First published in 1990, this is a reissue of Professor Hilary Putnam 's dissertation thesis, written in 1951, which concerns itself with The Meaning of the Concept of Probability in Application to Finite Sequences and the problems of the deductive justification for induction. Written under the direction of Putnam 's mentor, Hans Reichenbach, the book considers Reichenbach 's idealization of very long finite sequences as infinite sequences and the bearing this has upon Reichenbach 's pragmatic vindication of induction.

A collection of Hilary Putnam's stimulating, incisive responses to such varied and eminent thinkers as Richard Rorty, Jurgen Habermas, Noam Chomsky, Martha Nussbaum, W. V. Quine, Wilfrid Sellars, John McDowell, and Cornel West. Hilary Putnam (1926-2016) was renowned-some would say infamous-for changing his philosophical positions over the course of his long and much-admired career. This collection of essays, the first of its kind, showcases how his ideas evolved as he wrestled with the work of his contemporaries. Divided into five thematic sections, Philosophy as Dialogue begins with questions of language and formal logic, tracing Putnam's reactions to the arguments of Wilfrid Sellars, Noam Chomsky, Charles Travis, and Tyler Burge. Next, it brings together Putnam's responses to realists and antirealists, philosophers of science and of perception, followed by forays into pragmatism and skepticism. While Putnam devoted most of his efforts to logic, mathematics, and the philosophy of mind, he also took up issues in moral philosophy, politics, and religion. Here we read him in conversation with giants of these fields, including Martha Nussbaum, Jurgen Habermas, Elizabeth Anscombe, Cora Diamond, Richard Rorty, and Franz Rosenzweig. Finally, Philosophy as Dialogue presents Putnam's deeply personal and largely unknown writing on philosophical method that reveals the influence of W. V. Quine, Michael Dummett, and Stanley Cavell on his work. Once more, Mario De Caro and David Macarthur have presented and introduced a choice selection of Hilary Putnam's writings that will change the way he is understood. Most of all, these thirty-six replies and responses to his contemporaries showcase the extraordinary-perhaps even unparalleled-breadth of his work, and his capacity to engage deeply with seemingly every mode of philosophy.

First published in 1990, this is a reissue of Professor Hilary Putnam's dissertation thesis, written in 1951, which concerns itself with The Meaning of the Concept of Probability in Application to Finite Sequences and the problems of the deductive justification for induction. Written under the direction of Putnam's mentor, Hans Reichenbach, the book considers Reichenbach's idealization of very long finite sequences as infinite sequences and the bearing this has upon Reichenbach's pragmatic vindication of induction.

Hilary Putnam's unceasing self-criticism has led to the frequent changes of mind he is famous for, but his thinking is also marked by considerable continuity. A simultaneous interest in science and ethics-unusual in the current climate of contention-has long characterized his thought. In Philosophy in an Age of Science, Putnam collects his papers for publication-his first volume in almost two decades. Mario De Caro and David Macarthur's introduction identifies central themes to help the reader negotiate between Putnam past and Putnam present: his critique of logical positivism; his enduring aspiration to be realist about rational normativity; his anti-essentialism about a range of central philosophical notions; his reconciliation of the scientific worldview and the humanistic tradition; and his movement from reductive scientific naturalism to liberal naturalism. Putnam returns here to some of his first enthusiasms in philosophy, such as logic, mathematics, and quantum mechanics. The reader is given a glimpse, too, of ideas currently in development on the subject of perception. Putnam's work, contributing to a broad range of philosophical inquiry, has been said to represent a "history of recent philosophy in outline." Here it also delineates a possible future.

Here, in a new edition, is Nelson Goodman's provocative philosophical classic--a book that, according to "Science," "raised a storm of controversy" when it was first published in 1954, and one that remains on the front lines of philosophical debate.

How is it that we feel confident in generalizing from experience in some ways but not in others? How are generalizations that are warranted to be distinguished from those that are not? Goodman shows that these questions resist formal solution and his demonstration has been taken by nativists like Chomsky and Fodor as proof that neither scientific induction nor ordinary learning can proceed without an "a priori," or innate, ordering of hypotheses.

In his new foreword to this edition, Hilary Putnam forcefully rejects these nativist claims. The controversy surrounding these unsolved problems is as relevant to the psychology of cognitive development as it is to the philosophy of science. No serious student of either discipline can afford to misunderstand Goodman's classic argument.

