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Covers four pillars of safety statistics: cross-disciplinary
scientific engagement, effective and efficient operational process,
visual analytics, and intelligent data architecture Links safety
monitoring to benefit risk evaluation Presents an emerging topic
that links to ICH E19 and TransCelerate safety efforts
"Morality and Community in the Extended Market Order" is volume
seven of a series of seven lectures sponsored by Liberty Fund and
the Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago in
celebration of the hundredth anniversary of F. A. Hayek's birth.
Buchanan is a pioneer of the theory of public choice, extending
models of economic exchange to the realm of political
decision-making. Buchanan's work on the constitutional and
contractual bases of collective political action has contributed
new insights into the relationships between taxation, public
expenditure, and public finance.
"Democracy in Deficit" is one of the early comprehensive attempts
to apply the basic principles of public-choice analysis to
macroeconomic theory and policy.
According to Robert D. Tollison in the foreword, "The central
purpose of the book was to examine the simple precepts of Keynesian
economics through the lens of public-choice theory. The basic
discovery was that Keynesian economics had a bias toward deficits
in terms of political self-interest."
"Democracy in Deficit" opened the door for much of the current work
on political business cycles and the incorporation of public-choice
considerations into macroeconomic theory. Even in the area of
monetarism, Buchanan's landmark work has greatly influenced the
sway of contemporary theorists away from the nearly universally
held belief of Keynesian theory.
"Democracy in Deficit" contributes greatly to Buchanan's lifelong
fiscal and monetary rules to guide long-term policy in
macroeconomics. The book serves to bolster Buchanan's central
beliefs in the necessity of a balanced-budget amendment to the U.S.
Constitution and in monetary rules rather than central bank
discretion.
The book is co-authored with Richard Wagner, a respected colleague
of Buchanan, whom Buchanan recognized as helping to keep the book
free of polemics and on target with its central purpose of applying
the elementary theory of public choice.
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one
of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"
This volume presents a collection of Buchanan's most representative
works in economic method and analysis. As Robert D. Tollison points
out in his foreword, " Included] in this volume are some of
Buchanan's] most often cited works on methodology, including papers
reflecting his emphasis on the subjective nature of opportunity
costs and the implications of this subjectivity for economic
analysis."
The works collected in this volume also demonstrate Buchanan's
interest throughout his career in the ideas and issues posed by
economic theory. Buchanan shows throughout this volume that he
believes economic theory can help explain the world around us.
Spanning nearly his entire fifty-year career, Buchanan's writings
in this volume exhibit a consistency of thought and belief as ideas
recur from paper to paper, ever richer and more resonant.
The thirty-six works represented here are grouped into the major
categories:
1.The Practice and Method of Economic Theory
2.Competition and Entrepreneurship
3.The Theory of Monopoly
4.Input Prices
5.Opportunity Cost and Efficient Prices
6.Increasing Returns and the Work Ethic
7.Economic Theory in a Post-Socialist World
Clearly, these papers as a whole reflect a broad range of issues
and provide us with countless insights. More than this, they give
us a picture of the theorist in his workshop. They acquaint us with
what interests him and how he deals with important issues.
In his conclusion to the opening essay, "Is Economics the Science
of Choice?" Buchanan typifies the richness of thought available
throughout this volume: "Modern economics, as practiced by
professional scholars, embodies confusions that are fundamentally
methodological. For myself, I advance no claim that my own thinking
has yet fully rid itself of the paradigms of neoclassical
orthodoxy."
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one
of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional
Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Evennts"
This volume presents a collection of thirty-four essays and shorter
works by James M. Buchanan that represent the brilliance of his
founding work on public-choice theory.
The work of James M. Buchanan is perhaps most often associated
with his helping to found public-choice theory. Buchanan's
book-length works such as "The Calculus of Consent" or "The Reason
of Rules" (Volumes 3 and 10, respectively, in Liberty Fund's "The
Collected Works of James M. Buchanan") are best known for their
brilliant application of market behavioral models to government.
But Buchanan's shorter works represented here all show originality
and insight as well as clear articulation of important theoretical
principles. What's more, these essays have all had a significant
impact on the subsequent literature about public choice.
