This book examines the implications of counterinsurgency warfare for U.S. defense policy and makes the compelling argument that the United States' default position on counterinsurgency wars should be to avoid them. Given the unsatisfactory outcomes of the counterinsurgency (COIN) wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military is now in a heated debate over whether wars involving COIN operations are worth fighting. This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of COIN through key historic episodes and concludes that the answer is an emphatic "no," based on a dominant record of U.S. military or political failure, and inconsistency in the reasons for the rare cases of success. The author also examines the implications of his findings for U.S. foreign policy, defense policy, and future weapons procurement. Examines a wider breadth of historical cases than other books on counterinsurgency, allowing for more accurate assessments and conclusions about the efficacy of COIN based on the lessons learned across history Presents research-based evidence that the Unites States should get involved in counterinsurgency warfare only in the rare cases in which U.S. vital interests are at stake Provides thought-provoking discussion of the domestic negative effects resulting from overseas counterinsurgency operations Questions the effectiveness of COIN strategy by utilizing numerous historical examples covered throughout the book Covers major instances of COIN warfare in history, including the French in Algeria and Indochina, the British in Malaysia and Afghanistan, the United States in Vietnam and the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and numerous others Appeals to readers and students of military history, strategy, and defense

This book examines the implications of counterinsurgency wars for U.S. defense policy and makes the compelling argument that the United States' default position on counterinsurgency wars should be to avoid them. In this compelling study, Eland questions the core assumptions of the American foreign policy and defense establishments that call for military interventions around the world and high and increasing defense budgets at home. He outlines a security policy more appropriate to the sober realities of the post-Cold War era. This is an approach that calls for military restraint overseas, taking advantage of the already secure U.S. geostrategic position, while safeguarding vital national interests. Eland details the military force structure needed for this new role and calculates the reduced defense budget required to pay for these forces. This book is a timely wake-up call to those who make American foreign and defense policies. It demands a badly needed re-thinking of America's national interests. In the author's view, America's natural geostrategic position places it at a natural advantage, rendering unnecessary a forward defense posture. A non-interventionist foreign policy would save money by requiring lower defense budgets. An America less willing to get involved in complex overseas disputes unrelated to U.S vital interests would also be less likely to make enemies around the world.