Hilary Putnam's ever-evolving philosophical oeuvre has been called "the history of recent philosophy in outline"-an intellectual achievement, nearly seventy years in the making, that has shaped disciplinary fields from epistemology to ethics, metaphysics to the philosophy of physics, the philosophy of mathematics to the philosophy of mind. Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity offers new avenues into the thought of one of the most influential minds in contemporary analytic philosophy. The essays collected here cover a range of interconnected topics including naturalism, commonsense and scientific realism, ethics, perception, language and linguistics, and skepticism. Aptly illustrating Putnam's willingness to revisit and revise past arguments, they contain important new insights and freshly illuminate formulations that will be familiar to students of his work: his rejection of the idea that an absolute conception of the world is obtainable; his criticism of a nihilistic view of ethics that claims to be scientifically based; his pathbreaking distinction between sensations and apperceptions; and his use of externalist semantics to invalidate certain forms of skepticism. Above all, Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity reflects Putnam's thinking on how to articulate a theory of naturalism which acknowledges that normative phenomena form an ineluctable part of human experience, thereby reconciling scientific and humanistic views of the world that have long appeared incompatible.

Throughout his diverse and highly influential career, Hilary Putnam was famous for changing his mind. As a pragmatist he treated philosophical "positions" as experiments in deliberate living. His aim was not to fix on one position but to attempt to do justice to the depth and complexity of reality. In this new collection, he and Ruth Anna Putnam argue that key elements of the classical pragmatism of William James and John Dewey provide a framework for the most progressive and forward-looking forms of philosophy in contemporary thought. The Putnams present a compelling defense of the radical originality of the philosophical ideas of James and Dewey and their usefulness in confronting the urgent social, political, and moral problems of the twenty-first century. Pragmatism as a Way of Life brings together almost all of the Putnams' pragmatist writings-essays they wrote as individuals and as coauthors. The pragmatism they endorse, though respectful of the sciences, is an open experience-based philosophy of our everyday lives that trenchantly criticizes the fact/value dualism running through contemporary culture. Hilary Putnam argues that all facts are dependent on cognitive values, while Ruth Anna Putnam turns the problem around, illuminating the factual basis of moral principles. Together, they offer a shared vision which, in Hilary's words, "could serve as a manifesto for what the two of us would like philosophy to look like in the twenty-first century and beyond."

Distinguished philosopher Hilary Putnam, who is also a practicing Jew, questions the thought of three major Jewish philosophers of the 20th century Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, and Emmanuel Levinas to help him reconcile the philosophical and religious sides of his life. An additional presence in the book is Ludwig Wittgenstein, who, although not a practicing Jew, thought about religion in ways that Putnam juxtaposes to the views of Rosenzweig, Buber, and Levinas. Putnam explains the leading ideas of each of these great thinkers, bringing out what, in his opinion, constitutes the decisive intellectual and spiritual contributions of each of them. Although the religion discussed is Judaism, the depth and originality of these philosophers, as incisively interpreted by Putnam, make their thought nothing less than a guide to life."

"The first two lectures place the alternative I defend -- a kind of pragmatic realism -- in a historical and metaphysical context. Part of that context is provided by Husserl's remark that the history of modern philosophy begins with Galileo -- that is, modern philosophy has been hypnotized by the idea that scientific facts are all the facts there are. Another part is provided by the analysis of a very simple example of what I call 'contextual relativity'. The position I defend holds that truth depends on conceptual scheme and it is nonetheless 'real truth'.

"In my third lecture I turn to the Kantian antecedents of this view, explaining what I think should be retained of the Kantian idea of autonomy as the central theme of morality, and extracting from Kant's work a 'moral image of the world' that connects the ideals of equality and intellectual liberty. In this lecture I defend the idea that moral images are an indispensible part of our moral and cultural heritage.

"In the final lecture I defend the idea of moral objectivity. I compare our epistemological positions in ethics, history, analysis of human character, and science, and I argue that in no area can we hope for a 'foundation' which is more ultimate than the beliefs that actually, at a given time, function as foundational in the area, the beliefs concerning which one has to say 'this is where my spade is turned'. In ethics such beliefs are represented in moral images of the world".

The volumes in this series bring together the papers of one of America's most distinguished philosophers. The first two volumes, which appeared in 1975, marked his highly significant and original contribution in a number of related fields and were praised for their "technical sophistication, clear-sightedness, depth, and power." The third volume contains the major essays written since then and reveals modifications of and amplifications on some of Professor Putnam's beliefs.

