EXCEPT for chapter 8, an editorial foot-bridge across the con fused years which separate the Dutch Republic from the King dom of the Netherlands, the essays collected in this volume were originally read and discussed at meetings of Dutch and British historians held between 22 and 27 September 1969 in a number of delightful comers of Groningen and Friesland. That this con ference took place at all was due in the first instance to the initiative and organizing genius of the Instituut voor Geschiedenis of the University of Groningen: particular thanks are due to the Rector Magnificus and his colleagues of that illustrious place of learning. On behalf of those fortunate enough to take part, we also wish to place on record our deep gratitude for the benevolent assistance of the Netherlands Ministerie van Onderwijs, of the H. S. Kammingafonds and of the Groninger Universiteitsfonds. As our sub-title strives to hint, the conference papers were commissioned with a view to stimulating historical awareness of a problem which is increasingly forcing itself on the attention of contemporary statesmen, administrators, sociologists and others - indeed of all who value local character and the human scale in the age of mass communications and socialized government.

During the past few years the worlds has reverberated of names like Seveso, Love Canal, Lekkerkerk, Times Beach, just to name the most publicized ones. All these names are connected with hazardous or toxic waste, waste from business and industry, especially the chemical industry. The list is endless because there are, all over the world, many thousands of "points noirs" not yet discovered or identified old lagoons and landfills, polluted rivers, estuaries, and harbors needing remedial action, which undoubtedly will reveal more unpleasant secrets of the chemical industry's past. It is not an exaggerated statement that chemists of the past have paid too much attention to the composition of new products while neglecting the disposition of byproducts, i.e., chemical waste. Admittedly, during the last decade this attitude has changed dramatically. Although we cannot yet properly speak of a new science of peri ontology (the theory of residues), we seem to be headed towards substantiated rules, analyses, disposal protocols, definitions and remedial practices in handling the problems of chemical waste. Especially during the last two years comprehensive treatises of the whole complex subject as well as monographs dealing with assorted aspects of waste tech nology have appeared."

AS Dr. Coen Tamse points out in the introductory essay specially written for this volume, what we call myths are all too often the errors and misconceptions of others. Time being short and human un derstanding imperfect, it is wise to suppose that posterity will convict us all of thinking and acting in some sort within mythological uni verses; only a dead myth is by common consent recognized as a false reading of reality. And yet, in our troubled century, we have witnessed the deliberate fabrication of mythologies, apart from the inheritance of earlier growths like those which still feed nationalism and anti Semitism. It almost looks as if mass democracies positively require neatly packaged and emotionally charged explanations of the social and political environment as a substitute for religion. At all events, the modern science of public relations has advanced far enough for cer tain regimes, or for those who seek to overthrow them, to make a calculated appeal to the vanities, anxieties and frustrations of ordinary people by offering highly simplified explanations of a baffling world, often in easily grasped pictorial or dramatic forms, whether the object is to condition obedience or incite to 'struggle'. The advent of the mass media is generally, if unfairly, taken to have opened limitless new op portunities for the manipulation of our thought-processes, even below the threshold of consciousness.

Two societies, two conceptions of justice, collaborated and collided when French forces stormed Cartagena of the Indies in May 1697. For their commander, the baron de Pointis, a naval captain in the mould of Drake, this bloody if strategically pointless success fulfilled a long-postponed design "that might be both honourable and advantageous", with ships lent and soldiers (but not seamen) paid by the King, who in return would take the Crown's usual one-fifth interest in such "preis de vaisseaux", the remaining costs falling on private subscribers, in this case no less than 666 of them, headed by courtiers, financiers, naval contractors and officers of both pen and sword.' According to Pointis, peace rumours restricted the flow of advances and the expedition, nearly 4,000 strong when it sailed out of Brest, was weaker than he had planned, especially if it should prove difficult to use the ships' crews ashore.