This book reflects on the research and career of political theorist Russell Hardin from scholars of Political Science, Philosophy, Sociology, Economics, and Law, among other disciplines. Contributions address core issues of political theory as perceived by Hardin, starting with his insistence that many of the basic institutions of modern society and their formative historical beginnings can be understood as proceeding primarily from the self-interested motives of the participants. Many of the contributions in this volume struggle with the constraints imposed on political theorizing by the idea of self-interested agents, or homo economicus. Some reject the idea as empirically unfounded. Others try to show that homo economicus is even more versatile than Hardin depicts. And yet others accept the constraints and work within them. But all pay tribute to the lasting intellectual contribution of Russell Hardin and the challenge he poses. The book should appeal to scholars and students interested in collective action, public choice and democracy, moral reasoning and its limits, constitutionalism, liberalism, conventions and coordination, trust, identity politics, social epistemology, and methods in politics philosophy.

This book reflects on the research and career of political theorist Russell Hardin from scholars of Political Science, Philosophy, Sociology, Economics, and Law, among other disciplines. Contributions address core issues of political theory as perceived by Hardin, starting with his insistence that many of the basic institutions of modern society and their formative historical beginnings can be understood as proceeding primarily from the self-interested motives of the participants. Many of the contributions in this volume struggle with the constraints imposed on political theorizing by the idea of self-interested agents, or homo economicus. Some reject the idea as empirically unfounded. Others try to show that homo economicus is even more versatile than Hardin depicts. And yet others accept the constraints and work within them. But all pay tribute to the lasting intellectual contribution of Russell Hardin and the challenge he poses. The book should appeal to scholars and students interested in collective action, public choice and democracy, moral reasoning and its limits, constitutionalism, liberalism, conventions and coordination, trust, identity politics, social epistemology, and methods in politics philosophy.

An in-depth political, legal, and philosophical study into the implications of wealth inequality in modern societies. Wealth, and specifically its distribution, has been a topic of great debate in recent years. Calls for justice against corporations implicated in the 2008 financial crash; populist rallying against "the one percent"; distrust of the influence of wealthy donors on elections and policy-all of these issues have their roots in a larger discussion of how wealth operates in American economic and political life. In Wealth a distinguished interdisciplinary group of scholars in political science, law and philosophy address the complex set of questions that relate to economic wealth and its implications for social and political life in modern societies. The volume thus brings together a range of perspectives on wealth, inequality, capitalism, oligarchy, and democracy. The essays also cover a number of more specific topics including limitarianism, US Constitutional history, the wealth defense industry, slavery, and tax policy. Wealth offers analysis and prescription including original assessment of existing forms of economic wealth and creative policy responses for the negative implications of wealth inequality. Economic wealth and its distribution is a pressing issue and this latest installment in the NOMOS series offers new and thought provoking insights.

Many of the fundamental questions in social science entail an examination of the role played by social institutions. Why do we have so many social institutions? Why do they take one form in one society and quite different ones in others? In what ways do these institutions originally develop? And when and why do they change? Institutions and Social Conflict addresses these questions in two ways. First it offers a thorough critique of a wide range of theories of institutional change, from the classical accounts of Smith, Hume, Marx and Weber to the contemporary approaches of evolutionary theory, the theory of social conventions and the new institutionalism. Second, it develops a new theory of institutional change that emphasizes the distributional consequences of social institutions. The emergence of institutions is explained as a by-product of distributional conflict in which asymmetries of power in a society generate institutional solutions to conflicts. The book draws its examples from an extensive variety of social institutions.

