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The rift which has long divided the philosophical world into
opposed schools-the "Continental" school owing its origins to the
phenomenology of Husserl and the "analytic" school derived from
Frege-is finally closing. But this closure is occurring in ways
both different and in certain respects at odds with one another. On
the one hand scholars are seeking to rediscover the concerns and
positions common to both schools, positions from which we can
continue fruitfully to address important philosophical issues. On
the other hand successors to both traditions have developed
criticisms of basic assumptions shared by the two schools. They
have suggested that we must move not merely beyond the conflict
between these two "modem" schools but beyond the kind of philosophy
represented in the unity of the two schools and thereby move
towards a new "postmodern" philosophical style. On the one hand,
then and for example, Husserl scholarship has in recent years
witnessed the development of an interpretation of Husserl which
more closely aligns his phenomenology with the philosophical
concerns of the "analytic" tradition. In certain respects, this
should come as no surprise and is long overdue. It is true, after
all, that the early Husserl occupied himself with many of the same
philosophical issues as did Frege and the earliest thinkers of the
analytic tradition. Examples include the concept of number, the
nature of mathematical analysis, meaning and reference, truth,
formalization, and the relationship between logic and mathematics.
lbis volume was occasioned by the desire of its contributors to
honor Robert Sokolowski on his sixtieth birthday. The desire first
took fonn on the streets of an American metropolis when several of
us, while attending a philosophy conference, were bemoaning the
lack of passion for doing philosophy as we all conceived it. In
this expression of our discontent we all had a common exemplar in
mind, someone for whom the passion for "the truthful" and "the
good" is embodied in every sentence of his rich writings.
Felicitously this very thinker was someone whom we an regard as
manifesting in his person and life these same properties which his
writings exhibit and pursue as luminous ideals. As a result, John
Brough, John Drummond, and I came up with the idea that we hold our
own conference and do philosophy as we envisage it and at the same
time honor its foremost exemplary practitioner whose sixtieth
birthday was the following year. Immediately the idea took wings
among the handful ofus and the dreariness of that philosophy
congress receded. The first task of thinking of possible speakers
was easy. The issue of the venue for our symposium, what I like to
call the "Sokofest," had to be decided, as well as the details of
its realization.
Against the background of the recent revival of ethics, this
handbook aims to show the great fertility of the phenomenological
tradition for the study of ethics and moral philosophy by
collecting a set of papers on the contributions to ethical thought
by major phenomenological thinkers. Twenty-one chapters in the book
are articles by experts who explore the thought of the major
ethical thinkers in the first two generations of the
phenomenological tradition and direct the reader toward the most
relevant primary and secondary materials. The final three chapters
of the book sketch more recent developments in various parts of the
world, and the first three chapters investigate the relations
between phenomenology and the dominant normative approaches in
contemporary moral philosophy.
Philosophers contributing new ideas are commonly caught within a
received philosophical vocabulary and will often coin new,
technical terms. Husserl understood himself as advancing a new
theory of intentionality, and he fashioned the new vocabulary of
`noesis' and `noema'. But Husserl's own statements regarding the
noema are ambiguous. Hence, it is no surprise that controversy has
ensued. The articles in this book elucidate and clarify the notion
of the noema; the book includes articles which phenomenologically
describe and analyze the noemata of various experiences as well as
articles which undertake the `metaphenomenological' explication of
the doctrine of the noema. These two enterprises cannot be isolated
from one another. Any analysis of the noema of a particular type of
experience will necessarily illustrate, at least by instantiating
the general notion of noema. And any metaphenomenological account
of the noema itself will guide particular researches into the
noemata of particular experiences.
Against the background of the recent revival of ethics, this
handbook aims to show the great fertility of the phenomenological
tradition for the study of ethics and moral philosophy by
collecting a set of papers on the contributions to ethical thought
by major phenomenological thinkers. Twenty-one chapters in the book
are articles by experts who explore the thought of the major
ethical thinkers in the first two generations of the
phenomenological tradition and direct the reader toward the most
relevant primary and secondary materials. The final three chapters
of the book sketch more recent developments in various parts of the
world, and the first three chapters investigate the relations
between phenomenology and the dominant normative approaches in
contemporary moral philosophy.
lbis volume was occasioned by the desire of its contributors to
honor Robert Sokolowski on his sixtieth birthday. The desire first
took fonn on the streets of an American metropolis when several of
us, while attending a philosophy conference, were bemoaning the
lack of passion for doing philosophy as we all conceived it. In
this expression of our discontent we all had a common exemplar in
mind, someone for whom the passion for "the truthful" and "the
good" is embodied in every sentence of his rich writings.
Felicitously this very thinker was someone whom we an regard as
manifesting in his person and life these same properties which his
writings exhibit and pursue as luminous ideals. As a result, John
Brough, John Drummond, and I came up with the idea that we hold our
own conference and do philosophy as we envisage it and at the same
time honor its foremost exemplary practitioner whose sixtieth
birthday was the following year. Immediately the idea took wings
among the handful ofus and the dreariness of that philosophy
congress receded. The first task of thinking of possible speakers
was easy. The issue of the venue for our symposium, what I like to
call the "Sokofest," had to be decided, as well as the details of
its realization.
Philosophers contributing new ideas are commonly caught within a
received philosophical vocabulary and will often coin new,
technical terms. Husserl understood himself as advancing a new
theory of intentionality, and he fashioned the new vocabulary of
`noesis' and `noema'. But Husserl's own statements regarding the
noema are ambiguous. Hence, it is no surprise that controversy has
ensued. The articles in this book elucidate and clarify the notion
of the noema; the book includes articles which phenomenologically
describe and analyze the noemata of various experiences as well as
articles which undertake the `metaphenomenological' explication of
the doctrine of the noema. These two enterprises cannot be isolated
from one another. Any analysis of the noema of a particular type of
experience will necessarily illustrate, at least by instantiating
the general notion of noema. And any metaphenomenological account
of the noema itself will guide particular researches into the
noemata of particular experiences.
The rift which has long divided the philosophical world into
opposed schools-the "Continental" school owing its origins to the
phenomenology of Husserl and the "analytic" school derived from
Frege-is finally closing. But this closure is occurring in ways
both different and in certain respects at odds with one another. On
the one hand scholars are seeking to rediscover the concerns and
positions common to both schools, positions from which we can
continue fruitfully to address important philosophical issues. On
the other hand successors to both traditions have developed
criticisms of basic assumptions shared by the two schools. They
have suggested that we must move not merely beyond the conflict
between these two "modem" schools but beyond the kind of philosophy
represented in the unity of the two schools and thereby move
towards a new "postmodern" philosophical style. On the one hand,
then and for example, Husserl scholarship has in recent years
witnessed the development of an interpretation of Husserl which
more closely aligns his phenomenology with the philosophical
concerns of the "analytic" tradition. In certain respects, this
should come as no surprise and is long overdue. It is true, after
all, that the early Husserl occupied himself with many of the same
philosophical issues as did Frege and the earliest thinkers of the
analytic tradition. Examples include the concept of number, the
nature of mathematical analysis, meaning and reference, truth,
formalization, and the relationship between logic and mathematics.
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