This insightful Modern Guide offers a broad coverage of questions and controversies encountered by contemporary economists. A refreshing approach to philosophy of economics, chapters comprise a range of methodological and theoretical perspectives, from lab and field experiments to macroeconomics and applied policy work, written using a familiar, accessible language for economists. Highlighting key areas of methodological controversy, the Modern Guide looks at estimating utility functions in choice data, causal modelling, and ethics in randomised control trials. Chapters further explore topical issues, including: economists' attitudes to other disciplines; gender bias in economic research; methods of modelling social influence in economics; behavioural welfare economics; anti-poverty policy controversies; and inflexible reliance on DSGE models in macroeconomics. Furthermore, it explores the implications of the last financial crisis for macroeconomic confidence, and ways to adapt abstract theory to everyday policy advice. Avoiding philosophical jargon, and with the majority of chapters written by economists, this Modern Guide will challenge economists and scholars of philosophy of economics to engage with different approaches to the topic. This will also be a useful tool for policy makers administering nudges, development initiatives, macro-forecasting and monetary policy.

Medicine raises numerous philosophical issues. Most discussed have been debates in bioethics. Yet contemporary medicine is also a rich source of controversies and examples that raise important issues in philosophy of science, philosophy of biology, and metaphysics. This volume approaches the philosophy of medicine from the broad naturalist perspective that holds that philosophy must be continuous with, constrained by, and relevant to empirical results of the natural and social sciences and that believes that the history, sociology, politics, and ethics of science provide relevant information for philosophical analysis. One traditional topic covered by several of the contributions is the nature of disease, but the approach is largely from the philosophy of science rather than traditional linguistic analysis. The complex interplay of epistemological and sociological factors in producing evidence in medicine is discussed by chapters on collective medical discussion making, experimental medicine," genetic" diseases, mental illness, and race and gender categories. The upshot is a volume that ties medicine to contemporary issues in philosophy of science and metaphysics like no other.

a ~a ]An excellent collection of essays in the philosophy of medicine. Whereas most philosophical work about medicine has been concerned with medical ethics, this volume focuses more on key questions in epistemology and metaphysics, although many of these are also relevant to ethical issues. Some of the chapters are among the best I have read in the philosophy of medicine on their respective topics.a (TM)

Professor Paul Thagard, Philosophy Department, University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine is a comprehensive guide to topics in the fields of epistemology and metaphysics of medicine. It examines traditional topics such as the concept of disease, causality in medicine, the epistemology of the randomized controlled trial, the biopsychosocial model, explanation, clinical judgment and phenomenology of medicine and emerging topics, such as philosophy of epidemiology, measuring harms, the concept of disability, nursing perspectives, race and gender, the metaphysics of Chinese medicine, and narrative medicine. Each of the 48 chapters is written especially for this volume and with a student audience in mind. For pedagogy and clarity, each chapter contains an extended example illustrating the ideas discussed. This text is intended for use as a reference for students in courses in philosophy of medicine and philosophy of science, and pairs well with The Routledge Companion to Bioethics for use in medical humanities and social science courses.

It has long been thought that science is our best hope for realizing objective knowledge, but that, to deliver on this promise, it must be value free. Things are not so simple, however, as recent work in science studies makes clear. The contributors to this volume investigate where and how values are involved in science, and examine the implications of this involvement for ideals of objectivity.

In this original and important book, Harold Kincaid defends a view of the special sciences--all sciences outside physics--as autonomous and nonreducible. He argues that the biological and social sciences provide explanations that cannot be captured by explanations at the level of their constituent parts, and yet that this does not commit us to mysterious, nonphysical entitites like vital forces or group minds. A look at real scientific practice shows that the many different sciences can be unified in a way that leaves them each an autonomous explanatory role. This book will be of great interest to philosophers of science and social scientists.

"Thomas Scheff demonstrates why Goffman remains such a key figure for social scientists. Goffman may have been cautious about recognizing the role of emotions in social life, but Scheff boldly and creatively shows why the sociological and the psychological are necessarily intertwined. This is certainly a book for all serious analysts of social behaviour." Michael Billig, Nottingham University "Scheff's critical eye is equal to his subject, shrewdly appreciating Goffman's many virtues while also showing where and how Goffman's thinking needs revision and development. This original and provocative book offers a fresh interpretation of Goffman and will become a benchmark for all subsequent commentary." Greg Smith, University of Salford One of the seminal sociologists of the twentieth century, Erving Goffman revolutionized our understanding of the microworld of emotions and relationships. We all live in this world every day of our lives, yet it is virtually invisible to us. Goffman's genius was to recognize and describe this world as no one had before. The book synthesizes prior scholarly commentary on Goffman's work, and includes biographical material from his life, untangling some of the many puzzles in Goffman's work and life. Scheff also proposes ways of filling gaps and false starts. One chapter explores the meaning of the emotion of love, another of hatred. These and other new directions could facilitate the creation of a microsocial science that unveils the emotional/relational world.