In this volume, the works are broken down into these major
categorical groupings:
1.General Approach
2.Public Choice and Its Critics
3.Voters
4.Voting Models
5.Rent Seeking
6.Regulation
7.Public Choice and Public Expenditures
As Robert D. Tollison concludes his foreword to this volumes,
"Read in conjunction with the other parts of the 'Collected Works,
' these papers offer the reader a fuller appreciation of the
public-choice revolution and its impact and prospects."
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one
of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"
Public-goods theory constituted a major element in James M.
Buchanan's research agenda throughout the 1960s. "The Demand and
Supply of Public Goods" is a major part of that work.
At the time that Buchanan was elaborating on his theories of
public goods, the prevailing trend in public economics was the
emergence of public-expenditure theory, which attempted to form a
comprehensive theory of the state around the notion of market
failure.
"The Demand and Supply of Public Goods" established Buchanan's
broad purpose of explicitly comparing market performance with
political performance. As such, the book is an important part of
Buchanan's contractarian theory of the "productive state."
Conceived originally as a series of lectures given at Cambridge
University in 1961 and 1962, "The Demand and Supply of Public
Goods" is written for students, but is in no way a textbook of dry
pedagogy. Instead, as Geoffrey Brennan writes in the foreword,
"What Buchanan provides here is a clear statement of the
contractarian approach to public goods problems, very much in the
'voluntary exchange' tradition of Wicksell and Lindhal."
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one
of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"
Economic Evaluation in Genomic and Precision Medicine provides an
in-depth examination of essential concepts, protocols and
applications of economic evaluation in genomic and precision
medicine. Contributions from leading international medical
geneticists and health economists compile new ways to effectively
assess the costs and outcomes of different genomic care pathways,
implement cost-effective medical interventions, and enhance the
value of genomic and precision healthcare. Foundational chapters
and discipline-specific case studies cover topics ranging from the
economic analysis of genomic trial design, to health technology
assessment of next-generation sequencing, ethical aspects, economic
policy in genomic medicine, and pricing and reimbursement in
clinical genomics.
In his foreword, Robert D. Tollison identifies the main objective
of Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan's "The Reason of Rules: "
." . . a book-length attempt to focus the energies of economists
and other social analysts on the nature and function of the rules
under which ordinary political life and market life function."
In persuasive style, Brennan and Buchanan argue that too often
economists become mired in explaining the obvious or constructing
elaborate mathematical models to shed light on trivial phenomena.
Their solution: economics as a discipline would be better focused
on deriving normative procedures for establishing rules so that
ordinary economic life can proceed unaffected as much as possible
by social issues.
In "The Reason of Rules," Brennan and Buchanan sketch out a
methodological and analytical framework for the establishment of
rules. They point out that the consideration of rules has its roots
in classical economics and has been hinted at in the work of some
contemporary economists. But the enterprise of applying the
analytical rigor of modern economics to the establishment of
effective rules is the little-traveled road that bears the most
promise.
In fact, the basic idea of the importance of rules is a thread
that runs through virtually the whole of Buchanan's distinguished
career, and it is one of his signal contributions to the
contemporary discipline of economics. "The Reason of Rules" is an
elaboration of the potential for rules and the normative process by
which they can best be devised.
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one
of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"
Recent scholars have tended to interpret 2 Corinthians 12:1-10 as
an attempt to belittle ecstatic experiences, such as Paul's ascent
to paradise, in favor of suffering in the service of the gospel.
This study offers an alternative. An analysis of ascent traditions
in the Greco-Roman and Jewish worlds investigates ascent as both a
literary motif and a religious practice. This analysis probes
several issues relevant to 2 Cor 12:1-10, including dynamics of
ascent and suffering. The study turns next to religious experiences
Paul believes he and his communities have undergone. A pattern
emerges in which extraordinary experiences provide the basis for
suffering and service. Moreover, Paul expects his communities to
have had experiences similar to, if less dramatic than, his ascent
to heaven. The author argues that in its context in 2 Corinthians,
Paul's ascent should be understood as an encounter with Christ that
transcends human language and endows Paul with divine power, which
must be refined through suffering. With the help of four premodern
interpreters, the study further explores the theological relevance
of Paul's ascent. For Paul, mystical encounter with Christ forms
the precondition for suffering and service because it enables
self-transcending love for God and neighbors.
