The fundamental legal and institutional changes of recent decades have brought the English constitution into question. Accompanying issues have been the extent to which its traditional character and main features have been changed, lost their former appeal and retained their distinctness in the European Union. These issues are not readily addressed in everyday thinking about a constitution simply conceived as unwritten or in constitutional accounts variously preoccupied with abstract analysis, political accountability or transcendent norms. The English Historical Constitution addresses these issues by developing a historical constitutional approach and thus elaborating on continuity and change in the constitution's main doctrines and institutions. From an English legal perspective, it offers a complement or corrective to analytical, political and normative approaches by reforming an old conception of the historical constitution and of its history, partly obscured and long neglected through the modern analytical preoccupation with its law as an abstract scheme of rules, principles and practices.

The fundamental legal and institutional changes of recent decades have brought the English constitution into question. Accompanying issues have been the extent to which its traditional character and main features have been changed, lost their former appeal and retained their distinctness in the European Union. These issues are not readily addressed in everyday thinking about a constitution simply conceived as unwritten or in constitutional accounts variously preoccupied with abstract analysis, political accountability or transcendent norms. The English Historical Constitution addresses these issues by developing a historical constitutional approach and thus elaborating on continuity and change in the constitution's main doctrines and institutions. From an English legal perspective, it offers a complement or corrective to analytical, political and normative approaches by reforming an old conception of the historical constitution and of its history, partly obscured and long neglected through the modern analytical preoccupation with its law as an abstract scheme of rules, principles and practices.

The development of an autonomous English public law has been accompanied by persistent problems - a lack of systematic principles, dissatisfaction with judicial procedures, and uncertainty about the judicial role. It has provoked an ongoing debate on the very desirability of the distinction between public and private law. In this debate, a historical and comparative perspective has been lacking. A Continental Distinction in the Common Law introduces such a perspective. It compares the recent emergence of a significant English distinction with the entrenchment of the traditional French distinction. It explains how persistent problems of English public law are related to fundamental differences between the English and French legal and political traditions, differences in their conception of the state administration, their approach to law, their separation of powers, and their judicial procedures in public-law cases. The author argues that a satisfactory distinction between public and private law depends on a particular legal and political context, a context which was evident in late nineteenth-century France and is absent in twentieth-century England. He concludes by identifying the far-reaching theoretical, institutional, and procedural changes required to accommodate English public law.

The Law of the Constitution has been the main doctrinal influence upon English constitutional thought since the late-nineteenth century. It acquired and long retained extraordinary legal authority, despite fierce criticism and many changes in law and government. By many, it was treated as a canonical text embodying axiomatic principles, or it was simply understood as indeed the law of the constitution; and even by its critics, it was still granted the status of orthodoxy. Basic constitutional principles became commonly conceived in Diceyan terms: parliamentary sovereignty was pure and absolute in being without legal limit; and Dicey's rule of law precluded recognition of an English administrative law and thus retarded its development for decades. Reaffirmed in each new edition of Dicey's canonical text, the constitution itself seemed static. This volume provides sources with which to reassess the extraordinary authority and lasting influence of Dicey's canonical text. This volume consists of Dicey's rare first edition in its original lecture form and of the main addenda in later editions. It facilitates a historical understanding of Dicey's original text in its context and of later changes when they were made. In introducing the first volume, John Allison reassesses The Law of the Constitution's authority and the kinds of response it has elicited in view of its original educative form and educational context.

The development of an autonomous English public law has been accompanied by persistent problems - a lack of systematic principles, dissatisfaction with judicial procedures, and uncertainty about the judicial role. It has provoked an ongoing debate on the very desirability of the distinction between public and private law. In this debate, a historical and comparative perspective has been lacking. A Continental Distinction in the Common Law introduces such a perspective. It compares the recent emergence of a significant English distinction with the entrenchment of the traditional French distinction. It explains how persistent problems of English public law are related to fundamental differences between the English and French legal and political traditions, differences in their conception of the state administration, their approach to law, their separation of powers, and their judicial procedures in public-law cases. The author argues that a satisfactory distinction between public and private law depends on a particular legal and political context, a context which was evident in late nineteenth-century France and is absent in twentieth-century England. He concludes by identifying the far-reaching theoretical, institutional, and procedural changes required to accommodate English public law.

The Oxford Edition of Dicey provides sources with which to reassess the extraordinary authority and lasting influence of Dicey's canonical text. Volume Two, Comparative Constitutionalism, provides a complement to Dicey's The Law of the Constitution. These largely unpublished comparative constitutional lectures were written for different versions of a comparative constitutional book that Dicey began but did not finish prior to his death in 1922. The lectures were a pioneering venture into comparative constitutionalism and reveal an approach to legal education broader than Dicey is widely understood to have taken. In Part I, The Comparative Study of the Constitution, topics discussed include constitutionalism in the English Commonwealth, and French, American, and Prussian constitutionalism. Part II, The Comparative Study of Constitutions, includes lectures on representative government, the separation of powers, and basic divisions between kinds of constitution. The volume begins with an editorial introduction examining the implications of these comparative lectures and Dicey's early foray into comparative constitutionalism for his general constitutional thought, and the kinds of response it has elicited.

The Law of the Constitution has been the main doctrinal influence upon English constitutional thought since the late-nineteenth century. It acquired and long retained extraordinary legal authority, despite fierce criticism and many changes in law and government. By many, it was treated as a canonical text embodying axiomatic principles, or it was simply understood as indeed the law of the constitution; and even by its critics, it was still granted the status of orthodoxy. Basic constitutional principles became commonly conceived in Diceyan terms: parliamentary sovereignty was pure and absolute in being without legal limit; and Dicey's rule of law precluded recognition of an English administrative law and thus retarded its development for decades. Reaffirmed in each new edition of Dicey's canonical text, the constitution itself seemed static. The Oxford Edition of Dicey provides sources with which to reassess the extraordinary authority and lasting influence of Dicey's canonical text. This volume consists of Dicey's rare first edition in its original lecture form and of the main addenda in later editions. It facilitates a historical understanding of Dicey's original text in its context and of later changes when they were made. In introducing the first volume, John Allison reassesses The Law of the Constitution's authority and the kinds of response it has elicited in view of its original educative form and educational context.