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Professor Jarvie examines the nature of the revolution in social
anthropology in order to investigate its results. Working within
Karl Popper's radical view of the nature of science, he argues that
the subject is one of the oldest and most fundamental of all
studies and suggests it can easily be traced back to Plato and
Aristotle, not merely as a matter of historical curiosity, but as
having fruitful results for the understanding of Malinowski and the
revolution.
First published in 1998. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor &
Francis, an informa company.
First published in 1998. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor &
Francis, an informa company.
Professor Jarvie examines the nature of the revolution in social
anthropology in order to investigate its results. Working within
Karl Popper's radical view of the nature of science, he argues that
the subject is one of the oldest and most fundamental of all
studies and suggests it can easily be traced back to Plato and
Aristotle, not merely as a matter of historical curiosity, but as
having fruitful results for the understanding of Malinowski and the
revolution.
Anthropology revolves round answers to problems about the nature,
development and unity of mankind; problems that are both
philosophical and scientific. In this book, first published in
1984, Professor Jarvie applies Popper's philosophy of science to
understanding the history and theory of anthropology. Jarvie
describes how the ancient view that the aim of science and
philosophy was to get at the truth is challenged in anthropology by
the doctrine of cultural relativism; that is, that truth varies
with the cultural framework. He shows how philosophers as various
as Peter Winch, W.V.O. Quine, W.T. Jones, Nelson Goodman and
Richard Rorty were influenced by this doctrine. Yet these
philosophers also accept the value of rational argument. Jarvie
believes that there is a contradiction between relativism and any
notion of human rationality that centres around argument. Forced by
the contradiction to choose between rationality and relativism, he
argues strongly that logical, scientific and moral considerations
favour rationality and urge repudiation of relativism. The central
argument of the book is that relativism is intellectually
disastrous and has fostered intellectual attitudes from which
anthropology still suffers.
I suppose Joseph Agassi's best and dearest self-description, his
cher ished wish, is to practice what his 1988 book promises: The
Gentle Art of Philosophical Polemics. But for me, and for so many
who know him, our Agassi is tough-minded, not tender, not so
gentle. True to his beloved critical thinking, he is ever the
falsificationist, testing himself of course as much as everyone
else. How, he asks himself, can he engage others in their own
self-critical exploration? Irritate? Question their logic, their
facts, their presuppositions, their rationales? Subvert their
reasoning, uncover their motives? Help them to lose their balance,
but always help them, make them do it to, and for, themselves. Out
of their own mouths, and minds, and imagination. A unique teacher,
in classroom and out; not for everyone. Agassi is not quite a tight
textual Talmudist disputant, not quite the competitor in the
marketplace of ideas offered for persuasive sale, not quite the
clever cross-examining lawyer advocate, not quite a
philosopher-scientist, not a sceptic more than necessary, not quite
embat tled in the bloody world but not ever above the battle either
. . . but a good deal of all of these, and steeped in intelligence
and good will."
An outstanding feature of this book is the broad range of the
contributors, drawn from Europe, the Middle East and North America,
testifying both to the range of Professor Agassi's interests and
the geographical spread of his influence. Most contributors use
Agassi's ideas as a springboard to engage in debate on issues, or
offer a contribution in an area that interests him. In this volume
contributors consider such questions as Agassi's philosophy of
education, in practice as well as in theory; the impact of
psychologism in philosophy; the origins of critical rationalism in
the Bible; the debates in economics stimulated by the work of
Popper and Agassi, and many other topics. Besides the special
topics, the reader gains some sense of the fruitfulness of critical
rationalism in the hands of Agassi's friends and colleagues.
I suppose Joseph Agassi's best and dearest self-description, his
cher ished wish, is to practice what his 1988 book promises: The
Gentle Art of Philosophical Polemics. But for me, and for so many
who know him, our Agassi is tough-minded, not tender, not so
gentle. True to his beloved critical thinking, he is ever the
falsificationist, testing himself of course as much as everyone
else. How, he asks himself, can he engage others in their own
self-critical exploration? Irritate? Question their logic, their
facts, their presuppositions, their rationales? Subvert their
reasoning, uncover their motives? Help them to lose their balance,
but always help them, make them do it to, and for, themselves. Out
of their own mouths, and minds, and imagination. A unique teacher,
in classroom and out; not for everyone. Agassi is not quite a tight
textual Talmudist disputant, not quite the competitor in the
marketplace of ideas offered for persuasive sale, not quite the
clever cross-examining lawyer advocate, not quite a
philosopher-scientist, not a sceptic more than necessary, not quite
embat tled in the bloody world but not ever above the battle either
. . . but a good deal of all of these, and steeped in intelligence
and good will."
