A collection of carefully selected contributions to behavioral economics from some of the leading international scholars in the field. Designed to fully complement Volume One, topics covered include preferences, behavioral game theory, motivated mental states and emotions and decision making.

This volume brings together contributions to the burgeoning research area of behavioral economics from a number of well-known international scholars in the field. Topics covered include 'irrational' conducts; imperfect self-knowledge; imperfect memory; time and utility; and experimental practices in psychology, economics, and finance. This book will provide a point of entry to anyone wishing to discover what the intellectual terrain between economics and psychology looks like.

This volume brings together contributions to the burgeoning research area of behavioral economics from a number of well-known international scholars in the field. Topics covered include 'irrational' conducts; imperfect self-knowledge; imperfect memory; time and utility; and experimental practices in psychology, economics, and finance. This book will provide a point of entry to anyone wishing to discover what the intellectual terrain between economics and psychology looks like.

This volume brings together contributions to the burgeoning research area of behavioural economics from a number of well-known international scholars in the field. Topics covered include 'irrational' conducts; imperfect self-knowledge; imperfect memory; time and utility; and experimental practices in psychology, economics, and finance. The book will provide a point of entry to anyone wishing to investigate the intellectual terrain between economics and psychology.

What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis.

Combining the best of three separate traditions -- the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science -- Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.