novel-like narration. This is good history. . . ." -Daniel R. Mortensen, Office of Air Force History." . . an engrossing and minutely detailed account based on a variety of US and Japanese government and military records and on personal interviews with the surviving pilots." -"Choice ."" . . an admirably detailed history . . . the work will be of] interest to both aviation buffs and students of WWII." -"Publisher's Weekly""Ignoring the point of view of the top brass, Bartsch's book becomes a triumph of human interest rather than another statistical account. . . . A winning account of a losing campaign defended by courage and honor." -"Journal of Military History."" . . as much a compelling human drama as an objective and detailed unit history. . . . a prodigious achievement in unit history research that does overdue justice to the memory of a tragic group of airmen who did the best they could with what they had under extraordinary circumstances and against thoroughly daunting adversity." -"Military History"

Mit dem Modell werden Tunnelbauten nach der Grundlagenermittlung funktional ausgeschrieben. Entwurf und Konstruktion werden dem Wettbewerb unterstellt. Die Vorgaben an den Bieter resultieren aus der Nutzung. Das Modell erm glicht ein gemeinsames L sen der sich aus dem Bauvorhaben ergebenden Problemstellung, indem der Unternehmer seine speziellen Kenntnisse bez glich Bauverfahren, Dispositionsm glichkeiten und Erfahrungen neben dem der Fachplaner von Beginn an in die gesamte Planung einflie en lassen kann. Es dient nicht dazu einseitig Risiken zu verschieben oder an der Planung zu sparen.

On Friday, August 7, 1942, at 1300, after a furious cannonading by the Navy fighting vessels slamming salvo after salvo into the shores, 36-year-old Marine Sergeant Abraham Felber jumped from a Higgins boat onto Beach Red in the first-wave assault on the deadly jungle island of Guadalcanal. Felber was responsible for writing the Record of Events for his unit, and recorded in meticulous detail the fighting that wrested Guadalcanal from the enemy in the skies, off the shores, and in the muddy jungles.

This work is part of the diary that Abraham Felber kept during his service in World War II. It begins with January 7, 1941, and ends with December 31, 1945. As the 1st Sergeant of Headquarters Battery, 11th Marines, Felber dealt with both officers and enlisted men, which exposed him to the perspectives and insights of both. Felber was also granted the unusual privilege of taking photographs during the Guadalcanal and Cape Gloucester campaigns, some of which are published here for the first time. Felber's accounts of his units role in the combat at Guadalcanal and Cape Gloucester; his time at Guantanamo Bay, Parris Island and Camp Lejune; daily life, and other experiences are presented here as he recorded them.