In this book, James Lewis demonstrates the centrality of American ideas about and concern for the union of the states in the policymaking of the early republic. For four decades after the nation's founding in the 1780s, he says, this focus on securing a union operated to blur the line between foreign policies and domestic concerns. Such leading policymakers as Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Henry Clay worried about the challenges to the goals of the Revolution that would arise from a hostile neighborhood--whether composed of new nations outside the union or the existing states following a division of the union. At the center of Lewis's story is the American response to the dissolution of Spain's empire in the New World, from the transfer of Louisiana to France in 1800 to the independence of Spain's mainland colonies in the 1820s. The breakup of the Spanish empire, he argues, presented a series of crises for the unionist logic of American policymakers, leading them, finally, to abandon a crucial element of the distinctly American approach to international relations embodied in their own federal union. |Uses the American response to the dissolution of Spain's empire in the New World (1783-1829) to demonstrate that American concern for the union of the states was a major factor in the policymaking of the early republic.

In the 1790s, the Jeffersonian Republicans were the party of "no." They opposed attempts to expand the government's role in society, criticized the Washington administration's national bank, railed against a standing army, and bemoaned the spirit of the Federalist regime, which, they claimed, favored elite over ordinary Americans. Accordingly, Thomas Jefferson asserted that his election as President in 1801 was a "revolution": with Jeffersonians in power, the government could be stripped down in size and strength. But there was a paradox at the heart of this image. Maintaining the security, stability, and prosperity of the republic required aggressive statecraft, and as a result, Jeffersonians deployed state power to reduce taxes and the debt, enforced a shipping embargo, go to war, and ultimately to support a national bank during Madison's administration. This book explores the logic and logistics of Jeffersonian statesmanship. Focusing on Jeffersonian Republican statecraft in action, Jeffersonians in Power maps the meeting place of ideology and policy as Jeffersonians shifted from being an oppositional party to exercising power as the ruling coalition. Contributors: Andrew Burstein, Louisiana State University * Benjamin L. Carp, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York * Christa Dierksheide, University of Missouri * Kevin R. C. Gutzman, Western Connecticut State University * James E. Lewis Jr., Kalamazoo College * Martin OEhman, Gothenburg University * Robert G. Parkinson, Binghamton University * John A. Ragosta, Robert H. Smith International Center for Jefferson Studies at Monticello * Leonard J. Sadosky III * Richard Samuelson, California State University, San Bernardino * Brian Schoen, Ohio University * Mark Smith, John Burroughs School, St. Louis * Andrew Trees, Roosevelt University.