Magnanimity and Statesmanship is a collection of papers on the virtue of Aristotelian magnanimity (or greatness of soul) and its relationship to the history of political philosophy and to the art of statesmanship. Aristotle's account of the "great-souled man" may seem somewhat alien to the sensibilities of a modern democracy. There is, after all, an inegalitarian element in the great-souled man's confidence in his moral excellence and hence in his superior worthiness to hold public office. Nevertheless, even modern democratic thinkers admit that democracy needs, at least in certain critical phases in its development, political leaders who far excel their fellow citizens in virtue and wisdom. This book, then, traces the path of magnanimity in the history of political philosophy and examines certain statesmen in light of this virtue, all with a view to addressing the following questions: What is magnanimity, and what is its relationship to political life? Is magnanimity compatible with Christianity, or with the modern commitment to equality? Does modernity still stand in need of such a virtue? Can magnanimity flourish under modern conditions? Are there examples of political leaders whose lives exemplify this virtue and the study of whose political conduct can deepen our understanding of it?

Why does the Civil War still speak to us so powerfully? If we listen to the most thoughtful, forceful, and passionate voices of that day we find that many of the questions at the heart of that conflict are also central to the very idea of America-and that many of them remain unresolved in our own time. The Political Thought of the Civil War offers us the opportunity to pursue these questions from a new, critical perspective as leading scholars of American political science, history, and literature engage in some of the crucial debates of the Civil War era-and in the process illuminate more clearly the foundation and fault lines of the American regime. The essays in this volume use practical dilemmas of the Civil War to reveal and probe fundamental questions about the status of slavery and race in the American founding, the tension between moralism and constitutionalism, and the problem of creating and sustaining a multiracial society on the basis of the original principles of the American regime. Adopting a deliberative approach, the authors revisit the words and deeds of the most important political actors of era, from William Lloyd Garrison, John C. Calhoun, and Abraham Lincoln to Alexander Stephens and Frederick Douglass, with reference to the American Founders and the architects of Reconstruction. The essays in this volume consider the difficult choices each of these figures made, the specific problems they were responding to, and the consequences of those choices. As this book exposes and explores the theoretical principles at play within their historical context, it also offers vivid reminders of how the great controversies surrounding the Civil War continue to shape American political life to this day.

James Stoner's purpose is an ambitious one: to recover the common law basis of American constitutionalism.

American constitutionalism in general, he argues, and judicial review in particular, cannot be fully understood without acknowledging their roots in both common law and liberal political theory. But for the most part, the common law underpinnings of constitutionalism have received short shrift.

Through close study of liberal political philosopher Thomas Hobbes and the writings of Edward Coke, a seventeenth-century judge and parliamentarian whose opinion in Doctor Bonham's Case (1610) was once viewed as a precedent for the modern practice of judicial review, Stoner establishes a dialogue between two schools of thought. The contrast that emerges between liberalism, with its scientific ambitions, and common law opens up a fresh perspective on the foundations of the American regime.

Common law is grounded in precedent and local tradition as well as reason; it stresses community. Liberal political theory is based on abstract, rational principles; it stresses individualism. To overlook the common law roots of American constitutionalism, then, is to ignore a tradition that is more contextual and historical, more flexible yet more respectful of the wisdom of tradition or experience, less individualistic and more emphatic about responsibility than is the liberal philosophic tradition.

In "Common Law and Liberal Theory," Stoner reexamines the sources of judicial review and the American founding. He focuses on Hobbes and Coke as representative of the two traditions, but also includes chapters on Locke, Montesquieu, Blackstone, and the Federalists. His careful reading of the influences of and conflicts between liberalism and common law will cast new light on the controversy over the origins of American constitutionalism.

If natural law arguments struggle to gain traction in contemporary moral and political discourse, could it be because we moderns do not share the understanding of nature on which that language was developed? Building on the work of important thinkers of the last half-century, including Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin, John Finnis, and Bernard Lonergan, the essays in Concepts of Nature compare and contrast classical, medieval, and modern conceptions of nature in order to better understand how and why the concept of nature no longer seems to provide a limit or standard for human action. These essays also evaluate whether a rearticulation of pre-modern ideas (or perhaps a reconciliation or reconstitution on modern terms) is desirable and/or possible. Edited by R. J. Snell and Steven F. McGuire, this book will be of interest to intellectual historians, political theorists, theologians, and philosophers.