This volume brings together academic economists and lawyers to evaluate and compare the regulation of telecommunications markets in Germany and the United States. The unifying theme in all of the pa pers is that the goal of public policy in this area should be to make the broadest and most functional competition possible by means of an ap propriate regulatory framework. Because the European and American telecommunications markets are becoming more intertwined each day, the issues addressed in this volume will be topical to the business, government, and academic communities for some time. For the chairman of the Monopoly Commission, Wernhard Moschel, the opening of the German telecommunications market has been successful in principle. This is clearly recognizable in the case of the competition in long-distance transport. Based on the view that the regulatory authority should make itself obsolete, Professor Moschel advocates an incremental review and gradual reduction of regulation."

This 1998 book addresses deregulatory policies that threaten to reduce or destroy the value of private property in network industries without any accompanying payment of just compensation, policies that are termed 'deregulatory takings'. The authors further consider the problem of renegotiation of the regulatory contract, which changes the terms and conditions of operation of utility companies. They argue that constitutional protections of private property from takings, as well as efficient remedies for contractual breach, provide the proper foundation for the competitive transformation of the network industries. The benefits of competition do not stem from government regulations that redistribute income from utility investors to customers, nor do such benefits stem from regulatory policies for network access that promote free riding on incumbent facilities by entrants. Such actions represent a new version of increased regulation, not deregulation.

This volume brings together academic economists and lawyers to evaluate and compare the regulation of telecommunications markets in Germany and the United States. The unifying theme in all of the pa pers is that the goal of public policy in this area should be to make the broadest and most functional competition possible by means of an ap propriate regulatory framework. Because the European and American telecommunications markets are becoming more intertwined each day, the issues addressed in this volume will be topical to the business, government, and academic communities for some time. For the chairman of the Monopoly Commission, Wernhard Moschel, the opening of the German telecommunications market has been successful in principle. This is clearly recognizable in the case of the competition in long-distance transport. Based on the view that the regulatory authority should make itself obsolete, Professor Moschel advocates an incremental review and gradual reduction of regulation."

This book addresses deregulatory policies that threaten to reduce or destroy the value of private property in network industries without any accompanying payment of just compensation, policies that are termed "deregulatory takings." The authors further consider the problem of renegotiation of the regulatory contract, which changes the terms and conditions of operation of utility companies. They argue that constitutional protections of private property from takings, as well as efficient remedies for contractual breach, provide the proper foundation for the competitive transformation of the network industries.

Influential industry and government leaders speak out on the first major overhaul of US communications policy in over 60 years. Contributors include: F. Duane Ackerman; William P. Barr; Thomas J. Bliley; Paul W. MacAvoy; Richard D. McCormick; Gregory Sidak; Robert D. Willig; and John D. Zeglis.