This final volume (save for the Index) in Liberty Fund's "The
Collected Works of James M Buchanan" acquaints us most intimately
with the man himself. Included are essays and short pieces that
shed light on Buchanan's view of the world. Ranging from personal
reflections on the art and science of economics, to restatements of
his central themes and reminiscences of his encounters and
collaborations with other great thinkers, this volume presents
James Buchanan as a multidimensional human being, not just as a
great economic and political thinker.The thirty-three pieces
collected in "Ideas, Persons and Events" are grouped into these
categories: autobiographical and personal reflections; reflections
on fellow political economists; political economy in the
post-socialist century; reform without romance. As Hartmut Kliemt
states in his foreword, "The personal and the theoretical are often
inseparably intertwined in the essays of this volume...As a case in
point, consider James Buchanan's account of his relationship to
Frank Knight. This account not only sheds some interesting light on
the personal element in the development of science, it also offers
some new perspectives on the concept of the 'relatively absolute
absolutes', which has been so central to Buchanan's thinking in
general."
This final volume (save for the Index) in Liberty Fund's "The
Collected Works of James M. Buchanan" acquaints us most intimately
with the man himself. Included are essays and short pieces that
shed light on Buchanan's view of the world.
Ranging from personal reflections on the art and science of
economics, to restatements of his central themes and reminiscences
of his encounters and collaborations with other great thinkers,
this volume presents James Buchanan as a multidimensional human
being, not just as a great economic and political thinker.
The thirty-three pieces collected in "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
are grouped into these categories:
1.Autobiographical and Personal Reflections
2.Reflections on Fellow Political Economists
3.Political Economy in the Post-Socialist Century
4.Reform without Romance
As Hartmut Kliemt states in his foreword, "The personal and the
theoretical are often inseparably intertwined in the essays of this
volume. . . . As a case in point, consider James Buchanan's account
of his relationship to Frank Knight. This account not only sheds
some interesting light on the personal element in the development
of science, it also offers some new perspectives on the concept of
the 'relatively absolute absolutes, ' which has been so central to
Buchanan's thinking in general."
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one
of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"
Constitutional political economy is the theme of the papers
collected in this volume. This entire area of contemporary economic
thought is a legacy of James M. Buchanan.
In outlining the importance of this volume to the contemporary
study of economics and to the work of James M. Buchanan, Robert D.
Tollison states in his foreword, "Buchanan literally founded the
field of constitutional political economy. . . . His] insistence on
the importance of rules was an important innovation in economics,
and, over the past thirty years or so, the analytical and empirical
relevance of Buchanan's constitutional perspective has become
apparent."
The thirty-five papers represented in this volume are grouped into
these major subject categories:
1.Foundational Issues
2.The Method of Constitutional Economics
3.Incentives and Constitutional Choice
4.Constitutional Order
5.Market Order
6.Distributional Issues
7.Fiscal and Monetary Constitutions
8.Reform
For Buchanan, his work in constitutional political economy is just
the first step. He is concerned with inducing economists and other
scholars to take the constitutional problem seriously. As they do,
says Robert D. Tollison, "the face of modern economics will be
changed."
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one
of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"
In his foreword, Geoffrey Brennan states, "The papers in this
volume represent a coherent set of pieces focused on aspects of
public-expenditure theory and constitute all of Buchanan's papers
in this area."
Buchanan's work on the subject of what governments should do and
his insistence on Knut Wicksell's ideal that taxation and public
expenditure be integrated topics have contributed significantly to
the current thinking of most economists on the topic. Geoffrey
Brennan summarizes Buchanan's central themes in this way, "There
are two messages that emerge from this work: one is that a proper
sense of the "extent" of market failure, rather than its mere
"presence, " is relevant in all cases; the other is that
'correcting' for such market failure is often a complex
multidimensional business not captured by direct public provision
at zero price and not necessarily involving expansion of market
output."
The twenty-nine papers represented in this volume are grouped into
these major subject categories:
1.Public Services and Collective Action
2.Externalities
3.Clubs and Joint Supply
4.Public Goods Theory
5.Applications--City, Health, and Social Security
6.Distributive Norms and Collective Action
This volume also includes what are arguably Buchanan's two most
famous articles: "Externality," which he wrote with William
Stubblebine, and "Economic Theory of Clubs."
