This book argues that any strategy for dealing with Pakistan requires an understanding of the country's complex and turbulent history and of the weaknesses of its political and other institutions. It describes how, in the absence of an inherent national identity, successive military and civilian governments have made use of Islam and Kashmir,the unfinished business of Partition for political purposes. It also examines the role of the army and of its intelligence service, the ISI, in relation to India, Afghanistan and internal political manipulation. The nature and history of the tribal regions in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which are little understood in the West and which explain much of the animosity towards the US, are also described in detail. After 9/11, Pakistan's support for counter-terrorism and military operations in Afghanistan increased the population's animosity towards the West and hence the government's difficulties in delivering. Meanwhile, the military leadership hedged its bets by maintaining links with militant organisations and with a re-emerged Taliban. With the arrival of an elected leadership, the emergence of simultaneous political, economic and security crises, tactical errors by the West, and the Mumbai terrorist attacks in late 2008, the situation was complicated further. The book concludes with recommendations, aimed particularly at the new US administration, for a durable long-term relationship with Pakistan, entailing increased attention and resources devoted to institution-building and, over time, the reduction of the role and influence of the army.

Instead of a nuclear flash-point in Cuba or the Korean Peninsula, could the world now be facing one in a Kashmiri mountain village? The nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998 shook the region, challenged the near-global consensus on non-proliferation and increased the risk that other states would follow suit. The international community has been largely powerless in its response. In the wake of the tests the regions underlying problems have become yet more intractable, the need to resolve them more urgent than ever. This paper argues that attempts to deal with the consequences of the tests are inseparable from the history of nuclear developments in both India and Pakistan.;Sanctions have not succeeded in changing policy in the region and more pragmatic responses are necessary. For example, political stability should be encouraged within the countries concerned, in their relations with each other, and in the wider region. Arms control and measures to increase confidence and security also need to be re-examined and adapted to the changed circumstances.

This book argues that any strategy for dealing with Pakistan requires an understanding of the country's complex and turbulent history and of the weaknesses of its political and other institutions. It describes how, in the absence of an inherent national identity, successive military and civilian governments have made use of Islam and Kashmir, 'the unfinished business of Partition', for political purposes. It also examines the role of the army and of its intelligence service, the ISI, in relation to India, Afghanistan and internal political manipulation.

The nature and history of the tribal regions in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which are little understood in the West and which explain much of the animosity towards the US, are also described in detail.

After 9/11, Pakistan's support for counter-terrorism and military operations in Afghanistan increased the population's animosity towards the West and hence the government's difficulties in delivering. Meanwhile, the military leadership hedged its bets by maintaining links with militant organisations and with a re-emerged Taliban. With the arrival of an elected leadership, the emergence of simultaneous political, economic and security crises, tactical errors by the West, and the Mumbai terrorist attacks in late 2008, the situation was complicated further.

The book concludes with recommendations, aimed particularly at the new US administration, for a durable long-term relationship with Pakistan, entailing increased attention and resources devoted to institution-building and, over time, the reduction of the role and influence of the army.

The phonecall came from out of the blue, just when Sir Hilary Synnott was looking forward to retirement after helping steer India and Pakistan back from the verge of nuclear war. "It's about Iraq. We need a King of the South..."Bad Days in Basra" is the story of Synnott's time as Britain's most senior representative in Southern Iraq, trying to keep the region together as the rest of the country descended in to murderous violence. By turns wryly comic, revealing and heart-breaking, it offers a never seen before glimpse in to the high politics of the occupation. Shuttling between the gilded palaces of the Green Zone and the leaky outhouses which constituted Coalition HQ in Basra, Synnott had to negotiate his boss, Paul Bremer's brash indifference to what was going outside Baghdad, the indecisiveness of his London masters, and the brutal political realities of a country under occupation.Bearing witness for the first time to the chaotic fashion in which the coalition was run at the highest levels, Synnott's unique insider account is the most important primary source we yet have on how the South was lost. It offers new insights in to the style and motivations of key characters such as Bremer himself, US commander General David Petraeus and the then UK Foreign Minister Jack Straw. It provides an entertaining and witty portrait of the absurdities of life inside the occupying coalition, a devastating critique of CPA policies and controversial revelations about the real relationship between the two occupying powers, Britain and America.