In this book, nine scholars representing various perspectives examine institutions that govern economic activity in the United States and the dramatic changes they have undergone since the late nineteenth century. They investigate how and why these changes occurred and continue to occur as markets become more volatile, technology changes and international competition becomes more intense. They also address general questions about the governance of capitalist economies by considering several governance mechanisms such as markets, bureaucratic hierarchies, associations and informal networks and by exploring how such mechanisms emerge to coordinate economic activity and affect economic performance. The first part of the book describes the important characteristics of these organisational forms and provides an overview of institutional development in the US economy. The second part includes case studies of the institutional development of eight economic sectors. Finally, based on data from these case studies, the third part of the book tests competing theories of institutional change in capitalism, develops a new evolutionary model of the change process, and offers an original analysis of how the state influences this process.

This book argues that there is no single best institutional arrangement for organizing modern societies. Therefore, the market should not be considered the "ideal and universal" arrangement for coordinating economic activity. Instead, the editors argue, the economic institutions of capitalism exhibit a large variety of objectives and tools that complement each other and cannot work in isolation. The various chapters of the book explore challenging issues in the analysis of differing institutional arrangements for coordinating economic activity, asking what logics and functions they follow and why they emerge, mature and persist in the forms they do. They conclude that any institutional arrangement has its strengths and weaknesses and that such institutions evolve according to a logic specific to each society. They also note that institutions continuously respond to changing circumstances, and are not static entities.

This book argues that there is no single best institutional arrangement for organizing modern societies. Therefore, the market should not be considered the ideal and universal arrangement for coordinating economic activity. Instead, the editors argue, the economic institutions of capitalism exhibit a large variety of objectives and tools that complement each other and can not work in isolation. The various chapters of the book ask what logics and functions institutions follow and why they emerge, mature and persist in the forms they do.

In this book, nine scholars representing various perspectives examine institutions that govern economic activity in the United States and the dramatic changes they have undergone since the late nineteenth century. They investigate how and why these changes occurred and continue to occur as markets become more volatile, technology changes and international competition becomes more intense. They also address general questions about the governance of capitalist economies by considering several governance mechanisms such as markets, bureaucratic hierarchies, associations and informal networks and by exploring how such mechanisms emerge to coordinate economic activity and affect economic performance. The first part of the book describes the important characteristics of these organisational forms and provides an overview of institutional development in the US economy. The second part includes case studies of the institutional development of eight economic sectors. Finally, based on data from these case studies, the third part of the book tests competing theories of institutional change in capitalism, develops a new evolutionary model of the change process, and offers an original analysis of how the state influences this process.