Changes in the shape of the yield curve have traditionally been one of the key macroeconomic indicators of a likely change in economic outlook. However, the recent financial crises have created a challenge to the management of monetary policy, demanding a revision in the way that policymakers model expected changes in the economy. This volume brings together central bank economists and leading academic monetary economists to propose new methods for modelling the behaviour of interest rates. Topics covered include: the analysis and extraction of expectations of future monetary policy and inflation; the analysis of the short-term dynamics of money market interest rates; the reliability of existing models in periods of extreme market volatility and how to adjust them accordingly; and the role of government debt and deficits in affecting sovereign bond yields and spreads. This book will interest financial researchers and practitioners as well as academic and central bank economists.

The financial crisis of 2007-11 has now been analysed and explained from almost every conceivable standpoint. Far less attention has been paid to the long business cycle expansion that started in 1992 and provided an exceptional period of macroeconomic stability in the UK. To many it seemed that the main problem of the UK economy had been solved: that of sustained non-inflationary economic growth. This book brings together senior macroeconomists from universities and the Bank of England to look at what policy-making lessons can be learned from looking at the period of expansion that preceded the financial crisis. It does so with the twin aims of encouraging more policy-focused research on the UK and encouraging policy debate in the aftermath of the financial crisis and the prolonged economic recession. Students, researchers and practitioners with an interest in the UK economy will need to absorb the lessons of this book.

Many of the assumptions that underpin mainstream macroeconomic models have been challenged as a result of the traumatic events of the recent financial crisis. Thus, until recently, it was widely agreed that although the stock of money had a role to play, in practice it could be ignored as long as we used short-term nominal interest rates as the instrument of policy because money and other credit markets would clear at the given policy rate. However, very early on in the financial crisis interest rates effectively hit zero percent and so central banks had to resort to a wholly new set of largely untested instruments to restore order, including quantitative easing and the purchase of toxic financial assets. This book brings together contributions from economists working in academia, financial markets and central banks to assess the effectiveness of these policy instruments and explore what lessons have so far been learned.

Changes in the shape of the yield curve have traditionally been one of the key macroeconomic indicators of a likely change in economic outlook. However, the recent financial crises have created a challenge to the management of monetary policy, demanding a revision in the way that policymakers model expected changes in the economy. This volume brings together central bank economists and leading academic monetary economists to propose new methods for modelling the behaviour of interest rates. Topics covered include: the analysis and extraction of expectations of future monetary policy and inflation; the analysis of the short-term dynamics of money market interest rates; the reliability of existing models in periods of extreme market volatility and how to adjust them accordingly; and the role of government debt and deficits in affecting sovereign bond yields and spreads. This book will interest financial researchers and practitioners as well as academic and central bank economists.

This collection of essays applies modern micro-founded macroeconomic models to some of the most important economic policy questions facing monetary and macroeconomic policymakers. Key issues surveyed include: consumption investment; growth and business cycles; the role of government; asset pricing; the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy; open-economy issues; stabilization policy and general equilibrium analysis of emerging market crises. The book includes specially commissioned chapters from recognized authorities.

Many of the assumptions that underpin mainstream macroeconomic models have been challenged as a result of the traumatic events of the recent financial crisis. Thus, until recently, it was widely agreed that although the stock of money had a role to play, in practice it could be ignored as long as we used short-term nominal interest rates as the instrument of policy because money and other credit markets would clear at the given policy rate. However, very early on in the financial crisis interest rates effectively hit zero percent and so central banks had to resort to a wholly new set of largely untested instruments to restore order, including quantitative easing and the purchase of toxic financial assets. This book brings together contributions from economists working in academia, financial markets and central banks to assess the effectiveness of these policy instruments and explore what lessons have so far been learned.

The financial crisis of 2007-11 has now been analysed and explained from almost every conceivable standpoint. Far less attention has been paid to the long business cycle expansion that started in 1992 and provided an exceptional period of macroeconomic stability in the UK. To many it seemed that the main problem of the UK economy had been solved: that of sustained non-inflationary economic growth. This book brings together senior macroeconomists from universities and the Bank of England to look at what policy-making lessons can be learned from looking at the period of expansion that preceded the financial crisis. It does so with the twin aims of encouraging more policy-focused research on the UK and encouraging policy debate in the aftermath of the financial crisis and the prolonged economic recession. Students, researchers and practitioners with an interest in the UK economy will need to absorb the lessons of this book.

This collection of essays applies modern micro-founded macroeconomic models to some of the most important economic policy questions facing monetary and macroeconomic policymakers. Key issues surveyed include: consumption investment; growth and business cycles; the role of government; asset pricing; the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy; open-economy issues; stabilization policy and general equilibrium analysis of emerging market crises. The book includes specially commissioned chapters from recognized authorities.

We wrote this book as the result of a number of passionate, and it must be admitted heated, conversations on the EMU question before Christmas 2011, around the time of the Fiscal Compact, which led to a first draft in January this year. We are putting the finishing touches to the work on the twentieth anniversary of the UK's exit from ERM, which occurred on 16th September 1992. European events continue to dominate the UK agenda, but now also the sentiment in global financial markets. We each have grown up with the spectre of the European question: How far should the UK integrate into the European project? The answer to that question has continually provided the context for so much of the UK policy agenda that it has sometimes proved hard to think more profoundly about the question in the Kennedy-sense of not what the Euro can do for us but what we can do for the Euro. Undoubtedly the missing ingredient in the Euro debate is what we might call good old-fashioned market liberalism. That would probably have been the main contribution that UK entry to EMU could have provided to Euro policymaking elite. We maintain in what follows that financial markets are not to be feared but, as they are enormously powerful machines for processing information, to be learnt from. However, they must also be intelligently managed, as they are prone to fads and fashions. We have tried here to collect up a number of such observations and comments into an agenda for reform in terms of necessary steps towards a functional Eurozone. This is not because we think that common currency ought to fail, but because we think that the current situation can and should be rescued. However time though is short. Already the sinews of the policymakers have been stretched to breaking point, and sadly, economic and monetary policy is not far behind.'