The Nuclear Dilemma in a Changing World. The War That Must Never Be Fought explores how nuclear deterrence should be understood seventy years after the first nuclear tests. These essays, edited by George P. Shultz and James E. Goodby, challenge outdated deterrence theories and show a clear need to re-examine notions from the Cold War that no longer fit present circumstances. They argue that a world without nuclear weapons is a desirable objective that is in the national security interests of the United States. The contributors examine nuclear deterrence from the vantage points of nations in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, all of which have some form of security relationship with the United States, either cooperative or competitive. They explain, for instance, why agreement by Poland and Germany on nuclear deterrence and nuclear arms control is necessary if Europeans are to be proactive in reducing nuclear weapons in Europe and. They explore the strategic views, and resulting nuclear policies, of India and Pakistan to determine the possibilities for decoupling nuclear weapons from deterrence. They also tell why successfully reducing and ultimately eliminating the nuclear threat must be based on a combination of regional and global joint enterprises. The authors conclude with suggestions that might lead to a successful joint enterprise on security among the world's nuclear powers.

Drawn from the Hoover Institution's Shultz-Stephenson Task Force on Energy Policy January 2010 conference, this book discusses critical energy issues including, energy and synthetic biology, cap and trade and carbon tax policies, energy efficiency, international energy relationships, and other key topics. The contributors present a range of ideas and recommendations that might improve the performance of the United States in responding to the energy challenge.

Drawn from presentations made at the Hoover Institution's October 2007 conference, this collection of essays examines the practical steps necessary to address the current security challenges of nuclear weapons and to move toward the Reykjavik goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons. The distinguished group of contributors includes former officials of the past six administrations--Republican and Democratic--along with senior scholar and scientific experts on nuclear issues.

In foreign policy, the Trump administration has appeared to depart from long-standing norms of international behavior that have underwritten American primacy for decades in a more interdependent and prosperous world. In this book, a diplomat and a historian revisit that perception by examining and reproducing several of their own essays during the past twenty years. The essays reveal that Trump's style exaggerates tendencies towards unilateralism already present in the actions, if not the policies, of previous presidents, and in their neglect of three imperatives: collective security, regional integration, and diplomatic imagination. It is not too late, however, to remedy the problem by learning the lessons of the recent past.

In foreign policy, the Trump administration has appeared to depart from long-standing norms of international behavior that have underwritten American primacy for decades in a more interdependent and prosperous world. In this book, a diplomat and a historian revisit that perception by examining and reproducing several of their own essays during the past twenty years. The essays reveal that Trump's style exaggerates tendencies towards unilateralism already present in the actions, if not the policies, of previous presidents, and in their neglect of three imperatives: collective security, regional integration, and diplomatic imagination. It is not too late, however, to remedy the problem by learning the lessons of the recent past.

Drawn from presentations made at the Hoover Institution's October 2007 conference, this collection of essays examines the practical steps necessary to address the current security challenges of nuclear weapons and to move toward the Reykjavik goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons. The distinguished group of contributors includes former officials of the past six administrations--Republican and Democratic--along with senior scholar and scientific experts on nuclear issues.

The mortal danger of nuclear weapons is unique in its terrifying potential for devastation on an unprecedented and unimaginable scale. In this book, Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby--each with more than twenty years' experience in national security issues both in public and private capacities--review the main policy issues surrounding nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. They address the specific actions that the community of nations--with American leadership--should take to confront and turn back the nuclear danger that imperils humanity. The nuclear genie, say the authors, cannot be put back in the bottle. Our most urgent task as a nation today is to successfully manage, contain, and reduce the grave danger of nuclear weapons--whether in the hands of adversaries or friendly states. This book hopes to stimulate active public dialogue on this important subject.

Globalization and technology have created new challenges to national governments. As a result, they now must share power with other entities, such as regional and global organizations or large private economic units. In addition, citizens in most parts of the world have been empowered by the ability to acquire and disseminate information instantly. However this has not led to the type of international cooperation essential to deal with existential threats. Whether governments can find ways to cooperate in the face of looming threats to the survival of human society and our environment has become one of the defining issues of our age. A struggle between renewed nationalism and the rise of a truly global society is underway, but neither global nor regional institutions have acquired the skills and authority needed to meet existential threats, such as nuclear proliferation. Arms control efforts may have reduced the excesses of the Cold War, but concepts and methodologies for dealing with the nuclear menace have not kept up with global change. In addition, governments have shown surprisingly little interest in finding new ways to manage or eliminate global and regional competition in acquiring more or better nuclear weapons systems. This book explains why nuclear weapons still present existential dangers to humanity and why engagement by the United States with all states possessing nuclear weapons remains necessary to forestall a global catastrophe. The terms of engagement, however, will have to be different than during the Cold War. Technology is developing rapidly, greatly empowering individuals, groups, and nations. This can and should be a positive development, improving health, welfare, and quality of life for all, but it can also be used for enormous destruction. This book reaches beyond the military issues of arms control to analyze the impact on international security of changes in the international system and defines a unique cooperative security agenda.