A distinguished group of scholars explore the moral values and political consequences of privatization The 21st century has seen a proliferation of privatization across industries in the United States, from security and the military to public transportation and infrastructure. In shifting control from the state to private actors, do we weaken or strengthen structures of governance? Do state-owned enterprises promise to be more equal and fair than their privately-owned rivals? What role can accountability measures play in mediating the effects of privatization; and what role does coercion play in the state governance and control? In this latest installment from the NOMOS series, an interdisciplinary group of distinguished scholars in political science, law, and philosophy examine the moral and political consequences of transferring state-provided or state-owned goods and services to the private sector. The essays consider how we should evaluate the decision to privatize, both with respect to the quality of outcomes that might be produced, and in terms of the effects of privatization on the core values underlying democratic decision-making. Privatization also affects the structure of governance in a variety of important ways, and these essays evaluate the consequences of privatization on the state. Privatization sheds new light on these highly salient questions of contemporary political life and institutional design.

Essays on the political, legal, and philosophical dimensions of political legitimacy Scholars, journalists, and politicians today worry that the world’s democracies are facing a crisis of legitimacy. Although there are key challenges facing democracy—including concerns about electoral interference, adherence to the rule of law, and the freedom of the press—it is not clear that these difficulties threaten political legitimacy. Such ambiguity derives in part from the contested nature of the concept of legitimacy, and from disagreements over how to measure it. This volume reflects the cutting edge of responses to these perennial questions, drawing, in the distinctive NOMOS fashion, from political science, philosophy, and law. Contributors address fundamental philosophical questions such as the nature of public reasons of authority, as well as urgent concerns about contemporary democracy, including whether “animus” matters for the legitimacy of President Trump’s travel ban, barring entry for nationals from six Muslim-majority nations, and the effect of fundamental transitions within the moral economy, such as the decline of labor unions. Featuring twelve essays from leading scholars, Political Legitimacy is an important and timely addition to the NOMOS series.

Pragmatism and its consequences are central issues in American politics today, yet scholars rarely examine in detail the relationship between pragmatism and politics. In "The Priority of Democracy," Jack Knight and James Johnson systematically explore the subject and make a strong case for adopting a pragmatist approach to democratic politics--and for giving priority to democracy in the process of selecting and reforming political institutions.

What is the primary value of democracy? When should we make decisions democratically and when should we rely on markets? And when should we accept the decisions of unelected officials, such as judges or bureaucrats? Knight and Johnson explore how a commitment to pragmatism should affect our answers to such important questions. They conclude that democracy is a good way of determining how these kinds of decisions should be made--even if what the democratic process determines is that not all decisions should be made democratically. So, for example, the democratically elected U.S. Congress may legitimately remove monetary policy from democratic decision-making by putting it under the control of the Federal Reserve.

Knight and Johnson argue that pragmatism offers an original and compelling justification of democracy in terms of the unique contributions democratic institutions can make to processes of institutional choice. This focus highlights the important role that democracy plays, not in achieving consensus or commonality, but rather in addressing conflicts. Indeed, Knight and Johnson suggest that democratic politics is perhaps best seen less as a way of reaching consensus or agreement than as a way of structuring the terms of persistent disagreement.

Pragmatism and its consequences are central issues in American politics today, yet scholars rarely examine in detail the relationship between pragmatism and politics. In The Priority of Democracy, Jack Knight and James Johnson systematically explore the subject and make a strong case for adopting a pragmatist approach to democratic politics--and for giving priority to democracy in the process of selecting and reforming political institutions. What is the primary value of democracy? When should we make decisions democratically and when should we rely on markets? And when should we accept the decisions of unelected officials, such as judges or bureaucrats? Knight and Johnson explore how a commitment to pragmatism should affect our answers to such important questions. They conclude that democracy is a good way of determining how these kinds of decisions should be made--even if what the democratic process determines is that not all decisions should be made democratically. So, for example, the democratically elected U.S. Congress may legitimately remove monetary policy from democratic decision-making by putting it under the control of the Federal Reserve. Knight and Johnson argue that pragmatism offers an original and compelling justification of democracy in terms of the unique contributions democratic institutions can make to processes of institutional choice. This focus highlights the important role that democracy plays, not in achieving consensus or commonality, but rather in addressing conflicts. Indeed, Knight and Johnson suggest that democratic politics is perhaps best seen less as a way of reaching consensus or agreement than as a way of structuring the terms of persistent disagreement.

