This volume explores institutional and policy developments in the EU and its member states in a parallel examination of citizens' views of the effectiveness of crisis response reflected in public trust, output legitimacy, and satisfaction with democracy. Our approach to understanding the crisis posits EU-level governance and institutional change, national-level policymaking, and domestic politics as interrelated, interdependent domains of political action and public spheres that collectively shape the political landscape of post-crisis Europe. The volume sheds new light on the relationship among the institutional, policy, and polity consequences of the crisis. The book has two fundamental aims. The first is to demonstrate the interconnected nature of European governance, domestic reform, and democratic politics. The unprecedented complexity of the financial, sovereign debt, economic, and social crises in Europe has led to a political crisis that reflects the struggle to effectively address its various causes and effects. The second objective is to present a theoretically informed assessment of the consequences of the European crises for state-society relations and democratic legitimacy. Our analysis of the crisis in a variety of national contexts and European governance highlights the difficulties faced by political decision-makers. We find that the domestic policy process is selectively affected or disconnected from the process of rule-making at the EU level, that public opinion still matters in the process of policy formation and EU crisis response, and that the salience of the EU agenda in the domestic public sphere increasingly depends on the preferences of political actors. Public response to the crisis has become increasingly complex as well, ranging from declining trust in the political institutions, emerging national stereotypes, changing expectations of the EU level of crisis response, growing disconnect between political parties and voters, and evolving intra-regional distinctions across the EU's east-west divide.

The postcommunist countries were amongst the most fervent and committed adopters of neoliberal economic reforms. Not only did they manage to overcome the anticipated domestic opposition to 'shock therapy' and Washington Consensus reforms, but many fulfilled the membership requirements of the European Union and even adopted avant-garde neoliberal reforms like the flat tax and pension privatization. Neoliberalism in the postcommunist countries went farther and lasted longer than expected, but why? Unlike pre-existing theories based on domestic political-economic struggles, this book focuses on the imperatives of re-insertion into the international economy. Appel and Orenstein show how countries engaged in 'competitive signaling', enacting reforms in order to attract foreign investment. This signaling process explains the endurance and intensification of neoliberal reform in these countries for almost two decades, from 1989-2008, and its decline thereafter, when inflows of capital into the region suddenly dried up. This book will interest students of political economy and Eastern European and Eurasian politics.

The postcommunist countries were amongst the most fervent and committed adopters of neoliberal economic reforms. Not only did they manage to overcome the anticipated domestic opposition to 'shock therapy' and Washington Consensus reforms, but many fulfilled the membership requirements of the European Union and even adopted avant-garde neoliberal reforms like the flat tax and pension privatization. Neoliberalism in the postcommunist countries went farther and lasted longer than expected, but why? Unlike pre-existing theories based on domestic political-economic struggles, this book focuses on the imperatives of re-insertion into the international economy. Appel and Orenstein show how countries engaged in 'competitive signaling', enacting reforms in order to attract foreign investment. This signaling process explains the endurance and intensification of neoliberal reform in these countries for almost two decades, from 1989-2008, and its decline thereafter, when inflows of capital into the region suddenly dried up. This book will interest students of political economy and Eastern European and Eurasian politics.

After the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe, more than a dozen countries undertook aggressive privatization programs. Proponents of economic reform championed such large-scale efforts as the fastest, most reliable way to make the transition from a state-run to a capitalist economy.
The idea was widely embraced, and in the span of a few years, policymakers across the region repeatedly chose an approach that distributed vast amounts of state property to the private sector essentially for free-despite the absence of any historical precedent for such a radical concept. But privatization was not a panacea. It has, instead, become increasingly synonymous with collusion, corruption, and material deprivation.
Why was privatization so popular in the first place, and what went wrong? In answering this question, Hillary Appel breaks with mainstream empirical studies of postcommunist privatization.
By analyzing the design and development of programs in Russia, the Czech Republic, and across eastern Europe, Appel demonstrates how the transformation of property rights in these countries was first and foremost an ideologically driven process. Looking beyond simple economic calculations or pressure from the international community, she argues that privatization was part and parcel of the foundation of the postcommunist state.
"A New Capitalist Order" reveals that privatization was designed and implemented by pro-market reformers not only to distribute gains and losses to powerful supporters, but also to advance a decidedly Western, liberal vision of the new postcommunist state. Moreover, specific ideologies-such as anticommunism, liberalism, or nationalism, to name but a few-profoundly influenced the legitimacy, the power, and even the material preferences of key economic actors and groups within the privatization process.