This monograph asks the question, "How can the command and control system best support the AirLand Battle commander, i.e., what mix of technology and people is appropriate?" By tracing the historical evidence of liaison and liaison officers, and some of the current and proposed technological command and control aids, the study presents examples of how a commander has been successfully supported by his command and control system, and what some of the problems have been with both human and technological command and control aids. This monograph proposes a solution to the continuing problem facing commanders - how to have a clear picture of the battlefield and simultaneously transmit his intent to his subordinates. Liaison officers equipped with high technology equipment can serve the commander as a directed telescope system on the AirLand Battlefield. This monograph concludes that the best commanders have been the ones who made the command and control system work for them, and did not become slaves to the system. The study also concludes that its proposed solution - liaison officers equipped with high technology equipment - can improve the command and control system. By doing so, the commander can make his will and intent both informed and clearly transmitted.

This monograph asks the question: How does a commander at the operational level command and control his forces to achieve synchronization? The lessons of history suggest that the threads common to successful command and control can be identified. Perhaps these lessons hold clues for operational level commanders both now and in the future. Each of the illustrative examples demonstrates that successful operational synchronization can be achieved through effective command and control. The common threads identified from the illustrative examples of Napoleon, the Prussian/German General Staff system, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and Field Marshal William Slim include: a clear commander's intent, flexibility, tactical proficiency, the innovative use of assets, stability, forward command, unity of effort and simplicity, resulting in a common cultural bias. How these threads were applied by the United States in the Vietnam Conflict and the Iranian Rescue Mission is next examined. This monograph states that most of these common threads were violated in each of these illustrative examples. That these violations occurred is not necessarily bad, but they indicate symptoms of a possible systemic failure. This monograph recommends that the United States build a system of command and control based upon a stable, yet flexible common cultural bias, incorporating both the positive and negative lessons of history. This monograph concludes that effective command and control, based upon stable, compatible doctrine, will lead to a common cultural bias which will enhance unity of effort, and thus, the nation's defense.