"Thomas Scheff demonstrates why Goffman remains such a key figure for social scientists. Goffman may have been cautious about recognizing the role of emotions in social life, but Scheff boldly and creatively shows why the sociological and the psychological are necessarily intertwined. This is certainly a book for all serious analysts of social behaviour." Michael Billig, Nottingham University "Scheff's critical eye is equal to his subject, shrewdly appreciating Goffman's many virtues while also showing where and how Goffman's thinking needs revision and development. This original and provocative book offers a fresh interpretation of Goffman and will become a benchmark for all subsequent commentary." Greg Smith, University of Salford One of the seminal sociologists of the twentieth century, Erving Goffman revolutionized our understanding of the microworld of emotions and relationships. We all live in this world every day of our lives, yet it is virtually invisible to us. Goffman's genius was to recognize and describe this world as no one had before. The book synthesizes prior scholarly commentary on Goffman's work, and includes biographical material from his life, untangling some of the many puzzles in Goffman's work and life. Scheff also proposes ways of filling gaps and false starts. One chapter explores the meaning of the emotion of love, another of hatred. These and other new directions could facilitate the creation of a microsocial science that unveils the emotional/relational world.

The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Medicine is a comprehensive guide to topics in the fields of epistemology and metaphysics of medicine. It examines traditional topics such as the concept of disease, causality in medicine, the epistemology of the randomized controlled trial, the biopsychosocial model, explanation, clinical judgment and phenomenology of medicine and emerging topics, such as philosophy of epidemiology, measuring harms, the concept of disability, nursing perspectives, race and gender, the metaphysics of Chinese medicine, and narrative medicine. Each of the 48 chapters is written especially for this volume and with a student audience in mind. For pedagogy and clarity, each chapter contains an extended example illustrating the ideas discussed. This text is intended for use as a reference for students in courses in philosophy of medicine and philosophy of science, and pairs well with The Routledge Companion to Bioethics for use in medical humanities and social science courses.

Scholars question the extent to which current psychiatric classification systems are inadequate for diagnosis, treatment, and research of mental disorders and offer suggestions for improvement. In this volume, leading philosophers of psychiatry examine psychiatric classification systems, including the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), asking whether current systems are sufficient for effective diagnosis, treatment, and research. Doing so, they take up the question of whether mental disorders are natural kinds, grounded in something in the outside world. Psychiatric categories based on natural kinds should group phenomena in such a way that they are subject to the same type of causal explanations and respond similarly to the same type of causal interventions. When these categories do not evince such groupings, there is reason to revise existing classifications. The contributors all question current psychiatric classifications systems and the assumptions on which they are based. They differ, however, as to why and to what extent the categories are inadequate and how to address the problem. Topics discussed include taxometric methods for identifying natural kinds, the error and bias inherent in DSM categories, and the complexities involved in classifying such specific mental disorders as "oppositional defiance disorder" and pathological gambling. Contributors George Graham, Nick Haslam, Allan Horwitz, Harold Kincaid, Dominic Murphy, Jeffrey Poland, Nancy Nyquist Potter, Don Ross, Dan Stein, Jacqueline Sullivan, Serife Tekin, Peter Zachar

Medicine raises numerous philosophical issues. This volume approaches the philosophy of medicine from the broad naturalist perspective. This holds that philosophy must be continuous with, constrained by, and relevant to empirical results of the natural and social sciences. The upshot is a unique volume that ties medicine to contemporary issues in philosophy of science and metaphysics.

This 1996 book defends the prospects for a science of society. It argues that behind the diverse methods of the natural sciences lies a common core of scientific rationality that the social sciences can and sometimes do achieve. It also argues that good social science must be in part about large-scale social structures and processes and thus that methodological individualism is misguided. These theses are supported by a detailed discussion of actual social research, including theories of agrarian revolution, organizational ecology, social theories of depression, and supply-demand explanations in economics. Professor Kincaid provides a general picture of explanation and confirmation in the social sciences and discusses the nature of scientific rationality, functional explanation, optimality arguments, meaning and interpretation, the place of microfoundations in social explanation, the status of neo-classical economics, the role of idealizations and non-experimental evidence, and other specific controversies.

This 1996 book defends the prospects for a science of society. It argues that behind the diverse methods of the natural sciences lies a common core of scientific rationality that the social sciences can and sometimes do achieve. It also argues that good social science must be in part about large-scale social structures and processes and thus that methodological individualism is misguided. These theses are supported by a detailed discussion of actual social research, including theories of agrarian revolution, organizational ecology, social theories of depression, and supply-demand explanations in economics. Professor Kincaid provides a general picture of explanation and confirmation in the social sciences and discusses the nature of scientific rationality, functional explanation, optimality arguments, meaning and interpretation, the place of microfoundations in social explanation, the status of neo-classical economics, the role of idealizations and non-experimental evidence, and other specific controversies.

