The accords and protocols that underlie the Arab and Israeli peace agreements set into place economic policies and political processes so flawed that they are bound to fail. The chapters in this volume look at the diplomatic and historical precedents that have led to this situation and they debate - some cynically and some sympathetically - the reasons why the institutional structures and trade regimes the process has created are so weak. But for whatever reason, the structural flaws built into the Middle East peace process are not only biased toward the dominant players but against the people who most want peace.

The Political Economy of Middle East Peace looks at the political economy of the Middle Eastern peace process with a focus on the politics of trade. Contributors investigate the ways new commercial alliances develop as a result of economic agencies established via the Arab-Israeli peace process and look at institutions which contribute to redirection of Arab intra- and inter-regional trade, such as the Palestine Monetary Authority, the Middle East Development Bank and free trade zone agencies in Aquaba and Dubai.

Negotiations between Israel and the Arab states have continued in several forms for over a decade, through three Israeli administrations, the death of a King in Jordan, and through countless riots and incidences of protest by Palestinians and Jews. The agreements that have been reached, and some situations established by defacto rule and force majure, have created possibly irreversible economic and political structures. This collection presents a debate among eminent scholars and public officials over the power these structures engender in the region.

The Political Economy of Middle East Peace looks at the political economy of the Middle Eastern peace process with a focus on the politics of trade. Contributors investigate the ways new commercial alliances develop as a result of economic agencies established via the Arab-Israeli peace process and look at institutions which contribute to redirection of Arab intra- and inter-regional trade, such as the Palestine Monetary Authority, the Middle East Development Bank and free trade zone agencies in Aquaba and Dubai.

Negotiations between Israel and the Arab states have continued in one form or another for over a decade, through three Israeli administrations, the death of a King of Jordan, and through countless riots and incidences of protest by Palestinians and Jews alike. The agreements that have been reached, and some situations established by defacto rule and force majure, have created possibly irreversible economic and political structures. This collection presents a debate among eminent scholars and public officials over the power these structures engender in the region.

The accords and protocols that underlie the Arab and Israeli peace agreements set into place economic policies and political processes so flawed that they are bound to fail. The chapters in this volume look at the diplomatic and historical precedents that have led to this situation and they debate - some cynically and some sympathetically - the reasons why the institutional structures and trade regimes the process has created are so weak. But for whatever reason, the structural flaws built into the Middle East peace process are not only biased toward the dominant players but against the people who most want peace.