This book examines how epistemology was reinvented by Ibn Sina, an influential philosopher-scientist of the classical Islamic world who was known to the West by the Latinised name Avicenna. It explains his theory of knowledge in which intentionality acts as an interaction between the mind and the world. This, in turn, led Ibn Sina to distinguish an operation of intentionality specific to the generation of numbers. The author argues that Ibn Sina's transformation of philosophy is one of the major stages in the de-hellinisation movement of the Greek heritage that was set off by the advent of the Arabic-Islamic civilisation. Readers first learn about Ibn Sina's unprecedented investigation into the concept of the number and his criticism of such Greek thought as Plato's realism, Pythagoreans' empiricism, and Ari stotle's conception of existence. Next, coverage sets out the basics of Ibn Sina's theory of knowledge needed for the construction of numbers. It describes how intentionality turns out to be key in showing the ontological dependence of numbers as well as even more critical to their construction. In describing the various mental operations that make mathematical objects intentional entities, Ibn Sina developed powerful arguments and subtle analyses to show us the extent our mental life depends on intentionality. This monograph thoroughly explores the epistemic dimension of this concept, which, the author believes, can also explain the actual genesis and evolution of mathematics by the human mind.

the demise of the logical positivism programme. The answers given to these qu- tions have deepened the already existing gap between philosophy and the history and practice of science. While the positivists argued for a spontaneous, steady and continuous growth of scientific knowledge the post-positivists make a strong case for a fundamental discontinuity in the development of science which can only be explained by extrascientific factors. The political, social and cultural environment, the argument goes on, determine both the questions and the terms in which they should be answered. Accordingly, the sociological and historical interpretation - volves in fact two kinds of discontinuity which are closely related: the discontinuity of science as such and the discontinuity of the more inclusive political and social context of its development. More precisely it explains the discontinuity of the former by the discontinuity of the latter subordinating in effect the history of science to the wider political and social history. The underlying idea is that each historical and - cial context generates scientific and philosophical questions of its own. From this point of view the question surrounding the nature of knowledge and its development are entirely new topics typical of the twentieth-century social context reflecting both the level and the scale of the development of science.

the demise of the logical positivism programme. The answers given to these qu- tions have deepened the already existing gap between philosophy and the history and practice of science. While the positivists argued for a spontaneous, steady and continuous growth of scientific knowledge the post-positivists make a strong case for a fundamental discontinuity in the development of science which can only be explained by extrascientific factors. The political, social and cultural environment, the argument goes on, determine both the questions and the terms in which they should be answered. Accordingly, the sociological and historical interpretation - volves in fact two kinds of discontinuity which are closely related: the discontinuity of science as such and the discontinuity of the more inclusive political and social context of its development. More precisely it explains the discontinuity of the former by the discontinuity of the latter subordinating in effect the history of science to the wider political and social history. The underlying idea is that each historical and - cial context generates scientific and philosophical questions of its own. From this point of view the question surrounding the nature of knowledge and its development are entirely new topics typical of the twentieth-century social context reflecting both the level and the scale of the development of science.

Cet ouvrage propose une interpretation non classique de la tradition scientifique arabe dont le statut a toujours pose un probleme aux historiens des sciences. Tout ouvrage qui se veut etre veritablement historique ne peut en effet se permettre de l'ignorer et pourtant les pages qui lui sont consacrees sont presque negligeables par rapport a la tradition qui la precede comme a celle qui lui succede. Et la conclusion a laquelle ils aboutissent c'est que son merite est de preserver et de transmettre l'heritage grec aux europeens, sans jamais se demander ce que signifie preserver ni transmettre. Ce traitement expeditif fait de la tradition arabe un accident de l'histoire, au mieux une annexe de la tradition grecque evacuant ainsi l'une des questions fondamentales dont s'occupe l'historien, a savoir son timing: pourquoi faudrait-il attendre jusqu'au IXe siecle pour voir la science et la rationalite rayonner dans le monde ?"