A commitment to free speech is a fundamental precept of all liberal democracies. However, democracies can differ significantly when addressing the constitutionality of laws regulating certain kinds of speech. In the United States, for instance, the commitment to free speech under the First Amendment has been held by the Supreme Court to protect the public expression of the most noxious racist ideology and hence to render unconstitutional even narrow restrictions on hate speech. In contrast, governments have been accorded considerable leeway to restrict racist and other extreme expression in almost every other democracy, including Canada, the United Kingdom, and other European countries. This book considers the legal responses of various liberal democracies towards hate speech and other forms of extreme expression, and examines the following questions:
What accounts for the marked differences in attitude towards the constitutionality of hate speech regulation?
Does hate speech regulation violate the core free speech principle constitutive of democracy?
Has the traditional US position on extreme expression justifiably not found favor elsewhere?
Do values such as the commitment to equality or dignity legitimately override the right to free speech in some circumstances?
With contributions from experts in a range of disciplines, this book offers an in-depth examination of the tensions that arise between democracy's promises.
Readership Academics, scholars, and advanced students of Human Rights; Comparative Human Rights; Freedom of Information & Freedom of Speech; Media, Information, & Communication Industries; Censorship; Extreme Speech & Hate Speech

This is a lively collection of essays by an internationally distinguished group of the world's most respected administrative lawyers. It is a timely work as public law in the United Kingdom is at an extremely interesting stage in its long development. The essays are written in honour of Sir William Wade, who was Professor of English at St John's College Oxford, Rouse Ball Professor of English Law at the University of Cambridge and Master of Gonville and Caius College Cambridge. He is one of the leading scholars of his generation and is justly credited for having contributed hugely to the development of administrative law in Britain through his text Administrative Law (OUP) but also through the Hamlyn lectures and through his work as a member of the English bar, his lectures throughout the world and numerous articles, notes and essays.

De Smith's Principles of Judicial Review is the leading work on the principles, practice and remedies of judicial review in England and Wales. This edition reflects the continuing importance and complexity of judicial review and incorporates recent fundamental developments in the area. It deals with domestic grounds of review, challenges under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the use of European Community law in judicial review. De Smith's Principles of Judicial Review provides a coherent, comprehensive and compelling analysis of Judicial Review and will be welcomed by students studying this area of law. Covers the history, theoretical foundations and principles of judicial review. Explains the scope of judicial review Provides authoritative and comprehensive guidance on the practice and procedure of judicial review. Deals comprehensively with all grounds of challenge, including illegality, procedural impropriety, substantive review, Convention rights and European Community grounds. Clarifies complex changes in substantive review, including proportionality and legitimate expectations, against a background of a developing "culture of justification". Sets out the principles underlying each area of judicial review Sets out the context of judicial review and its scope, considering at the outset a number of issues which guide De Smith's approach Considers the context in which judicial review is but one of a number of possible avenues of redress for aggrieved citizens Examines those who may initiate a claim for judicial review (claimants); who have a right to be a party (interested parties) and those who may seek permission from the court to make submissions as interveners. Considers the often complex and controversial questions of which defendants and decisions are subject to judicial review Deals comprehensively with the grounds of review in the following categories: illegality, lack of procedural fairness and irrationality or unreasonableness (Substantive Review and Justification) Full coverage of procedures and remedies, funding and costs

Commitment to free speech is a fundamental precept of all liberal democracies. However, democracies can differ significantly when addressing the constitutionality of laws regulating certain kinds of speech. In the United States, for instance, the commitment to free speech under the First Amendment has been held by the Supreme Court to protect the public expression of the most noxious racist ideology and hence to render unconstitutional even narrow restrictions on hate speech. In contrast, governments have been accorded considerable leeway to restrict racist and other extreme expression in almost every other democracy, including Canada, the United Kingdom, and other European countries. This book considers the legal responses of various liberal democracies towards hate speech and other forms of extreme expression, and examines the following questions:
What accounts for the marked differences in attitude towards the constitutionality of hate speech regulation?
Does hate speech regulation violate the core free speech principle constitutive of democracy?
Has the traditional US position on extreme expression justifiably not found favor elsewhere?
Do values such as the commitment to equality or dignity legitimately override the right to free speech in some circumstances?
With contributions from experts in a range of disciplines, this book offers an in-depth examination of the tensions that arise between democracy's promises.