This book presents a detailed analysis of the U.S. policy that was adopted toward Cuba by the Richard M. Nixon administration between January 20, 1969, and August 8, 1974. Based on governmental, as well as other, sources from both the U.S. and Cuba, this book examines the rupture where the policy of "passive containment" was complemented with a policy of "dirty war." President Nixon attempted to reestablish a confrontational and violent path of action, and once again, Cuba was exposed to a "dirty war" consisting of different forms of aggressive terrorist activities. Since the conditions for this violent route had changed dramatically both in the U.S. and in Cuba, a policy characterized by a continuity of the economic and psychological warfare came to be the central one for the Nixon administration. This book is unique since it is written from a Cuban perspective, and it therefore complements and enriches the knowledge of the U.S.-Cuban relationship during the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, and the policy adopted by the Nixon administration. It is of relevance to everyone interested in the issue, and especially for students and researchers within the disciplines of history and political science.

This book presents the reader with a detailed analysis of the U.S. policy toward Cuba that was designed and adopted by the Lyndon B. Johnson administration. Based in governmental and other sources from both the U.S. and Cuba, the book analyzes the changes in the U.S. policy and its political and practical effects. Cuba still had to face a combination of "dirty war" and "passive containment," but during the course of the 1960s, the influence of the "dirty war" policy was weakened due to the failure of the tactics to overthrow the Cuban Revolution by violent means. Instead, the policy was directed towards "passive containment," characterized by its focus on an intensification of the economic blockade, the promotion of diplomatic isolation, and propaganda campaigns and psychological warfare. The book is unique since it is written from a Cuban perspective and it complements and enriches the knowledge of the U.S.-Cuban relationship during the 1960s, and the policy adopted by the Johnson administration.

This book presents new aspects of the U.S. Cuba policy during Gerald R. Ford's presidency (August 9, 1974-January 20, 1977). Based in governmental and other sources from the U.S. and Cuba, the book examines how the Ford administration broke with Nixon's hostile policy when the diplomatic and economic isolation of Cuba was ended in the OAS, even when the U.S. economic blockade prevailed. In line with the detente policy towards the USSR, the Ford administration strived to normalize the relations with Cuba through secret discussions. However, the Cuban involvement in the Angolan civil war ended this process of normalization, and the U.S. returned to a confrontational policy. Within this framework, counterrevolutionary groups in the U.S. could act, more or less with impunity, towards Cuba, but also against Cuban and third-country targets both within and outside the U.S. The book describes the oscillating Cuba policy that was the hallmark of the Ford administration. The Cuban perspective adopted will complement and enrich the knowledge of the U.S. policy toward Cuba during Gerald Ford's presidency. It is of relevance to everyone interested in the issue and especially for students and researchers within the disciplines of History and Political Science.

This book presents new aspects of the U.S. "multiple path" policy toward Cuba that was designed and adopted after the Missile Crisis (October 1962) until the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963, from a Cuban perspective. The policy was characterized by its contradictory profile, since simultaneously as aggressions were directed at Cuba, it also included the establishment of channels of communication with the Cuban government. The book also analyzes the Cuban-Soviet dispute during the same period. The Cuban experiences have still not been sufficiently discussed, and the aspects offered will enrich the knowledge of the U.S.-Cuban relationship during the mentioned period.

This book presents a detailed analysis of the U.S. policy that was adopted toward Cuba by the Richard M. Nixon administration between January 20, 1969, and August 8, 1974. Based on governmental, as well as other, sources from both the U.S. and Cuba, this book examines the rupture where the policy of "passive containment" was complemented with a policy of "dirty war." President Nixon attempted to reestablish a confrontational and violent path of action, and once again, Cuba was exposed to a "dirty war" consisting of different forms of aggressive terrorist activities. Since the conditions for this violent route had changed dramatically both in the U.S. and in Cuba, a policy characterized by a continuity of the economic and psychological warfare came to be the central one for the Nixon administration. This book is unique since it is written from a Cuban perspective, and it therefore complements and enriches the knowledge of the U.S.-Cuban relationship during the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, and the policy adopted by the Nixon administration. It is of relevance to everyone interested in the issue, and especially for students and researchers within the disciplines of history and political science.

