This volume brings together eight original essays selected to provide an overview of the developments in the spatial theory of voting. The spatial theory of self-interest and explores the consequences of this assumption for elite behaviour and for the choices voters make in representative and direct democracies. The book summarizes work in eight major areas: elections with possible entry by new candidates who have policy preferences, experimental testing of spatial models of committees and elections, elections with imperfect information about voting intentions, voting on alternatives that are linked to future decisions, elections with candidates who have policy preferences, experimental testing of spatial manoeuvres designed to alter voting outcomes, elections with experimental testing of spatial models of committees and elections, elections with imperfect information about voting intentions, voting on alternatives that are linked to future decisions, elections with more than two candidates under different election rules, and bureaucratic efforts to manipulate referendum voting. Recognized scholars in these areas summarize the major results of their own and others' work, providing self-contained discussions that will apprise readers of important recent advances.

This book provides an introduction to an important approach to the study of voting and elections: the spatial theory of voting. In contrast to the social-psychological approach to studying voting behaviour, the spatial theory of voting is premised on the idea of self-interested choice. Voters cast votes on the basis of their evaluation of the candidates or policy alternatives competing for their vote. Candidates fashion their appeals to the voters in an effort to win votes. The spatial theory provides explicit definitions for these behavioural assumptions to determines the form that self-interested behaviour will take. The consequences of this behaviour for the type of candidate or policy that voters will select is the major focus of the theory. There is a twofold purpose to this work. The first is to provide an elementary but rigourous introduction to an important body of political science research. The second is to design and test a spatial theory of elections that provides insights into the nature of election contests. The book will appeal to a wide audience, since the mathematics is kept to an accessible level.

This volume brings together eight original essays selected to provide an overview of the developments in the spatial theory of voting. The spatial theory of self-interest and explores the consequences of this assumption for elite behaviour and for the choices voters make in representative and direct democracies. The book summarizes work in eight major areas: elections with possible entry by new candidates who have policy preferences, experimental testing of spatial models of committees and elections, elections with imperfect information about voting intentions, voting on alternatives that are linked to future decisions, elections with candidates who have policy preferences, experimental testing of spatial manoeuvres designed to alter voting outcomes, elections with experimental testing of spatial models of committees and elections, elections with imperfect information about voting intentions, voting on alternatives that are linked to future decisions, elections with more than two candidates under different election rules, and bureaucratic efforts to manipulate referendum voting. Recognized scholars in these areas summarize the major results of their own and others' work, providing self-contained discussions that will apprise readers of important recent advances.