The third edition of this popular core textbook provides wide-ranging coverage of the structure, internal working, policies and performance of international organizations such as the UN, EU, IMF and World Bank. Such organizations have never been so important in addressing the challenges that face our increasingly globalised world. This book introduces students to theories with which to approach international organizations, their history, and their ability to respond to contemporary issues in world politics from nuclear disarmament, climate change and human rights protection, to trade, monetary and financial relations, and international development. Underpinning the text is the authors' unique model that views international organizations as actual organizations. Reacting to world events, political actors provide the 'inputs' which are converted by the political systems of these organizations (through various decision-making procedures) into 'outputs' that achieve varying levels of real-world impact and effectiveness. This is the perfect text for undergraduate and postgraduate students of politics and international relations taking courses on International organization and global governance, as well as essential reading for those studying the UN, the EU and Globalization. New to this Edition: - Draws on the most recent research in the field and considers some of the significant world events of the last decade to ensure that the book is completely up to date. - Two separate chapters considering Trade and Development, and Finance and Monetary Relations respectively. - Fully accounts for the challenges to international organizations by the emerging powers, the Trump administration and Brexit

From the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the NATO International Staff and the European External Action Service, international bureaucrats make decisions that affect life and death. In carrying out their functions, these officials not only facilitate the work of the member states, but also pursue their own distinct agendas. This book analyzes how states seek to control secretariats when it comes to military operations by international organizations. It introduces an innovative theoretical framework that identifies different types of control mechanisms. The book presents six empirical chapters on the UN, NATO, and EU secretariats. It provides new data from a unique dataset and in-depth interviews. It shows that member states employ a wide range of control mechanisms to reduce the potential loss of influence. They frequently forfeit the gains of delegation to avoid becoming dependent on the work of secretariats. Yet while states invest heavily in control, this book also argues that they cannot benefit from the services of secretariats and keep full control over outcomes in international organizations. In their delegation and control decisions, states face trade-offs and have to weigh different cost categories: the costs of policy, administrative capacity, and agency loss. This book will be of interest to scholars, postgraduates, and officials in international organizations and national governments, dealing with questions of international political economy, security studies, and military affairs.

From the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the NATO International Staff and the European External Action Service, international bureaucrats make decisions that affect life and death. In carrying out their functions, these officials not only facilitate the work of the member states, but also pursue their own distinct agendas. This book analyzes how states seek to control secretariats when it comes to military operations by international organizations. It introduces an innovative theoretical framework that identifies different types of control mechanisms. The book presents six empirical chapters on the UN, NATO, and EU secretariats. It provides new data from a unique dataset and in-depth interviews. It shows that member states employ a wide range of control mechanisms to reduce the potential loss of influence. They frequently forfeit the gains of delegation to avoid becoming dependent on the work of secretariats. Yet while states invest heavily in control, this book also argues that they cannot benefit from the services of secretariats and keep full control over outcomes in international organizations. In their delegation and control decisions, states face trade-offs and have to weigh different cost categories: the costs of policy, administrative capacity, and agency loss. This book will be of interest to scholars, postgraduates, and officials in international organizations and national governments, dealing with questions of international political economy, security studies, and military affairs.