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Experimental philosophy has blossomed into a variety of
philosophical fields including ethics, epistemology, metaphysics
and philosophy of language. But there has been very little
experimental philosophical research in the domain of philosophy of
religion. Advances in Religion, Cognitive Science, and Experimental
Philosophy demonstrates how cognitive science of religion has the
methodological and conceptual resources to become a form of
experimental philosophy of religion. Addressing a wide variety of
empirical claims that are of interest to philosophers and
psychologists of religion, a team of psychologists and philosophers
apply data from the psychology of religion to important problems in
the philosophy of religion including the psychology of religious
diversity; the psychology of substance dualism; the problem of evil
and the relation between religious belief and empathy; and the
cognitive science explaining the formation of intuitions that
unwittingly guide philosophers of religion when formulating
arguments. Bringing together authors and researchers who have made
important contributions to interdisciplinary research on religion
in the last decade, Advances in Religion, Cognitive Science, and
Experimental Philosophy provides new ways of approaching core
philosophical and psychological problems.
Bringing together short stories by award-winning contemporary
science fiction authors and philosophers, this book covers a wide
range of philosophical ideas from ethics, philosophy of religion,
political philosophy, and metaphysics. Alongside the introductory
pieces by the editors that help readers to understand how
philosophy can be done through science fiction, you will find
end-of-story notes written by the authors that contextualize their
stories within broader philosophical themes. Organised
thematically, these stories address fundamental philosophical
questions such as: *What does it mean to be human? *Is neural
enhancement a good thing? *What makes a life worthwhile? *What
political systems are best? By making complex ideas easily
accessible, this unique book allows you to engage with
philosophical ideas in entertaining new ways, and is an ideal entry
point for anyone interested in using fiction to better understand
philosophy.
Bertrand Russell famously quipped that he didn't believe in God for
the same reason that he didn't believe in a teapot in orbit between
the earth and Mars: it is a bizarre assertion for which no evidence
can be provided. Is belief in God really like belief in Russell's
teapot? Kenneth L. Pearce argues that God is no teapot. God is a
real answer to the deepest question of all: why is there something
rather than nothing? Graham Oppy argues that we should believe that
there are none but natural causal entities with none but natural
causal properties-and hence should believe that there are no gods.
Beginning from this basic disagreement, the authors proceed to
discuss and debate a wide range of philosophical questions,
including questions about explanation, necessity, rationality,
religious experience, mathematical objects, the foundations of
ethics, and the methodology of philosophy. Each author first
presents his own side, and then they interact through two rounds of
objections and replies. Pedagogical features include standard form
arguments, section summaries, bolded key terms and principles, a
glossary, and annotated reading lists. In the volume foreword,
Helen De Cruz calls the debate "both edifying and a joy," and sums
up what's at stake: "Here you have two carefully formulated
positive proposals for worldviews that explain all that is:
classical theism, or naturalistic atheism. You can follow along
with the authors and deliberate: which one do you find more
plausible?" Though written with beginning students in mind, this
debate will be of interest to philosophers at all levels and to
anyone who values careful, rational thought about the nature of
reality and our place in it.
A philosopher explores the transformative role of wonder and awe in
an uncertain world Wonder and awe lie at the heart of life’s most
profound questions. Wonderstruck shows how these emotions respond
to our fundamental need to make sense of ourselves and everything
around us, and how they enable us to engage with the world as if we
are experiencing it for the first time. Drawing on the latest
psychological insights on the emotions, Helen De Cruz argues that
wonder and awe are emotional drives that motivate us to inquire and
discover new things, and that humanity has deliberately nurtured
these emotions in cultural domains such as religion, science, and
magic. Tracing how wonder and awe unify philosophy, the humanities,
and the sciences, De Cruz provides new perspectives on figures such
as Plato, Aristotle, Adam Smith, William James, Rachel Carson,
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Abraham Heschel. Along
the way, she explains how these singular emotions empower us to be
open-minded, to experience joy and hope, and to be resilient in the
face of personal troubles and global challenges. Taking inspiration
from Descartes’s portrayal of wonder as “that sudden surprise
of the soul,” this illuminating book reveals how wonder and awe
are catalysts that can help us reclaim what makes life worth living
and preserve the things we find wonderful and valuable in our
lives.
A growing body of evidence from the sciences suggests that our
moral beliefs have an evolutionary basis. To explain how human
morality evolved, some philosophers have called for the study of
morality to be naturalized, i.e., to explain it in terms of natural
causes by looking at its historical and biological origins. The
present literature has focused on the link between evolution and
moral realism: if our moral beliefs enhance fitness, does this mean
they track moral truths? In spite of the growing empirical
evidence, these discussions tend to remain high-level: the mere
fact that morality has evolved is often deemed enough to decide
questions in normative and meta-ethics. This volume starts from the
assumption that the details about the evolution of morality do make
a difference, and asks how. It presents original essays by authors
from various disciplines, including philosophy, anthropology,
developmental psychology, and primatology, who write in
conversation with neuroscience, sociology, and cognitive
psychology.
