Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest, among both philosophers, legal scholars, and military experts, on the ethics of war. Due in part due to post 9/11 events, this resurgence is also due to a growing theoretical sophistication among scholars in this area. Recently there has been very influential work published on the justificaton of killing in self-defense and war, and the topic of the ethics of war is now more important than ever as a discrete field. The 28 commissioned chapters in this Handbook will present a comprehensive overview of the field as well as make significant and novel contributions, and collectively they will set the terms of the debate for the next decade. Lazar and Frowe will invite the leading scholars in the field to write on topics that are new to them, making the volume a compilation of fresh ideas rather than a rehash of earlier work. The volume will be dicided into five sections: Method, History, Resort, Conduct, and Aftermath. The contributors will be a mix of junior and senior figures, and will include well known scholars like Michael Walzer, Jeff McMahan, and David Rodin.

The most lively and up-to-date introduction to the ethics of war and peace available offers: Breadth of coverage that is in line with modules/courses, ranging from self-defence, through just war theory, to terrorism New material on causation in war, indirect intervention, duties to rescue and new chapter on obligations to refugees, in line with developments in the field and current market needs A range of pedagogical features to support the student, including examples, chapter summaries, discussion questions, suggestions for further reading, and a glossary

The most lively and up-to-date introduction to the ethics of war and peace available offers: Breadth of coverage that is in line with modules/courses, ranging from self-defence, through just war theory, to terrorism New material on causation in war, indirect intervention, duties to rescue and new chapter on obligations to refugees, in line with developments in the field and current market needs A range of pedagogical features to support the student, including examples, chapter summaries, discussion questions, suggestions for further reading, and a glossary

Most people believe that it is sometimes morally permissible for a person to use force to defend herself or others against harm. In Defensive Killing, Helen Frowe offers a detailed exploration of when and why the use of such force is permissible. She begins by considering the use of force between individuals, investigating both the circumstances under which an attacker forfeits her right not to be harmed, and the distinct question of when it is all-things-considered permissible to use force against an attacker. Frowe then extends this enquiry to war, defending the view that we should judge the ethics of killing in war by the moral rules that govern killing between individuals. She argues that this requires us to significantly revise our understanding of the moral status of non-combatants in war. Non-combatants who intentionally contribute to an unjust war forfeit their rights not to be harmed, such that they are morally liable to attack by combatants fighting a just war.

The world responded with horror to ISIS's campaign of destruction of cultural heritage across the Middle East, including with calls for an international response to prevent such damage. At the same time, newspapers and screens were filled with images of human destruction, devastated cities, and thousands of refugees fleeing the conflict. This juxtaposition caused a backlash against those voicing their concerns about the destruction of ancient ruins, popularly framed as dispute about 'stone versus lives'. In the face of so much human suffering, it can seem inappropriate to worry about anything but the urgent, basic needs of people. Heritage and War addresses this issue within the context of a wider debate, amidst a range of moral questions. Eleven original essays investigate a variety of philosophical and moral questions arising from the phenomenon of heritage destruction in war, such how we ought to respond to heritage that is damaged in war, the nature of the harm caused by such damage, and the morally appropriate treatment of sites of war and conflict that have themselves become heritage sites. Such issues are philosophically rich, and yet they have been largely neglected by academic philosophers. This book makes a substantial contribution to developing this new philosophical territory and identifying the role that philosophers have to play in developing our understanding of and responses to these important issues.

Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest, among both philosophers, legal scholars, and military experts, on the ethics of war. Due in part due to post 9/11 events, this resurgence is also due to a growing theoretical sophistication among scholars in this area. Recently there has been very influential work published on the justificaton of killing in self-defense and war, and the topic of the ethics of war is now more important than ever as a discrete field. The 28 commissioned chapters in this Handbook will present a comprehensive overview of the field as well as make significant and novel contributions, and collectively they will set the terms of the debate for the next decade. Lazar and Frowe will invite the leading scholars in the field to write on topics that are new to them, making the volume a compilation of fresh ideas rather than a rehash of earlier work. The volume will be dicided into five sections: Method, History, Resort, Conduct, and Aftermath. The contributors will be a mix of junior and senior figures, and will include well known scholars like Michael Walzer, Jeff McMahan, and David Rodin.

How We Fight: Ethics in War presents a substantial body of new work by some of the leading philosophers of war. The ten essays cover a range of topics concerned with both jus ad bellum (the morality of going to war) and jus in bello (the morality of fighting in war). Alongside explorations of classic in bello topics, such as the principle of non-combatant immunity and the distribution of risk between combatants and non-combatants, the volume also addresses ad bellum topics, such as pacifism and punitive justifications for war, and explores the relationship between ad bellum and in bello topics, or how the fighting of a war may affect our judgments concerning whether that war meets the ad bellum conditions. The essays take a keen interest in the micro-foundations of just war theory, and uphold the general assumption that the rules of war must be supported, if they are going to be supported at all, by the liability and non-liability of the individuals who are encompassed by those rules. Relatedly, the volume also contains work which is relevant to the moral justification of several moral doctrines used, either explicitly or implicitly, in just war theory: in the doctrine of double effect, in the generation of liability in basic self-defensive cases, and in the relationship between liability and the conditions which are normally appended to permissible self-defensive violence: imminence, necessity, and proportionality. The volume breaks new ground in all these areas.

Most people believe that it is sometimes morally permissible for a person to use force to defend herself or others against harm. In Defensive Killing, Helen Frowe offers a detailed exploration of when and why the use of such force is permissible. She begins by considering the use of force between individuals, investigating both the circumstances under which an attacker forfeits her right not to be harmed, and the distinct question of when it is all-things-considered permissible to use force against an attacker. Frowe then extends this enquiry to war, defending the view that we should judge the ethics of killing in war by the moral rules that govern killing between individuals. She argues that this requires us to significantly revise our understanding of the moral status of non-combatants in war. Non-combatants who intentionally contribute to an unjust war forfeit their rights not to be harmed, such that they are morally liable to attack by combatants fighting a just war.