This book is an analysis of President Bush's Regional Defense Strategy first unveiled in Aspen, Colorado, on August 2, 1990. This strategy involves a mix of active, reserve, and reconstitutable forces, and General Colin Powell's Base Force. If implemented, the new strategy and force structure would return significant U.S. ground and air forces to the continental United States where most would be demobilized. In the event of a major crisis, the United States would rely on active and reserve forces for a contingency response, much as was done for Operation Desert Storm. The new national security strategy is based upon the 25 percent budget cut negotiated with Congress, a greatly depleted Russian threat, and a new international security environment that assumes two-years' warning of a European-centered global war with the former USSR.

There are four major critical factors upon which the new strategy depends: (1) the continued decline of the Russians as a threat to world stability; (2) the ability of the intelligence community to meet new challenges; (3) the behavior of the allies and Congress; and (4) the ability of industry to meet new demands. The new strategy is not simply an adjustment to existing defense doctrine or strategy, but rather a fundamental revision of the way the United States has approached defense since 1945. Students and scholars interested in politico-military strategy and government policy will find this book of great interest.

This book analyzes President Bush's new Regional Defense Strategy--the master plan that will guide the transformation of U.S. defense policy for the post-Cold War era. Most recent books on defense prescribe how U.S. policy ought to change or critique past policies without taking Bush's new strategy into account. This book takes a different approach, providing the first comprehensive assessment of the new Regional Defense Strategy, analyzing the consequences for U.S. forces and alliance relations, and examining the political difficulties of transforming President Bush's vision into reality. It explains major changes in U.S. defense doctrine and strategy, force and command structure, future programming requirements, and the major question of how such a significant change was managed in the United States.

Much is new and even radical about the Regional Defense Strategy. Bush has built it around the concept of reconstitution, under which the United States will scrap the forces needed to fight a large-scale conflict and rely on the ability to create new forces if such a conflict looms on the horizon. However, reconstitution will impose demanding requirements on U.S. intelligence and the defense industrial base. Congress will also have an important say over this proposal and the new national security strategy as a whole. So will U.S. allies in Europe and the Far East, some of whom are already moving to recast the strategy's proposals for basing U.S. forces abroad. The primary audience of this book is politico-military strategic planners and those interested in organizational theory, management of change in large organizations, and government policy.

Based on formal content analysis of the writings of Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov and past Soviet ministers of defense and heads of the Politburo, James J. Tritten interprets what the Soviets say they will do in the event of nuclear war. He then constructs a hardware and exercise analysis of the strategic employment of the Soviet Navy in a nuclear war, offering three possible cases-the a bolt from the blue, with existing forces on patrol; full mobilization; and a plausible case of partial mobilization. In addition, Dr. Tritten examines, from a Soviet perspective, concepts of deterrence, the strategic goals and missions of the fleet, nuclear targeting policy, the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) disruption mission, and the potential for tactical nuclear warfare limited to the sea. The author concludes by assessing the implications of Soviet politico-military planning for Western defense strategy and arms control.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the term military doctrine for a naval audience that is less than familiar with the term and unsure of its impact. It is also written for other writers of military doctrine so that they will understand current naval doctrine development. This paper will, first, review the already approved military definitions of doctrine to provide the reader with a sense of how doctrine is viewed by the military profession. From a variety of terms that include the word doctrine, it will then, second, set military doctrine for the Navy in the context of all of the possible types of doctrine. Third, this paper will consider what influences the various types of military doctrine, including doctrine in the Navy. Fourth, the paper will consider what, in turn, is influenced by military doctrine. Fifth, the paper will consider what military doctrine is not; for example, doctrine is not tactics. Sixth, the paper will consider standardization of military doctrine, and finally, the paper concludes with the use of the term military doctrine by the Navy. With properly developed military doctrine we gain professionalization, without relinquishing freedom of judgment that the commanders need to exercise individual initiative in battle. Doctrine is defined in the dictionary as "a principle or body of principles presented by a specific field, system or organization for acceptance or belief."1 From an organizational perspective, doctrine is those shared beliefs and principles that define the work of a profession. Principles are: (1), basic truths, laws, or assumptions; (2), rules or standards of behavior; (3), fixed or predetermined policies or modes of action. Professions are occupations and vocations requiring training and education in a specialized field--training and education in the doctrine of that profession. Doctrine is the codification of what a profession thinks (believes) and does (practices) whenever the profession's membership perform in the usual and normal (normative) way. Generally, society lets professions regulate their own activities if there is a doctrine which defines how the profession will do its work and there is some form of management and oversight of the activities of those who belong to it. Because of a number of special circumstances, the military as a profession is subject to more than the average amount of oversight by government. Like other professions, militaries have always had doctrine which defines how they do their job. Unlike some professions however, military doctrine does not have one standard approach nor common thread which can be found in all nations and in all military Services. Military doctrine in the U.S. has been consciously made a province of the uniformed Services rather than the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defense

In March 1993, the United States Navy and Marine Corps established the Naval Doctrine Command as the primary authority for the development of naval concepts and integrated naval doctrine. It has several specific roles-serving as the coordinating authority for the development and evaluation of Navy service-unique doctrine, providing a coordinated Navy-Marine Corps voice in joint and combined doctrine development, and ensuring that naval and joint doctrine are addressed in training and education curricula and in operations, exercises, and war games. Although this was the first time the sea services had established a formal command to prepare and publish multi-service naval doctrine, it was not the first time that either service, or navies in general, had formal written doctrine. In the minds of most serving officers, however, doctrine was something new for the fleet. Newport Paper Number Nine is the first of two publications in this series which will present the story of naval doctrine's history and theory for use in war colleges, command and staff colleges, professional schools, and other centers of excellence. The major message of these pages is that naval and navy doctrine is not new and there is value today in reviewing the lessons of past doctrinal development experiences. Under the leadership of the Naval Doctrine Command's first commander, Rear Admiral Frederick Lewis, U.S. Navy, the Command set out to examine history to learn the lessons of naval doctrine development from the past. This effort was not an attempt to publish history, as such. Instead, it was directed primarily as a study of history from the perspective of doctrine-a term generally not found in the index pages of naval historical studies. Our own navy and four European navies were selected for in-depth analysis, primarily because the history of these navies is well-documented and it was relatively easy to find the evidence of past doctrinal development once researchers became familiar with the concept. Newport Paper Number Nine contains the results of research conducted on the navies of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Spain. Each has a unique story to tell, and each story has value for us today. This paper concludes with an interpretive essay on the relationship of doctrine to technology, particularly revolutions in military affairs (RMAs). It questions the ground forces-oriented RMA paradigm and makes a strong case for the uniqueness of naval warfare. A forthcoming Newport Paper, which continues with two additional interpretive essays on the theory of military and naval doctrine and two essays that express the need for doctrine, takes the lessons learned from all these studies and provides the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps with the issues that must be addressed in naval doctrine publications of today.