Bertrand Russell famously quipped that he didn't believe in God for
the same reason that he didn't believe in a teapot in orbit between
the earth and Mars: it is a bizarre assertion for which no evidence
can be provided. Is belief in God really like belief in Russell's
teapot? Kenneth L. Pearce argues that God is no teapot. God is a
real answer to the deepest question of all: why is there something
rather than nothing? Graham Oppy argues that we should believe that
there are none but natural causal entities with none but natural
causal properties-and hence should believe that there are no gods.
Beginning from this basic disagreement, the authors proceed to
discuss and debate a wide range of philosophical questions,
including questions about explanation, necessity, rationality,
religious experience, mathematical objects, the foundations of
ethics, and the methodology of philosophy. Each author first
presents his own side, and then they interact through two rounds of
objections and replies. Pedagogical features include standard form
arguments, section summaries, bolded key terms and principles, a
glossary, and annotated reading lists. In the volume foreword,
Helen De Cruz calls the debate "both edifying and a joy," and sums
up what's at stake: "Here you have two carefully formulated
positive proposals for worldviews that explain all that is:
classical theism, or naturalistic atheism. You can follow along
with the authors and deliberate: which one do you find more
plausible?" Though written with beginning students in mind, this
debate will be of interest to philosophers at all levels and to
anyone who values careful, rational thought about the nature of
reality and our place in it.
A growing body of evidence from the sciences suggests that our
moral beliefs have an evolutionary basis. To explain how human
morality evolved, some philosophers have called for the study of
morality to be naturalized, i.e., to explain it in terms of natural
causes by looking at its historical and biological origins. The
present literature has focused on the link between evolution and
moral realism: if our moral beliefs enhance fitness, does this mean
they track moral truths? In spite of the growing empirical
evidence, these discussions tend to remain high-level: the mere
fact that morality has evolved is often deemed enough to decide
questions in normative and meta-ethics. This volume starts from the
assumption that the details about the evolution of morality do make
a difference, and asks how. It presents original essays by authors
from various disciplines, including philosophy, anthropology,
developmental psychology, and primatology, who write in
conversation with neuroscience, sociology, and cognitive
psychology.
Bringing together short stories by award-winning contemporary
science fiction authors and philosophers, this book covers a wide
range of philosophical ideas from ethics, philosophy of religion,
political philosophy, and metaphysics. Alongside the introductory
pieces by the editors that help readers to understand how
philosophy can be done through science fiction, you will find
end-of-story notes written by the authors that contextualize their
stories within broader philosophical themes. Organised
thematically, these stories address fundamental philosophical
questions such as: *What does it mean to be human? *Is neural
enhancement a good thing? *What makes a life worthwhile? *What
political systems are best? By making complex ideas easily
accessible, this unique book allows you to engage with
philosophical ideas in entertaining new ways, and is an ideal entry
point for anyone interested in using fiction to better understand
philosophy.
Experimental philosophy has blossomed into a variety of
philosophical fields including ethics, epistemology, metaphysics
and philosophy of language. But there has been very little
experimental philosophical research in the domain of philosophy of
religion. Advances in Religion, Cognitive Science, and Experimental
Philosophy demonstrates how cognitive science of religion has the
methodological and conceptual resources to become a form of
experimental philosophy of religion. Addressing a wide variety of
empirical claims that are of interest to philosophers and
psychologists of religion, a team of psychologists and philosophers
apply data from the psychology of religion to important problems in
the philosophy of religion including the psychology of religious
diversity; the psychology of substance dualism; the problem of evil
and the relation between religious belief and empathy; and the
cognitive science explaining the formation of intuitions that
unwittingly guide philosophers of religion when formulating
arguments. Bringing together authors and researchers who have made
important contributions to interdisciplinary research on religion
in the last decade, Advances in Religion, Cognitive Science, and
Experimental Philosophy provides new ways of approaching core
philosophical and psychological problems.
This Element focuses on three challenges of evolution to religion:
teleology, human origins, and the evolution of religion itself.
First, religious worldviews tend to presuppose a teleological
understanding of the origins of living things, but scientists
mostly understand evolution as non-teleological. Second, religious
and scientific accounts of human origins do not align in a
straightforward sense. Third, evolutionary explanations of
religion, including religious beliefs and practices, may cast doubt
on their justification. We show how these tensions arise and offer
potential responses for religion. Individual religions can meet
these challenges, if some of their metaphysical assumptions are
adapted or abandoned.
This Element examines what we can learn from religious
disagreement, focusing on disagreement with possible selves and
former selves, the epistemic significance of religious agreement,
the problem of disagreements between religious experts, and the
significance of philosophy of religion. Helen De Cruz shows how
religious beliefs of others constitute significant higher-order
evidence. At the same time, she advises that we should not
necessarily become agnostic about all religious matters, because
our cognitive background colors the way we evaluate evidence. This
allows us to maintain religious beliefs in many cases, while
nevertheless taking the religious beliefs of others seriously.
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