Globalization and technology have created new challenges to national governments. As a result, they now must share power with other entities, such as regional and global organizations or large private economic units. In addition, citizens in most parts of the world have been empowered by the ability to acquire and disseminate information instantly. However this has not led to the type of international cooperation essential to deal with existential threats. Whether governments can find ways to cooperate in the face of looming threats to the survival of human society and our environment has become one of the defining issues of our age. A struggle between renewed nationalism and the rise of a truly global society is underway, but neither global nor regional institutions have acquired the skills and authority needed to meet existential threats, such as nuclear proliferation. Arms control efforts may have reduced the excesses of the Cold War, but concepts and methodologies for dealing with the nuclear menace have not kept up with global change. In addition, governments have shown surprisingly little interest in finding new ways to manage or eliminate global and regional competition in acquiring more or better nuclear weapons systems. This book explains why nuclear weapons still present existential dangers to humanity and why engagement by the United States with all states possessing nuclear weapons remains necessary to forestall a global catastrophe. The terms of engagement, however, will have to be different than during the Cold War. Technology is developing rapidly, greatly empowering individuals, groups, and nations. This can and should be a positive development, improving health, welfare, and quality of life for all, but it can also be used for enormous destruction. This book reaches beyond the military issues of arms control to analyze the impact on international security of changes in the international system and defines a unique cooperative security agenda.

'No previous generation of statesmen has had to conduct policy in so unknown an environment at the border line of Armageddon'-Henry Kissinger Nuclear weapons pose a unique challenge to American foreign policy and the American president in particular. The choices the president makes with regard to atomic weapons can change the course of human history and affect the lives of billions of people. In this important new work, scholar, teacher, and diplomat James Goodby analyzes how American presidents have confronted the dilemma of nuclear weapons. Drawing on his own involvement in over fifty years of nuclear policy, he explores specific case studies to illustrate the decision making process and the delicate balance between international cooperation and freedom of action, between the rules of behavior and governmental autonomy.

"No previous generation of statesmen has had to conduct policy in so unknown an environment at the border line of Armageddon"-Henry Kissinger Nuclear weapons pose a unique challenge to American foreign policy and the American president in particular. The choices the president makes with regard to atomic weapons can change the course of human history and affect the lives of billions of people. In this important new work, scholar, teacher, and diplomat James Goodby analyzes how American presidents have confronted the dilemma of nuclear weapons. Drawing on his own involvement in over fifty years of nuclear policy, he explores specific case studies to illustrate the decision making process and the delicate balance between international cooperation and freedom of action, between the rules of behavior and governmental autonomy.

Can Russia and the United States really move beyond their bitter Cold War rivalry to a genuinely cooperative relationship?Yes, argues distinguished diplomat James Goodby, but only if the United States, together with its European allies, promotes a new "logic of peace" to which NATO enlargement could contribute. During the nuclear standoff, a network of norms, rules, and structures kept the peace between the superpowers in Europe. Today, a new logic must be established, one that builds on mutual concerns to combat nuclear terrorism, reduce nuclear weaponry, and avoid the kind of bloodshed seen in the former Yugoslavia.Drawing on the lessons of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, Goodby analyzes the prospects for achieving a secure and democratic Euroatlantic community. He challenges policymakers and public alike to embrace a new vision of U.S.-Russian cooperation.

In this edited collection diplomats, academic researchers, and journalists survey modern Russian-Japanese relations. An attempt is made to go back to the origins of the conflict in their relations, to analyze their current status, and to propose an agenda for the future. The authors argue that the problems Moscow and Tokyo inherited from the decades of the Cold War cannot be resolved through a narrow bilateral approach and will require constructure U.S. participation. The problem of the Northern Territories is examined in the context of the North Pacific regional security environment. The authors explore the prospects for cooperative regional engagement, a nuclear build-down in the North Pacific, and possible involvement of the UN in the resolution of the territorial dispute.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union raised hopes for a rapid improvement of Japanese-Russian relations. This is important to both global and regional stability, peace, and security in Northeast Asia, and to Russia's transition to new relations with the West. Both Russia and Japan are in the process of domestic change and have weak political leadership. Yeltsin's visit to Tokyo in October 1993 was a cause for relief and for hope as the two nations discussed their common concerns. However, the Northern Territories remains a serious obstacle to improved relations. In this book an attempt is made to go back to the origins of the conflict in Japan-Russia relations, to discuss their current status, and to propose an agenda for the future.

There was a broad consensus among the diplomats, academic researchers, political analysts, and journalists whose writings are part of this collection. First, the problems Moscow and Tokyo inherited from the decades of Cold War cannot be resolved through a narrow bilateral approach and will require constructive U.S. participation. Second, the interconnection between bilateral, regional, and global trends created a new context for Moscow-Tokyo dialogue and cooperation. Third, the problem of the Northern Territories cannot be separated from the realities of the North Pacific regional security environment, which is still under the residual influence of the Cold War. The authors explore the prospects for cooperative regional engagement, a nuclear build-down in the North Pacific, and possible involvement of the UN in the resolution of the territorial dispute. Among the problems that require immediate attention, the writers focus on defense conversion, and dismantlement and disposing of nuclear weapons, and prospects for trilateral partnership that will serve the purpose of multilateral cooperation in the North Pacific/Northeast Asian region.

Drawn from the third in a series of conferences the Hoover Institution at Stanford University on the nuclear legacy of the cold war, this report examines the importance of deterrence, from its critical function in the cold war to its current role. Recognizing that today's international environment is radically different from that which it was during the cold war, the need is pressing to reassess the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence in the world of today and to look ahead to the future.

This book presents a detailed assessment of the conditions for security relations between Washington and Moscow in the post-cold war era, focusing on the scope for future co-operative management of common security. Three main areas provide the context for a thematically and theoretically varied discussion: the security and foreign policy implications of the transition from the Soviet to a Russian/Commonwealth regime military power and international stability after the cold war and the political, military, and technological requirements for a new security relationship. This book is intended for professionals, teachers, and students concerned with strategic studies, peace studies, and international relations consultants, policy-makers, and journalists specializing in these areas.