This book presents the reader with a detailed analysis of the U.S. policy toward Cuba that was designed and adopted by the Lyndon B. Johnson administration. Based in governmental and other sources from both the U.S. and Cuba, the book analyzes the changes in the U.S. policy and its political and practical effects. Cuba still had to face a combination of "dirty war" and "passive containment," but during the course of the 1960s, the influence of the "dirty war" policy was weakened due to the failure of the tactics to overthrow the Cuban Revolution by violent means. Instead, the policy was directed towards "passive containment," characterized by its focus on an intensification of the economic blockade, the promotion of diplomatic isolation, and propaganda campaigns and psychological warfare. The book is unique since it is written from a Cuban perspective and it complements and enriches the knowledge of the U.S.-Cuban relationship during the 1960s, and the policy adopted by the Johnson administration.

Previous works on the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) have approached the topic from the point of view of the U.S. and its allies, while Cuban experiences have still not been sufficiently discussed. This book presents new aspects which have seldom - or never - been offered before, giving a detailed account of the crisis from a Cuban perspective. It also investigates the archaeological and anthropological aspects of the crisis, by exploring the tangible and intangible remains that still can be found on the former Soviet missile bases in the Cuban countryside, and through interviews which add a local, human dimension to the subject.

This new book shows how the idea of a strategic triangle can illuminate the security relationships among the United States, the European Union and Russia in the greater transatlantic sphere.
This concept highlights how the relationships among these three actors may, on some issues, be closely related. A central question also follows directly from the use of the notion of the triangle: does the EU have actor capability in this policy sphere or will it get it in the future? The reason this is so important for our project is that only if the Union is regarded by the two other actors, and regards itself, as an actor in security policy does the strategic triangle really exists. Consequently, this book has a strong focus upon the development of the actor capability of the Union. In the case of the United States, it examines to what extent the concept of the strategic triangle has significance under each of five grand strategies that serve as alternative visions of the superpower's role in the world.

We are living amidst the fallout of the most controversial conflict of our times. This book is a tough examination of how and why it was fought and of its continuing effects.
This major new work contains analysis of the Iraq War from several different academic, as well as military perspectives. Its emphasis is on the links between US foreign policy, US strategy and the US conduct of war and it also covers Iraqi grand strategies, the consequences of the War for transatlantic relations, and includes a chapter on the International Law dimension. In scrutinzing the war and the behaviour of its main parties, the editors draw upon international relations, political science, strategic thought and military theory, plus international law and media studies. For those wishing to understand the Iraq war from a very wide range of rigorous perspectives, this is a must-read.

This new book shows how the idea of a strategic triangle can illuminate the security relationships among the United States, the European Union, and Russia in the greater transatlantic sphere. This concept highlights how the relationships among these three actors may, on some issues, be closely related. A central question also follows directly from the use of the notion of the triangle: does the EU have actor capability in this policy sphere or will it get it in the future? The reason this is so important for our project is that only if the Union is regarded by the two other actors, and regards itself, as an actor in security policy does the strategic triangle really exists. Consequently, this book has a strong focus upon the development of the actor capability of the Union. In the case of the United States, it examines to what extent the concept of the strategic triangle has significance under each of five grand strategies that serve as alternative visions of the superpower's role in the world.

We are living amidst the fallout of the most controversial conflict of our times. This book is a tough examination of how and why it was fought and of its continuing effects.
This major new work contains analysis of the Iraq War from several different academic, as well as military perspectives. Its emphasis is on the links between US foreign policy, US strategy and the US conduct of war and it also covers Iraqi grand strategies, the consequences of the War for transatlantic relations, and includes a chapter on the International Law dimension. In scrutinzing the war and the behaviour of its main parties, the editors draw upon international relations, political science, strategic thought and military theory, plus international law and media studies. For those wishing to understand the Iraq war from a very wide range of rigorous perspectives, this is a must-read.

This book presents new aspects of the U.S. "multiple path" policy toward Cuba that was designed and adopted after the Missile Crisis (October 1962) until the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963, from a Cuban perspective. The policy was characterized by its contradictory profile, since simultaneously as aggressions were directed at Cuba, it also included the establishment of channels of communication with the Cuban government. The book also analyzes the Cuban-Soviet dispute during the same period. The Cuban experiences have still not been sufficiently discussed, and the aspects offered will enrich the knowledge of the U.S.-Cuban relationship during the mentioned period.