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one
of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
ERRATA
Unfortunately, after this book had been printed and bound, it was
discovered that, due to a production error, the index contained
some erroneous page numbers. Please click on the pdf file below to
obtain the corrected index that should replace the index bound into
the back of the book. When this volume goes back to press for a
second printing, the index will be updated with the pages in this
pdf file, and we will be pleased to send all buyers of the
erroneous Volume 15 a corrected copy of the book at no extra
charge.
Click here for a pdf file of the corrected index.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
/div>
While relatively short, COST AND CHOICE, according to Hartmut
Kliemt in the foreword, "holds quite a central place in Buchanan's
work. For the fundamental economic notion of 'cost', or
'opportunity cost', is intimately related to the individualist and
subjectivist perspective that is so essential to the Buchanan
enterprise." To be sure, the Austrian school of economists
enunciated similar views of cost decades before Buchanan, but
Buchanan advances his theories by attempting to integrate his views
into the orthodox classical and neoclassical framework. When he
published the book in 1969, Buchanan hoped that other scholars
would follow him in researching the opportunity-cost concept and
its applications. Unlike the theatre of public policy, where
Buchanan's work is widely celebrated and influential, his important
work on the issue of cost and choice, so clearly explicated in this
volume, has done little to move the mainstream of economic thinking
in the thirty years since its original publication. It is hoped
that this new edition of Buchanan's seminal work will place
Buchanan's groundbreaking ideas in wider circulation. Buchanan
writes in the preface, "My aim is to utilise the theory of
opportunity cost to demonstrate basic methodological distinctions
that are often overlooked and to show that a consistent usage of
this theory clarifies important areas of disagreement on policy
issues."
As diverse as the papers presented in this volume may seem at first
glance, all of them touch on two characteristic themes of James
Buchanan's work: the respect for individual sovereignty and the
threat of monopoly power on the rights of the individual.
In his foreword, Hartmut Kliemt says, "As opposed to more extreme
and more utopian libertarians, Buchanan] well understands that in
our world it takes a state to defend the individual from the state.
Buchanan, therefore, is not an anarchist but, rather, what may be
called a 'reluctant anarchist' who accepts both that the state is
the greatest threat to individual sovereignty and that without some
statelike monopoly, individual sovereignty cannot be protected."
The twenty-six essays included in "Federalism, Liberty, and the
Law" are grouped into these categories:
1.The Analytics of Federalism
2.Federalism and Freedom
3.Liberty, Man, and the State
4.The Constitution of Markets
5.Economists, Efficiency, and the Law
6.Law, Money, and Crime
The central issue that unites the pieces in this volume is
monopoly power and its control. As a libertarian, Buchanan sees
government as the greatest threat--and also the greatest
protector--of individual liberties.
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one
of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"
In his foreword, Geoffrey Brennan states, "The papers in this
volume represent a coherent set of pieces focused on aspects of
public-expenditure theory and constitute all of Buchanan's papers
in this area."
Buchanan's work on the subject of what governments should do and
his insistence on Knut Wicksell's ideal that taxation and public
expenditure be integrated topics have contributed significantly to
the current thinking of most economists on the topic. Geoffrey
Brennan summarizes Buchanan's central themes in this way, "There
are two messages that emerge from this work: one is that a proper
sense of the "extent" of market failure, rather than its mere
"presence, " is relevant in all cases; the other is that
'correcting' for such market failure is often a complex
multidimensional business not captured by direct public provision
at zero price and not necessarily involving expansion of market
output."
The twenty-nine papers represented in this volume are grouped into
these major subject categories:
1.Public Services and Collective Action
2.Externalities
3.Clubs and Joint Supply
4.Public Goods Theory
5.Applications--City, Health, and Social Security
6.Distributive Norms and Collective Action
This volume also includes what are arguably Buchanan's two most
famous articles: "Externality," which he wrote with William
Stubblebine, and "Economic Theory of Clubs."
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one
of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
ERRATA
Unfortunately, after this book had been printed and bound, it was
discovered that, due to a production error, the index contained
some erroneous page numbers. Please click on the pdf file below to
obtain the corrected index that should replace the index bound into
the back of the book. When this volume goes back to press for a
second printing, the index will be updated with the pages in this
pdf file, and we will be pleased to send all buyers of the
erroneous Volume 15 a corrected copy of the book at no extra
charge.
