This book is an original study of the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the context of the ongoing debate about Anglo-German relations and the origins of the Second World War. Drawing on wide range of sources, the author casts new light on the diplomacy leading to the Anglo-German Naval Agreements of June 1935 and July 1937, and explores the crucial connections between naval intelligence, war planning and Admiralty policy. The author suggests that the Admiralty's response to the Nazi menace was far more rational and more complex than previous studies suggest.

This book focuses on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the broad context of the ongoing debate about Britain's policy of appeasement. It combines a narrative of diplomatic events and Whitehall policy-making with the thematic analysis of naval intelligence and war planning. Drawing on the wide range of sources, the author argues that the Admiralty's enthusiasm for naval armaments diplomacy with Nazi Germany was far more rational and more complex than previous studies would suggest.

This book focuses on the Royal Navy's response to the rise of the German navy under Hitler within the broad context of the ongoing debate about Britain's policy of appeasement. It combines a narrative of diplomatic events and Whitehall policy-making with the thematic analysis of naval intelligence and war planning. Drawing on the wide range of sources, the author argues that the Admiralty's enthusiasm for naval armaments diplomacy with Nazi Germany was far more rational and more complex than previous studies would suggest.