The present book treats a highly specialized topic, namely effec tivity functions, which are a tool for describing the power structure implicit in social choice situations of various kind. One of the ad vantages of effectivity functions is that they seem to contain exactly the information which is needed in several problems of implementa tion, that is in designing the rules for individual behaviour given that this behaviour at equilibrium should result in a prescribed functional connection between preferences and outcome. We shall be interested in both formal properties of effectiv ity functions and applications of them in social choice theory, and among such applications in particular the implementation problem. This choice of emphasis necessarily means that some other topics are treated only superficially or not at all. We do not attempt to cover all contributions to the field, rather we try to put some of the results together in order to get a reasonably coherent theory about the role of the power structure in cooperative implementation. The authors are indebted to many persons for assistance and advice during the work on this book. In particular, we would like to thank Peter Fristrup and Bodil Hansen for critical reading of the manuscript, and Lene Petersen for typesetting in '.lEX."

As a relatively young discipline, health economics as it appears today contains many features which can be traced back to its beginnings. Since it arose in the interface between the medical sciences and economics, the way of dealing with problems were often influenced by traditions which were well-established in the medical profession, while the classical way of thinking of economists came was filtering through at a slower pace. This means that much of both teaching and research in health economics puts the emphasis on collecting and analysing data on health and healthcare as well as on public and private outlays on healthcare. This is an extreme useful and worthwhile activity, and much new and valuable information is produced in this way, but occasionally there is a need for in-depth understanding of what is going on, rather than an estimated equation which comes from nowhere. This is where economic theory can offer some support.The present book is an introduction to health economics where the emphasis is on theory, with the aim of providing explanation of phenomena as far as possible given the current level of economics.

This book is intended as an introduction to game theory which goes beyond the field of application, economics, and which introduces the reader to as many different sides of game theory as possible within the limitations of an introduction. The main goal is to give an impression of the diversity of game theoretical models, while at the same time covering the standard topics. The book has an equal coverage of non-cooperative and cooperative games, and it covers several topics such as selecting Nash equilibria, non-transferable utility games, applications of game theory to logic, combinatorial and differential games.

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to general equilibrium theory, covering the standard topics as well as the developments of the theory over the past fifty years. This ensures that the reader gains a thorough account of what has been established both in pure theory and in applications.In addition to the basic topics, this book elaborates on fields which are relevant but not mentioned frequently in this context. The material covered includes international trade, growth, finance and implementation, and it offers a broader view than what is usual in texts on general equilibrium theory. This book would make for suitable reading for undergraduate and graduate courses in macroeconomics.

The present book treats a highly specialized topic, namely effec tivity functions, which are a tool for describing the power structure implicit in social choice situations of various kind. One of the ad vantages of effectivity functions is that they seem to contain exactly the information which is needed in several problems of implementa tion, that is in designing the rules for individual behaviour given that this behaviour at equilibrium should result in a prescribed functional connection between preferences and outcome. We shall be interested in both formal properties of effectiv ity functions and applications of them in social choice theory, and among such applications in particular the implementation problem. This choice of emphasis necessarily means that some other topics are treated only superficially or not at all. We do not attempt to cover all contributions to the field, rather we try to put some of the results together in order to get a reasonably coherent theory about the role of the power structure in cooperative implementation. The authors are indebted to many persons for assistance and advice during the work on this book. In particular, we would like to thank Peter Fristrup and Bodil Hansen for critical reading of the manuscript, and Lene Petersen for typesetting in '.lEX."

Modern welfare economics as it is known today to economists took its final shape with the emergence of the Arrow-Debreu model. The classical conjectures about the beneficient workings of markets together with the converse statement, that optimal (in the sense of Pareto) allocations may be sustained by prices and markets, has laid a firm foundation for further research in welfare economics. But more than that, it has inspired researchers to take up entirely new topics, notably by closer considerations of situations where the assumptions of the original model may seem overly restrictive. One of these new directions has been connected with generalizing the model so that it takes into account the possibility of infinitely many commodities. On the face of it, the idea of an infinity of commodities may seem a mathematical fancy having no "real" counterpart in economic life. This is not so, however. Quite to the contrary, infinity enters in a very natural way when it is taken into account that economic transactions take place over time. 2 In the Arrow-Debreu formalism, time may be incorporated into the model in a very simple way using dated commodities. Thus two commodities are considered as being different if they are to be delivered at different points of time.

Economics of Banking presents a thorough overview and analysis of the key aspects of financial intermediation necessary to understand this field. Based on the latest theory, and supporting arguments with practical examples, Hans Keiding discusses the problems of competition, risk taking in banks and the irregularities that may occur as a result. Banks in distress and avoiding bank failures through suitable regulation are also treated in a rigorous, yet easy-to-understand way. Economics of Banking: - Treats financial intermediation both from the point of view of the bank itself and from that of society - Covers both microeconomics of banking and risk management in banks - Offers more complicated mathematics as optional. A comprehensive advanced undergraduate or master's level textbook for students in banking, economics and finance who need to get to grips with the economic theory of banks.