Click here for a pdf file of the corrected index.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
/div>
This volume presents a collection of thirty-four essays and shorter
works by James M. Buchanan that represent the brilliance of his
founding work on public-choice theory.
The work of James M. Buchanan is perhaps most often associated
with his helping to found public-choice theory. Buchanan's
book-length works such as "The Calculus of Consent" or "The Reason
of Rules" (Volumes 3 and 10, respectively, in Liberty Fund's "The
Collected Works of James M. Buchanan") are best known for their
brilliant application of market behavioral models to government.
But Buchanan's shorter works represented here all show originality
and insight as well as clear articulation of important theoretical
principles. What's more, these essays have all had a significant
impact on the subsequent literature about public choice.
In this volume, the works are broken down into these major
categorical groupings:
1.General Approach
2.Public Choice and Its Critics
3.Voters
4.Voting Models
5.Rent Seeking
6.Regulation
7.Public Choice and Public Expenditures
As Robert D. Tollison concludes his foreword to this volumes,
"Read in conjunction with the other parts of the 'Collected Works,
' these papers offer the reader a fuller appreciation of the
public-choice revolution and its impact and prospects."
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one
of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"
Published originally in 1975, "The Limits of Liberty" made James
Buchanans name more widely known than ever before among political
philosophers and theorists and established Buchanan, along with
John Rawls and Robert Nozick, as one of the three new
contractarians, standing on the shoulders of Hobbes, Locke, and
Kant. While "The Limits of Liberty" is strongly related to
Buchanans "Calculus of Consent", it is logically prior to the
Calculus, according to Helmut Kliemt in the foreword, even though
it was published later. Buchanan frames the central idea most
cogently in the opening of his preface: "Precepts for living
together are not going to be handed down from on high. Men must use
their own intelligence in imposing order on chaos, intelligence not
in scientific problem-solving but in the more difficult sense of
finding and maintaining agreement among themselves. Anarchy is
ideal for ideal men; passionate men must be reasonable. Like so
many men have done before me, I examine the bases for a society of
men and women who want to be free but who recognise the inherent
limits that social interdependence places on them".
This volume is a collection of sixteen essays on three general
topics: the methodology of economics, the applicability of economic
reasoning to political science and other social sciences, and the
relevance of economics as moral philosophy. Several essays are
published here for the first time, including "Professor Alchian on
Economic Method," "Natural and Artifactual Man," and "Public Choice
and Ideology."This book provides relatively easy access to a wide
range of work by a moral and legal philosopher, a welfare economist
who has consistently defended the primacy of the contractarian
ethic, a public finance theorist, and a founder of the burgeoning
subdiscipline of public choice. Buchanan's work has spawned a
methodological revolution in the way economists and other scholars
think about government and government activity.As a measure of
recognition for his significant contribution, Dr. Buchanan was
awarded the 1986 Nobel Prize in Economics.
Published originally in 1975, "The Limits of Liberty" made James
Buchanan's name more widely known than ever before among political
philosophers and theorists and established Buchanan, along with
John Rawls and Robert Nozick, as one of the three new
contractarians, standing on the shoulders of Hobbes, Locke, and
Kant. While "The Limits of Liberty" is strongly related to
Buchanan's "Calculus of Consent", it is logically prior to the
Calculus, according to Helmut Kliemt in the foreword, even though
it was published later. Buchanan frames the central idea most
cogently in the opening of his preface: "Precepts for living
together are not going to be handed down from on high. Men must use
their own intelligence in imposing order on chaos, intelligence not
in scientific problem-solving but in the more difficult sense of
finding and maintaining agreement among themselves. Anarchy is
ideal for ideal men; passionate men must be reasonable. Like so
many men have done before me, I examine the bases for a society of
men and women who want to be free but who recognise the inherent
limits that social interdependence places on them".
As diverse as the papers presented in this volume may seem at first
glance, all of them touch on two characteristic themes of James
Buchanan's work: the respect for individual sovereignty and the
threat of monopoly power on the rights of the individual.
In his foreword, Hartmut Kliemt says, "As opposed to more extreme
and more utopian libertarians, Buchanan] well understands that in
our world it takes a state to defend the individual from the state.
Buchanan, therefore, is not an anarchist but, rather, what may be
called a 'reluctant anarchist' who accepts both that the state is
the greatest threat to individual sovereignty and that without some
statelike monopoly, individual sovereignty cannot be protected."
