A behind the scenes look at 50 years of US diplomacy. From Vietnam in the 1960s to the Afghanistan of this decade, James Dobbins was on the frontline of American diplomacy and working to advance U.S. national interests in some of the world's most difficult and troubled situations. In Foreign Service, Dobbins takes the reader behind the scenes at the Vietnam peace talks, the darkest dates of the Cold War, the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo, and Somalia. He provides a thoughtful insider's account of all these ventures, analyzes the sources of both success and failure, and provides incisive portraits of many of the chief actors. Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama turned repeatedly to Dobbins as a diplomatic trouble-shooter with the right instincts and experience to help find creative solutions for seemingly irresolvable problems. Now readers can benefit from his insights, learning that, while specific situations in world affairs are different, the basic principles and techniques for defending U.S. interests on the global stage remain constant.

It is not inevitable that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons or even that it will gain the capacity to quickly produce them. U.S. and even Israeli analysts continually push their estimates for such an event further into the future. Nevertheless, absent a change in Iranian policy, it is reasonable to assume that, some time in the coming decade, Iran will acquire such a capability. Most recent scholarly studies have also focused on how to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Other, less voluminous writing looks at what to do after Iran becomes a nuclear power. What has so far been lacking is a policy framework for dealing with Iran before, after, and, indeed, during its crossing of the nuclear threshold. This monograph attempts to fill that gap by providing a midterm strategy for dealing with Iran that neither begins nor ends at the point at which Tehran acquires a nuclear weapon capability. It proposes an approach that neither acquiesces to a nuclear-armed Iran nor refuses to admit the possibility - indeed, the likelihood - of this occurring.

The American engagement in Iraq has been looked at from many perspectives, to include examination of the flawed intelligence that provided the war's rationale, the failed effort to secure an international mandate, the rapid success of the invasion, and the long ensuing counterinsurgency campaign. This compelling new book focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its Administrator, L. Paul Bremer. The book also includes interviews with many of those in Baghdad and Washington responsible for setting and implementing occupation policy, on the memoirs of American and Iraqi officials who have since left office, on journalist accounts of the period, and on tens of thousands of internal and recently unclassified CPA documents, to which the authors were allowed access.

The United States has gained considerable experience in nation-building operations through its participation in at least eight significant operations since World War II - in Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. These eight cases can be split into three distinct periods: the post - World War II cases of Germany and Japan under the administrations of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman; the post - Cold War cases of Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo under the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton; and the post-9/11 cases of Afghanistan and Iraq under the administration of George W. Bush. Exploring both the decision-making style and structure of government in the three periods can lead to a deeper understanding of American decision-making on, and the American capacity for, nation-building.This volume first discusses some general theories of administration, leadership, and authority in order to frame the empirical evidence on nation-building. Then, each period of nation-building is examined, focusing on operations, the distribution of responsibility, how U.S. efforts fit into larger international efforts, and the impact of the decision-making structures on the overall success of the operation. Finally, the authors combine theory and evidence to draw conclusions about the influence of decision-making style and structure on American nation-building.

Peace is the most essential product of nation-building. Without peace, neither economic growth nor democratization is possible. The authors of "Europe's Role in Nation-Building" investigate the use of armed force as part of broader nation-building efforts led by European powers and its success at achieving the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbours. They then evaluate Europe's performance against the U.S. and United Nations records in past nation-building operations.The authors focus on factors that can be influenced by outside powers, making valuable recommendations that address the pitfalls of and lessons learned from past operations. They emphasize the need for multilateral operations and the involvement of crucial actors like the European Union and NATO. The success of nation-building activities depends on the wisdom with which all resources are employed."The RAND Nation-Building" series is just this kind of resource, having drawn from a total of 22 European, U.N. and U.S. led nation-building operations since World War II. Other volumes in the series examine the involvement of the United States and the UN in nation-building efforts. In this new addition to the series, the authors take an in-depth look at six European cases (Macedonia, Bosnia, Cote d'Ivoire, Albania, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone) and one Australian-led operation (the Solomon Islands) to complete a comprehensive history of best practices in nation-building. This series serves as an indispensable reference for the planning of successful future interventions.

On March 21, 2007, the RAND Corporation held a public conference on Capitol Hill, "Coping with Iran: Confrontation, Containment, or Engagement?" Participants sought to discuss the benefits and drawbacks of various policy options to address the Iranian challenge. This report summarizes remarks presented during the conference. The views expressed in this document are those of the participants, as interpreted by the RAND Corporation.

In two earlier volumes, the authors defined nation building as the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to promote a transition to democracy. By various actors, it is often called stabilisation and reconstruction, peace building, or state building, but at any name these missions have become more frequent, and frequently more complex and ambitious. As American forces entered Iraq, little effort was made to marshal abundant, recent, and relevant experience in support of the new nation-building mission in Iraq, with severe consequences.This guidebook is designed to contribute to future nation building efforts. It is organized around the components that make up any nation-building mission: planning, military and police contingents, civil administrators, humanitarian and relief efforts, governance, economic stabilization, democratisation, and infrastructure development. This guide should help practitioners avoid repeating earlier mistakes, help political leaders evaluate the cost and likelihood of success of any proposed operation, and help citizens evaluate their government's consequent performance.

Reviews UN nation-building efforts to transform unstable countries into democratic, peaceful, and prosperous partners, and compares those efforts to U.S.-led missions. Reviews UN efforts to transform eight unstable countries into democratic, peaceful, and prosperous partners, and compares those missions with U.S. nation-building operations. The UN provides the most suitable institutional framework for nation-building missions that require fewer than 20,000 men-one with a comparatively low cost structure, a comparatively high success rate, and the greatest degree of international legitimacy.

An assessment of humanitarian-assistance efforts by and interaction between civilian and military providers in the early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan Description and evaluation of relief, reconstruction, humanitarian, and humanitarian-type aid efforts in Afghanistan during the most intense phase of military operations, from September 2001 to June 2002. The efforts were generally successful, but there were serious coordination problems among the various civilian and military aid providers. Critical issues, both positive and negative, are identified, and a list of recommendations is provided for policymakers, implementers, and aid providers, based on lessons learned.