The philosophy of the social sciences considers the underlying explanatory powers of the social (or human) sciences, such as history, economics, anthropology, politics, and sociology. The type of questions covered includes the methodological (the nature of observations, laws, theories, and explanations) to the ontological - whether or not these sciences can explain human nature in a way consistent with common-sense beliefs. This Handbook is a major, comprehensive look at the key ideas in the field, is guided by several principles. The first is that the philosophy of social science should be closely connected to, and informed by, developments in the sciences themselves. The second is that the volume should appeal to practicing social scientists as well as philosophers, with the contributors being both drawn from both ranks, and speaking to ongoing controversial issues in the field. Finally, the volume promotes connections across the social sciences, with greater internal discussion and interaction across disciplinary boundaries.

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics is a cutting-edge reference work to philosophical issues in the practice of economics. It is motivated by the view that there is more to economics than general equilibrium theory, and that the philosophy of economics should reflect the diversity of activities and topics that currently occupy economists. Contributions in the Handbook are thus closely tied to ongoing theoretical and empirical concerns in economics.
Contributors include both philosophers of science and economists. Chapters fall into three general categories: received views in philosophy of economics, ongoing controversies in microeconomics, and issues in modeling, macroeconomics, and development. Specific topics include methodology, game theory, experimental economics, behavioral economics, neuroeconomics, computational economics, data mining, interpersonal comparisons of utility, measurement of welfare and well being, growth theory and development, and microfoundations of macroeconomics.
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics is a groundbreaking reference like no other in its field. It is a central resource for those wishing to learn about the philosophy of economics, and for those who actively engage in the discipline, from advanced undergraduates to professional philosophers, economists, and historians.

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics is a cutting-edge reference work to philosophical issues in the practice of economics. It is motivated by the view that there is more to economics than general equilibrium theory, and that the philosophy of economics should reflect the diversity of activities and topics that currently occupy economists. Contributions in the Handbook are thus closely tied to ongoing theoretical and empirical concerns in economics. Contributors include both philosophers of science and economists. Chapters fall into three general categories: received views in philosophy of economics, ongoing controversies in microeconomics, and issues in modeling, macroeconomics, and development. Specific topics include methodology, game theory, experimental economics, behavioral economics, neuroeconomics, computational economics, data mining, interpersonal comparisons of utility, measurement of welfare and well being, growth theory and development, and microfoundations of macroeconomics. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics is a groundbreaking reference like no other in its field. It is a central resource for those wishing to learn about the philosophy of economics, and for those who actively engage in the discipline, from advanced undergraduates to professional philosophers, economists, and historians.

Scientific Metaphysics collects original essays by some of the world's leading philosophers of science on the question of whether metaphysics can and should be naturalized-that is, conducted as a part of natural science. Some people will think that the idea of naturalized metaphysics is a contradiction in terms, on the grounds that metaphysics is by definition about matters that transcend the domain of empirical inquiry. Most of the authors here disagree, and hold that if metaphysics is to hold out any prospect of identifying objective truths, it must be continuous with and inspired by science. Many go further, and argue that it should be conducted in such a way as to be of some positive use to science. But beyond this each contributor differs with one another on numerous points of detail and emphasis. The essays presented here offer various points of view on the relationship between naturalized metaphysics, more traditional forms of metaphysics, and the wider history of philosophy. The discussions are rich in examples drawn from across the sciences: physics, biology, economics, psychology and others. Several chapters explore new ideas about the complex relationships between metaphysics, physics, and mathematics. At stake, in the end, is the question of whether metaphysics should give way to science and disappear from contemporary inquiry, or continue as an activity that unifies the particular sciences into a single naturalistic worldview.

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Political Science contains twenty-seven freshly written chapters to give the reader a panoramic introduction to philosophical issues in the practice of political science. Simultaneously, it advances the field of Philosophy of Political Science by creating a fruitful meeting place where both philosophers and practicing political scientists contribute and discuss. These philosophical discussions are close to and informed by actual developments in political science, making philosophy of science continuous with the sciences, another aspiration that motivates this volume. The chapters fall under four headings: (1) evaluating theoretical frameworks in political science; (2) methodological challenges and reconciliations; (3) the purposes and uses of political science; and, (4) the interactions between political science and society. Specific topics discussed include the biology of political attitudes, intra-agent mechanisms, rational choice explanations, theories of collective action, explaining institutional change, conceptualizing and measuring democracy, process tracing, qualitative comparative analysis, interpretivism and positivism, mixed methods, within-cause causal inference, evidential pluralism, lab and field experiments, external validity, contextualization, prediction, expertise, clientelism, feminism, values, and progress in political science.