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An important issue in epistemology concerns the source of epistemic
normativity. Epistemic consequentialism maintains that epistemic
norms are genuine norms in virtue of the way in which they are
conducive to epistemic value, whatever epistemic value may be. So,
for example, the epistemic consequentialist might say that it is a
norm that beliefs should be consistent, in that holding consistent
beliefs is the best way to achieve the epistemic value of accuracy.
Thus epistemic consequentialism is structurally similar to the
family of consequentialist views in ethics. Recently, philosophers
from both formal epistemology and traditional epistemology have
shown interest in such a view. In formal epistemology, there has
been particular interest in thinking of epistemology as a kind of
decision theory where instead of maximizing expected utility one
maximizes expected epistemic utility. In traditional epistemology,
there has been particular interest in various forms of reliabilism
about justification and whether such views are analogous to-and so
face similar problems to-versions of consequentialism in ethics.
This volume presents some of the most recent work on these topics
as well as others related to epistemic consequentialism, by authors
that are sympathetic to the view and those who are critical of it.
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