Terrorism and its manifestations continue to evolve, becoming deadlier and more menacing. This study considers the evolution of terrorism since 1968 and how airlines and governments have attempted to deal with this form of violence through a series of nonforce strategies. Using historical examples, we see how governments, particularly the United States, attempted to counter politically motivated aerial hijacking with metal detectors, legal means, and, finally, in frustration, counterviolence operations to subdue terrorists. As nations witnessed aerial hijacking and sieges, the requirement for paramilitary and military counterterrorist forces became a necessity. Through use of examples from Israel (Entebbe 1976), West Germany (Mogadishu 1977), and Egypt (Malta 1985), Taillon concludes that cooperation--ranging from shared intelligence to forward base access and observers--can provide significant advantages in dealing with low-intensity operations. He hopes to highlight those key aspects of cooperation at an international level which have, at least in part, been vital to successful counterterrorist operations in the past and, as we witnessed again in the campaign in Afghanistan, are destined to remain so in the future.

The threat of terrorism knows no borders, and, given the complexities of today's global system, no nation can afford to stand alone. This study considers the role that international cooperation plays in assisting elite military forces engaged in low-intensity and counter-terrorist operations, particularly hostage rescue efforts. Using historical examples from the experiences of Great Britain and the United States, the author concludes that cooperation (ranging from shared intelligence, to forward base access, to the provision of observers) can provide significant advantages in dealing with low-intensity operations. However, the most fruitful joint efforts involve shared activities by countries that possess a similar threat perception, usually in part a result of a common sociology in their view of historical developments.

Before turning to modern counter-terrorism, Taillon addresses the respective military experiences of Britain and America within the wider realm of conventional and low-intensity operations. The main Anglo-American focus of the book gives primary importance to the developments and doctrine for the employment of special forces, as well as an analysis of more recent low-intensity and counter-terrorism operations, such as the 1980 Iranian embassy siege in London and the failure, that same year, of the American hostage rescue attempt in Teheran. Taillon hopes to identify and highlight those key aspects of cooperation at an international level which have, at least in part, been absolutely essential to successful counter-terrorist operations in the past and which seem destined to remain so in the future.