An outstanding feature of this book is the broad range of the
contributors, drawn from Europe, the Middle East and North America,
testifying both to the range of Professor Agassi's interests and
the geographical spread of his influence. Most contributors use
Agassi's ideas as a springboard to engage in debate on issues, or
offer a contribution in an area that interests him. In this volume
contributors consider such questions as Agassi's philosophy of
education, in practice as well as in theory; the impact of
psychologism in philosophy; the origins of critical rationalism in
the Bible; the debates in economics stimulated by the work of
Popper and Agassi, and many other topics. Besides the special
topics, the reader gains some sense of the fruitfulness of critical
rationalism in the hands of Agassi's friends and colleagues.
In our papers on the rationality of magic, we distinghuished, for
purposes of analysis, three levels of rationality. First and lowest
(rationalitYl) the goal directed action of an agent with given aims
and circumstances, where among his circumstances we included his
knowledge and opinions. On this level the magician's treatment of
illness by incantation is as rational as any traditional doctor's
blood-letting or any modern one's use of anti-biotics. At the
second level (rationalitY2) we add the element of rational thinking
or thinking which obeys some set of explicit rules, a level which
is not found in magic in general, though it is sometimes given to
specific details of magical thinking within the magical
thought-system. It was the late Sir Edward E. Evans-Pritchard who
observed that when considering magic in detail the magician may be
as consistent or critical as anyone else; but when considering
magic in general, or any system of thought in general, the magician
could not be critical or even comprehend the criticism.
Evans-Pritchard went even further: he was sceptical as to whether
it could be done in a truly consistent manner: one cannot be
critical of one's own system, he thought. On this level
(rationalitY2) of discussion we have explained (earlier) why we
prefer to wed Evans Pritchard's view of the magician's capacity for
piece-meal rationality to Sir James Frazer's view that magic in
general is pseudo-rational because it lacks standards of rational
thinking."
In our papers on the rationality of magic, we distinghuished, for
purposes of analysis, three levels of rationality. First and lowest
(rationalitYl) the goal directed action of an agent with given aims
and circumstances, where among his circumstances we included his
knowledge and opinions. On this level the magician's treatment of
illness by incantation is as rational as any traditional doctor's
blood-letting or any modern one's use of anti-biotics. At the
second level (rationalitY2) we add the element of rational thinking
or thinking which obeys some set of explicit rules, a level which
is not found in magic in general, though it is sometimes given to
specific details of magical thinking within the magical
thought-system. It was the late Sir Edward E. Evans-Pritchard who
observed that when considering magic in detail the magician may be
as consistent or critical as anyone else; but when considering
magic in general, or any system of thought in general, the magician
could not be critical or even comprehend the criticism.
Evans-Pritchard went even further: he was sceptical as to whether
it could be done in a truly consistent manner: one cannot be
critical of one's own system, he thought. On this level
(rationalitY2) of discussion we have explained (earlier) why we
prefer to wed Evans Pritchard's view of the magician's capacity for
piece-meal rationality to Sir James Frazer's view that magic in
general is pseudo-rational because it lacks standards of rational
thinking."
Anthropology revolves round answers to problems about the nature,
development and unity of mankind; problems that are both
philosophical and scientific. In this book, first published in
1984, Professor Jarvie applies Popper's philosophy of science to
understanding the history and theory of anthropology. Jarvie
describes how the ancient view that the aim of science and
philosophy was to get at the truth is challenged in anthropology by
the doctrine of cultural relativism; that is, that truth varies
with the cultural framework. He shows how philosophers as various
as Peter Winch, W.V.O. Quine, W.T. Jones, Nelson Goodman and
Richard Rorty were influenced by this doctrine. Yet these
philosophers also accept the value of rational argument. Jarvie
believes that there is a contradiction between relativism and any
notion of human rationality that centres around argument. Forced by
the contradiction to choose between rationality and relativism, he
argues strongly that logical, scientific and moral considerations
favour rationality and urge repudiation of relativism. The central
argument of the book is that relativism is intellectually
disastrous and has fostered intellectual attitudes from which
anthropology still suffers.
This set of essays is concerned with the explanation of large scale
social change. Concentration is on the social stagnation
characteristic of agrarian circumstances, the conditions for exit
from that world, and the varied social orders that inhabit,
sometimes precariously, the modern world community. The
distinguished contributors from archaeology, anthropology,
sociology, economic history and philosophy, have all been
stimulated by the work of Ernest Gellner, and the essays are in
dialogue with his view of our social condition.
This set of essays is concerned with the explanation of large scale social change. Concentration is on the social stagnation characteristic of agrarian circumstances, the conditions for exit from that world, and the varied social orders that inhabit, sometimes precariously, the modern world community. The distinguished contributors from archaeology, anthropology, sociology, economic history and philosophy, have all been stimulated by the work of Ernest Gellner, and the essays are in dialogue with his view of our social condition.
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