This book is the story of Russian aviation and Soviet Russia's progress in preparing its strength as an air power. It discusses the Russia-Germany connect post 1919, how Russians gained expertise from German know-how, and post World War II progress from Stalin to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

Military affairs have been affected by major changes in recent years. The bipolar world of two superpowers has gone. The Cold War and the global military confrontation that accompanied it have ended. A new military and political order has emerged in the world, but the world has not become more stable; indeed, wars and armed conflict have become much more common. Forecasting the contours of future armed conflict is no easy task at such times, but this is the primary objective of If War Comes Tomorrow? Focusing on the impact of new technologies, General Gareev considers whether war is still a continuation of politics by other means' or whether the political, ideological, and technical transformation have broken that connection. He explores the linkage between threats to Russian national interests and war as an instrument of policy in great detail and concludes that there is very little prospect either of nuclear war or widespread conventional war. However, he does see local armed conflicts and local wars increasing, with greater emphasis on subversion. He argues that coming decades will see a shift towards a reliance upon indirect means to accomplish limited political ends, and analyses both information warfare and the revolution in military affairs from this perspective.

This book is the story of Russian aviation and Soviet Russia's progress in preparing its strength as an air power. It discusses the Russia-Germany connect post 1919, how Russians gained expertise from German know-how, and post World War II progress from Stalin to Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

Military affairs have been affected by major changes in recent years. The bipolar world of two superpowers has gone. The Cold War and the global military confrontation that accompanied it have ended. A new military and political order has emerged in the world, but the world has not become more stable; indeed, wars and armed conflict have become much more common. Forecasting the contours of future armed conflict is no easy task at such times, but this is the primary objective of If War Comes Tomorrow? Focusing on the impact of new technologies, General Gareev considers whether war is still a continuation of politics by other means' or whether the political, ideological, and technical transformation have broken that connection. He explores the linkage between threats to Russian national interests and war as an instrument of policy in great detail and concludes that there is very little prospect either of nuclear war or widespread conventional war. However, he does see local armed conflicts and local wars increasing, with greater emphasis on subversion. He argues that coming decades will see a shift towards a reliance upon indirect means to accomplish limited political ends, and analyses both information warfare and the revolution in military affairs from this perspective.

V K Triandafillov was an outstanding young commander who shaped the military theory and doctrine of the Red Army as it came to grips with the problem of future war. A conscript soldier who rose through the ranks to become an officer in the Tsarist Army, he saw combat in both the First World War and the Russian Civil War. A student of some of the finest military specialists teaching the first generation of young Red commanders, he sought to link theory and practice by using past experience to comprehend future combat.

The success of a society depends on formal, liberal property regimes. The West's property regimes are successful because of the high quality of evidence of everyday rights, the capacity of citizenry and governments to implement the meaning of that evidence, and because the basic rules which determine what can be owned and who can be owners are liberal in measure appropriate to the common understanding of justice. Formalized property information feeds conflict resolution mechanisms by clearly identifying owners, claimants, rights and duties; creates stakeholders willing to support the rule of law; produces landowners who are less inclined to engage in illegal behavior because they risk forfeiture; and the records associated with formal property provide a powerful forensic tool with which to support peaceful conflict resolution processes, restitution programs, and bring violators to justice. Outside the lines of formal property lies possession by force. The gamut of societal choices is few - formal property, internal violence, or tyranny. People should not be led to choose tyranny over violence because the condition of formal property has not been offered. This book argues that the quality of foreign real-property systems be made a priority issue in US thinking and strategy. A polity that does not formalize ownership rights and duties, especially to land, will not enjoy peace. Comprehensive, precise and transparent expression of real property is a necessary precondition of peace. If by success of a society we mean parallel improvement in freedom, material prosperity and social peace, then construction of formal, liberal property regimes and land-use systems is as important as elections or prosecuting human rights violators. The process of formalizing property, moreover, illuminates power and power relationships. It also exposes the otherwise invisible lines of communication and sanctuary that power over places provides.

This rare 10th anniversary edition (published in 2007) contains a new introduction by expert Soviet historian David M. Glantz. In addition all maps and graphics have been enhanced from the 1996 edition. "When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately for their soldiers, as well as the people of Afghanistan, they ignored not only the experiences of the British in the same region, but also their own experience with the Basmachi resistance fighters in Central Asia from 1918-1933. Consequently, in Afghanistan the Soviet army found its tactics inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the difficult terrain and the highly motivated mujahideen freedom fighters. To capture the lessons their tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to explain the change in tactics that followed, the Frunze Military Academy compiled this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers. The lessons are valuable not just for Russian officers, but for the tactical training of platoon, company and battalion leaders of any nation likely to engage in conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rough terrain. This is a book dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties and death, adaptation, and survival." (From the original foreword by Hans Binnendijk, 1996)

This rare 10th anniversary edition (published in 2007) contains a new introduction by expert Soviet historian David M. Glantz. In addition all maps and graphics have been enhanced from the 1996 edition. "When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately for their soldiers, as well as the people of Afghanistan, they ignored not only the experiences of the British in the same region, but also their own experience with the Basmachi resistance fighters in Central Asia from 1918-1933. Consequently, in Afghanistan the Soviet army found its tactics inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the difficult terrain and the highly motivated mujahideen freedom fighters. To capture the lessons their tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to explain the change in tactics that followed, the Frunze Military Academy compiled this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers. The lessons are valuable not just for Russian officers, but for the tactical training of platoon, company and battalion leaders of any nation likely to engage in conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rough terrain. This is a book dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties and death, adaptation, and survival." (From the original foreword by Hans Binnendijk, 1996)

The importance of Central Asia to three major powers the United States, China, and Russia is well understood but not widely recognized or discussed. Involvement in the region by the United States has been spotty and uneven over many years, but since 9.11 has taken on renewed importance in the War Against Terrorists. Russia views the region as its traditional sphere of influence, and the many strong ties between Russia and countries in Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan, reinforce this view. China has had a presence in the region via trade routes for centuries, but has only recently made a concerted effort to apply its influence. Key issues for the area include the following: terrorism/transnational crime/drug trafficking, energy resources (oil and gas), trade, stable governance, border disputes, the role of cooperative security organizations (mainly the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but there are a score of others), and, particularly, cooperation by the major powers. The August 2005 Central Asian Symposium, held in Monterey California, was a way for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) to gain a different and uniquely Chinese perspective on the area's problems and potential solutions. The timing and topic of the symposium are important, for China is growing more interested in Central Asia and its resources by the day. The region is less contentious than the Taiwan issue, however, and this factor increased the level of open discussion and value of the symposium dramatically. FMSO invited several top-rank Chinese researchers and analysts to attend the symposium, and also younger analysts/researchers with fresh perspectives on the region.

V K Triandafillov was an outstanding young commander who shaped the military theory and doctrine of the Red Army as it came to grips with the problem of future war. A conscript soldier who rose through the ranks to become an officer in the Tsarist Army, he saw combat in both the First World War and the Russian Civil War. A student of some of the finest military specialists teaching the first generation of young Red commanders, he sought to link theory and practice by using past experience to comprehend future combat.