Do American policymakers really know what the American public wants in U.S. foreign policy? Through extensive interviews with members of the policy community, the authors reveal a pervasive belief --especially in Congress --that, in the wake of the cold war, the public is showing a new isolationism: opposition to foreign aid, hostility to the United Nations, and aversion to contributing U.S. troops to peacekeeping operations. This view of the public has in turn had a significant impact on U.S. foreign policy. However, through a comprehensive review of polling data, as well as focus groups, the authors show that all these beliefs about the public are myths. The public does complain that the United States is playing the role of dominant world leader more than it should, but this does not lead to a desire to withdraw. Instead people prefer to share responsibility with other nations, particularly through the UN. The authors offer explanations of how such a misperception can occur and suggest ways to improve communication between the public and policymakers, including better presentation of polling data and more attention by practitioners to a wider public.

"The alliance between Japan and the United States has entered a new era. Successful in promoting mutually beneficial relations during the cold war era, it must now be adapted to a world of detente and new dealings with China. Effective in helping the vulnerable postwar Japanese economy recover domestically and expand its trade internationally, it is now confronted with the different issues accompanying Japan's rise to third rank among the world's economic powers. The alliance remains important because effective cooperation between Japan and the United States is indispensable to regional stability in East Asia and to a workable world economic order. This study of the politics and processes that influence U.S.-Japanese relations draws heavily on three episodes: revision of the bilateral security treaty in 1960; agreement on reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1969; and the dispute in 1969-71 over Japanese textile exports to the United States. All three illustrate differences and similarities in the national political and bureaucratic institutions through which policy decisions and actions are taken, how officials in each government perceive actions taken by the other, and recurrent patterns of misperception. The authors' analysis of U.S. and Japanese negotiating tactics constitutes a guide to effective political management and consensus-building within each country. The study also accounts for the ways in which issues arise, the channels through which they are negotiated, and the effect of actions in one system on decisionmaking in the other. The authors conclude with suggestions about how to reduce tension and promote constructive bilateral relations-suggestions that they believe to be relevant to the conduct of U.S. relations with other major allies. "

In this comprehensive revision of the most influential, widely read analysis of the US trade policymaking system, Destler addresses how globalization has reshaped trade politics, weakening traditional protectionism but intensifying concern about trade's societal impacts. Entirely new chapters treat the deepening of partisan divisions and the rise of ?trade and . . .? issues (especially labor and the environment). The author concludes with a comprehensive economic and political strategy to cope with globalization and maximize its benefits. The original edition of American Trade Politics won the Gladys Kammerer Award of the American Political Science Association for the best book on US national policy. The new edition contains three completely new chapters (9-11), plus an extensively reshaped concluding chapter (12). All of the other chapters have been revised and edited.

In January 1993, President Bill Clinton established in his Executive Office the National Economic Council, parallel to the National Security Council born 45 years before. Its official purpose was to "coordinate the economic policymaking process with respect to domestic and international economic issues." The NEC was the President's staff instrument for fulfilling his campaign promise to give top priority to the American economy. Under its first director, Robert E. Rubin, the NEC orchestrated the development of Clinton's comprehensive deficit reduction plan. Then and since, it has sought to coordinate policy on a range of issues, particularly in the area of international trade. Now, as the NEC nears its fourth anniversary, it is appropriate to assess its record. How effectively has it played the role the president assigned it? Has its role been institutionalized, so the NEC can endure as the NSC has endured? Destler reviews its performance across a range of issues, from its two years under Rubin to its role under his successor, Laura Tyson. The analysis concludes with recommendations for strengthening the NEC in 1997 and beyond.

Imports pour into the United States, up by 79 percent in six years. The trade deficit more than doubles. The House of Representatives solidly rejects a bill that would liberalize global and regional trade and endorses import quotas for a major manufactured product by a two-to-one margin. Although at first glance these events of the 1990s might sound like past chapters of US trade politics, in fact the political dynamics have changed in significant ways. As the impact of globalization comes into focus, politically important constituencies have begun to resist trade liberalization. Labor and environmental groups in particular, demanding that their concerns be addressed, have succeeded in fracturing the long-standing, bipartisan, protrade coalition in Congress, and in the process have undercut US leadership in liberalizing global trade. This new study reexamines the landscape of trade politics. It shows how trade advocates and labor and environmental skeptics differ significantly in both their substantive views and their political and organizational cultures. The authors demonstrate how this new challenge differs from that of traditional trade protectionism, likening it instead to the debate a century ago over whether and how to regulate American capitalism for social purposes. The analysis leads to a set of recommendations aimed at constructive compromise and a new political foundation for US trade policy leadership.

The most solemn obligation of any president is to safeguard the nation's security. But the president cannot do this alone. He needs help. In the past half century, presidents have relied on their national security advisers to provide that help.

Who are these people, the powerful officials who operate in the shadow of the Oval Office, often out of public view and accountable only to the presidents who put them there? Some remain obscure even to this day. But quite a number have names that resonate far beyond the foreign policy elite: McGeorge Bundy, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice.

Ivo Daalder and Mac Destler provide the first inside look at how presidents from John F. Kennedy to George W. Bush have used their national security advisers to manage America's engagements with the outside world. They paint vivid portraits of the fourteen men and one woman who have occupied the coveted office in the West Wing, detailing their very different personalities, their relations with their presidents, and their policy successes and failures.

It all started with Kennedy and Bundy, the brilliant young Harvard dean who became the nation's first modern national security adviser. While Bundy served Kennedy well, he had difficulty with his successor. Lyndon Johnson needed reassurance more than advice, and Bundy wasn't always willing to give him that. Thus the basic lesson -- the president sets the tone and his aides must respond to that reality.

The man who learned the lesson best was someone who operated mainly in the shadows. Brent Scowcroft was the only adviser to serve two presidents, Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush. Learning from others' failures, he found the winning formula: gain the trust of colleagues, build a collaborative policy process, and stay close to the president. This formula became the gold standard -- all four national security advisers who came after him aspired to be "like Brent."

The next president and national security adviser can learn not only from success, but also from failure. Rice stayed close to George W. Bush -- closer perhaps than any adviser before or since. But her closeness did not translate into running an effective policy process, as the disastrous decision to invade Iraq without a plan underscored. It would take years, and another national security aide, to persuade Bush that his Iraq policy was failing and to engineer a policy review that produced the "surge."

The national security adviser has one tough job. There are ways to do it well and ways to do it badly. Daalder and Destler provide plenty of examples of both. This book is a fascinating look at the personalities and processes that shape policy and an indispensable guide to those who want to understand how to operate successfully in the shadow of the Oval Office.