A distinguished group of scholars explores compromise in contemporary affairs Do lawmakers have a greater ethical responsibility to compromise than ordinary citizens? How does one rectify what is at stake when lawmakers concede to compromise for the sake of reaching resolution? Is compromise necessarily equalizing and is it a reasonable mode of problem solving and dispute resolution? In this latest installment from the NOMOS series, distinguished scholars across the fields of political science, law, and philosophy tackle the complex set of questions that relate to the practice of compromise and its implications for social and political life in modern societies. The volume, edited by Jack Knight, brings together a range of perspectives - in both disciplinary and substantive terms - on representation, political morality, disagreement, negotiation, and various forms of compromise. The ten essays reflect a variety of considerations across interdisciplinary lines, and provide a new and thought-provoking discussion of the policy, practice, and philosophy of compromise, covering a number of specific topics including alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and conscientious objection. Examining these issues and more, Compromise offers new and thought provoking insights into the pressing issue of the importance of compromise in social and political affairs.

Immigration, Emigration and Migration consists of essays written by distinguished scholars across the fields of law, political science, and philosophy that examine questions of travel and migration across national borders. Questions of immigration and border enforcement practices are particularly salient in contemporary public discourse, and examinations of policy and practice bring forth new philosophical quandaries. Why the common assumption that each country has the right to control its own borders? How are laws that restrict or regulate migration created and justified? Why has the criminalization of migration increased? How can migration be better considered through the point of view of the migrants themselves? What are the differences in international and national institutional migratory policy? The volume explores questions of border control and enforcement, criminalization of borders, and how to address current debates and changes in regards to migration and immigration. The intersection of analysis and prescription provides both an assessment of current forms of thought or regulation and suggestion of alterations to address the flaws or failures of present approaches. The eight essays in this volume reflect a variety of considerations and explorations across interdisciplinary lines, and provide a new and thought-provoking discussion of policy, practice, and philosophy of migratory and border practices.

The Choices Justices Make is a groundbreaking work that offers a strategic account of Supreme Court decision making. Justices realize that their ability to achieve their policy and other goals depends on the preferences of other actors, the choices they expect others to make, and the institutional context in which they act. All these factors hold sway over justices as they make their decisions, from which cases to accept, to how to interact with their colleagues, and what policies to adopt in their opinions. Choices is a thought-provoking, yet nontechnical work that is an ideal supplement for judicial process and public law courses. In addition to offering a unique and sustained theoretical account, the authors tell a fascinating story of how the Court works. Data culled from the Court's public records and from the private papers of Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Powell provide empirical evidence to support the central argument, while numerous examples from the justices' papers animate the work.

How is it that people with different and often conflicting interests can band together, overcome coordination problems, and create stable institutions that regulate the interactions among members of the group? "Explaining Social Institutions" leads us significantly closer to understanding how such institutions come to be.
Much of the work being done under the rubric of "new institutionalism" focuses on how institutions shape social, economic, and political outcomes. This emphasis on influence has provided students of economics, political science, and political economy with surprisingly little theory to account for the origins of such institutions. Yet without understanding how institutions form and consequently develop influence, much of the other work lacks context. The contributors fill this void by utilizing a variety of perspectives and theoretical approaches. The twin focus of these articles on the origins of institutions and the development of institutional influence yield innovative and suggestive outcomes. Topics range from the framing of the United States Constitution to debate over the Senate at the Federal Convention; from equilibrium and social institutions to democratic stability.
Contributors include Randall Calvert, Jon Elster, Avner Greif, Jack Knight, Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, William Riker, Norman Schofield, Itai Sened, and Barry Weingast.
Jack Knight is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Washington University, St. Louis. Itai Sened is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Tel Aviv University.