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As desired, the infonnation demand correspondence is single valued
at equilibrium prices. Hence no planner is needed to assign
infonnation allocations to individuals. Proposition 4. For any
given infonnation price system p E . P (F *), almost every a E A
demands a unique combined infonnation structure (although traders
may be indifferent among partial infonnation sales from different
information allocations, etc. ). In particular, the aggregate
excess demand correspondence for net combined infonnation trades is
a continuous function. Proof Uniqueness fails only if an agent can
obtain the same expected utility from two or more net combined
infonnation allocations. If this happens, appropriate slight
perturbations of personal probability vectors destroy the equality
unless the utility functions and wealth allocations were
independent across states. Yet, when utilities and wealths don't
depend on states in S, no infonnation to distinguish the states is
desired, so that the demand for such infonnation structures must
equal zero. To show the second claim, recall that if the
correspondence is single valued for almost every agent, then its
integral is also single valued. Finally, note that an upper
hemicontinuous (by Proposition 2) correspondence which is single
valued everywhere is, in fact, a continuous function. [] REFERENCES
Allen, Beth (1986a). "The Demand for (Differentiated) Infonnation";
Review of Economic Studies. 53. (311-323). Allen, Beth (1986b).
"General Equilibrium with Infonnation Sales"; Theory and Decision.
21. (1-33). Allen, Beth (1990). "Infonnation as an Economic
Commodity"; American Economic Review. 80. (268-273).
As desired, the infonnation demand correspondence is single valued
at equilibrium prices. Hence no planner is needed to assign
infonnation allocations to individuals. Proposition 4. For any
given infonnation price system p E . P (F *), almost every a E A
demands a unique combined infonnation structure (although traders
may be indifferent among partial infonnation sales from different
information allocations, etc. ). In particular, the aggregate
excess demand correspondence for net combined infonnation trades is
a continuous function. Proof Uniqueness fails only if an agent can
obtain the same expected utility from two or more net combined
infonnation allocations. If this happens, appropriate slight
perturbations of personal probability vectors destroy the equality
unless the utility functions and wealth allocations were
independent across states. Yet, when utilities and wealths don't
depend on states in S, no infonnation to distinguish the states is
desired, so that the demand for such infonnation structures must
equal zero. To show the second claim, recall that if the
correspondence is single valued for almost every agent, then its
integral is also single valued. Finally, note that an upper
hemicontinuous (by Proposition 2) correspondence which is single
valued everywhere is, in fact, a continuous function. [] REFERENCES
Allen, Beth (1986a). "The Demand for (Differentiated) Infonnation";
Review of Economic Studies. 53. (311-323). Allen, Beth (1986b).
"General Equilibrium with Infonnation Sales"; Theory and Decision.
21. (1-33). Allen, Beth (1990). "Infonnation as an Economic
Commodity"; American Economic Review. 80. (268-273).
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