The twenty-six essays included in "Federalism, Liberty, and the
Law" are grouped into these categories:
1.The Analytics of Federalism
2.Federalism and Freedom
3.Liberty, Man, and the State
4.The Constitution of Markets
5.Economists, Efficiency, and the Law
6.Law, Money, and Crime
The central issue that unites the pieces in this volume is
monopoly power and its control. As a libertarian, Buchanan sees
government as the greatest threat--and also the greatest
protector--of individual liberties.
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one
of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"
While this volume presents the important writings of James M.
Buchanan on taxation and debt, Geoffrey Brennan makes it clear in
the foreword that the thrust of Buchanan's work in this area has
been to integrate theories of taxation and debt with
public-expenditure theory. Therefore, the editors strongly urge
that the present volume on taxation and debt be read in tandem with
the subsequent Volume 15, 'Externalities and Public Expenditure
Theory'. Included in this present volume are thirty-five important
writings by Buchanan on taxation and debt. These are grouped into
the following major subject categories: taxation, politics, and
public choice; earmarking and incidence in democratic process;
analytical and ethical foundations of tax limits; the fiscal
constitution; confessions of a burden monger; Ricardian
equivalence; the constitution of a debt-free polity. As Geoffrey
Brennan points out in the foreword to this volume, "Although James
Buchanan's interests are wide-ranging, the core of his professional
reputation as an economist and the origin of much of his broader
thinking lie in public economics -- in engagement with the
questions of what governments do and how governments should
properly finance what they do." This volume together with its
partner subsequent volume present clear and accessible insights
into the rich economic work for which Buchanan is best known.
Commenting on his collaboration with Geoffrey Brennan on "The Power
to Tax," James M. Buchanan says that the book is "demonstrable
proof of the value of genuine research collaboration across
national-cultural boundaries." Buchanan goes on to say that ""The
Power to Tax" is informed by a single idea--the implications of a
revenue-maximizing government."
Originally published in 1980, "The Power to Tax" was a much-needed
answer to the tax revolts sweeping across the United States. It was
a much-needed answer as well in the academic circles of tax theory,
where orthodox public finance models were clearly inadequate to the
needs at hand.
The public-choice approach to taxation which Buchanan had earlier
elaborated stood in direct opposition to public-finance orthodoxy.
What Buchanan and Brennan constructed in "The Power to Tax" was a
middle ground between the two. As Brennan writes in the foreword,
"The underlying motivating question was simple: Why not borrow the
motivational assumptions standard in public-choice theory and put
them together with assumptions about policy-maker discretion taken
from public-finance orthodoxy?"
The result was a controversial book--and a much misunderstood one
as well. Looking back twenty years later, Brennan feels confirmed
in the rightness of the theories he and Buchanan espoused,
particularly in their unity with the public-choice tradition: "The
insistence on motivational symmetry is a characteristic feature of
the public choice approach, and it is in this dimension that "The
Power to Tax" and the orthodox public- finance approach diverge."
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one
of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"
In his foreword, Robert D. Tollison identifies the main objective
of Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan's "The Reason of Rules: "
." . . a book-length attempt to focus the energies of economists
and other social analysts on the nature and function of the rules
under which ordinary political life and market life function."
In persuasive style, Brennan and Buchanan argue that too often
economists become mired in explaining the obvious or constructing
elaborate mathematical models to shed light on trivial phenomena.
Their solution: economics as a discipline would be better focused
on deriving normative procedures for establishing rules so that
ordinary economic life can proceed unaffected as much as possible
by social issues.
In "The Reason of Rules," Brennan and Buchanan sketch out a
methodological and analytical framework for the establishment of
rules. They point out that the consideration of rules has its roots
in classical economics and has been hinted at in the work of some
contemporary economists. But the enterprise of applying the
analytical rigor of modern economics to the establishment of
effective rules is the little-traveled road that bears the most
promise.
In fact, the basic idea of the importance of rules is a thread
that runs through virtually the whole of Buchanan's distinguished
career, and it is one of his signal contributions to the
contemporary discipline of economics. "The Reason of Rules" is an
elaboration of the potential for rules and the normative process by
which they can best be devised.
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel
Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one
of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series will include:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"
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