Includes several classic essays from the first edition, a representative selection of the most influential work of the past twenty years, a substantial introduction, and an extended bibliography. Originally published by Prentice-Hall in 1964.

The six lectures gathered in this book by one of the most distinguished contemporary American philosophers discuss from an innovative perspective whether or not ethical judgments can be considered objective. In the first four lectures, given at the University of Perugia in Italy, Putnam considers that ethics are used to solve practical problems, not to establish universal principles, and he argues that ethics are characterized by an objectivity analogous to that of mathematics but that trying to explain the objectivity of mathematics and ethics in ontological terms is a big mistake. Ontology, understood as the part of philosophy that deals with existence, would be the result of a great misunderstanding that has perpetuated under different forms from the Greeks to Quine. In the last two lectures, given at the University of Amsterdam, Putnam puts his reconceptualization of ethics in a historical context and proposes a narrative of intellectual and moral progress based on the succession of three enlightenments: the Platonic, that of the 17th and 18th centuries, and John Dewey's Pragmatist. Faced with cultural relativism and an uncertainty that brings an "infinite regression of interpretations" of current postmodern thought, Putnam defends the possibility of justifying in a contextualized way the resolution of problems and conflicts of ethical and political character.

In this brief book one of the most distinguished living American philosophers takes up the question of whether ethical judgments can properly be considered objective--a question that has vexed philosophers over the past century. Looking at the efforts of philosophers from the Enlightenment through the twentieth century, Putnam traces the ways in which ethical problems arise in a historical context. Hilary Putnam's central concern is ontology--indeed, the very idea of ontology as the division of philosophy concerned with what (ultimately) exists. Reviewing what he deems the disastrous consequences of ontology's influence on analytic philosophy--in particular, the contortions it imposes upon debates about the objective of ethical judgments--Putnam proposes abandoning the very idea of ontology. He argues persuasively that the attempt to provide an ontological explanation of the objectivity of either mathematics or ethics is, in fact, an attempt to provide justifications that are extraneous to mathematics and ethics--and is thus deeply misguided.

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) was an American philosopher, physicist, mathematician, and the founder of pragmatism. Despite his importance in the history of philosophy, a unified statement of his thought has been unavailable. With this publication, readers at long last are offered the philosopher's only known, complete, and coherent account of his own work. Originally delivered as the Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898, Reasoning and the Logic of Things is the most accessible and thorough introduction to Peirce's mature thought to be found within the compass of a single book. Beginning with an explanation of the nature of philosophy, Peirce proceeds to illustrate his claim that mathematics provides the foundation of our logic and metaphysics. We find here the clearest formulation of an idea present in Peirce's thought since the 1860s, the distinction between three kinds of reasoning: induction, deduction, and retroduction. Then follows an introduction to Peirce's chief logical doctrines, as well as his attempts to provide a classification of the sciences, a theory of categories, and a theory of science. In conclusion, turning from "reasoning" to the "logic of things," Peirce called for an evolutionary cosmology to explain the reality of laws and described the kinds of reasoning he employed in developing this cosmology. At the urging of his friend William James, Peirce made an uncharacteristic effort in these lectures to present his ideas in terms intelligible to a general audience-those without advanced training in logic and philosophy. The introductory materials by Kenneth Ketner and Hilary Putman add to the volume's lucidity. Consequently, this book will be a valuable source for readers outside of the circle of Peirce specialists.

This is the third volume of Hilary Putnam’s philosophical papers, published in paperback for the first time. The volume contains his major essays from 1975 to 1982, which reveal a large shift in emphasis in the ‘realist’ position developed in his earlier work. While not renouncing those views, Professor Putnam has continued to explore their epistemological consequences and conceptual history. He now, crucially, sees theories of truth and of meaning that derive from a firm notion of reference as inadequate.

Concerned with some of the most fundamental problems in philosophy, the nature of truth, knowledge, and rationality, Putnam's aim is to break down the fixed categories of thought that have always appeared to define and constrain the permissible solutions to these problems.

Professor Hilary Putnam has been one of the most influential and sharply original of recent American philosophers in a whole range of fields. His most important published work is collected here, together with several new and substantial studies, in two volumes. The first deals with the philosophy of mathematics and of science and the nature of philosophical and scientific enquiry; the second deals with the philosophy of language and mind. Volume one is now issued in a new edition, including an essay on the philosophy of logic first published in 1971.