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War and landpower's role in the twenty-first century is not just
about military organizations, tactics, operations, and technology;
it is also about strategy, policy, and social and political
contexts. After fourteen years of war in the Middle East with
dubious results, a diminished national reputation, and a continuing
drawdown of troops with perhaps a future force increase proposed by
the Trump administration, the role of landpower in US grand
strategy will continue to evolve with changing geopolitical
situations. Landpower in the Long War: Projecting Force After 9/11,
edited by Jason W. Warren , is the first holistic academic analysis
of American strategic landpower. Divided into thematic sections,
this study presents a comprehensive approach to a critical aspect
of US foreign policy as the threat or ability to use force
underpins diplomacy. The text begins with more traditional issues,
such as strategy and civilian-military relations, and works its way
to more contemporary topics, such as how socio-cultural
considerations effect the landpower force. It also includes a
synopsis of the suppressed Iraq report from one of the now retired
leaders of that effort. The contributors -- made up of an
interdisciplinary team of political scientists, historians, and
military practitioners -- demonstrate that the conceptualization of
landpower must move beyond the limited operational definition
offered by Army doctrine in order to encompass social changes,
trauma, the rule of law, acquisition of needed equipment,
civil-military relationships, and bureaucratic decision-making, and
argue that landpower should be a useful concept for warfighters and
government agencies.
Analyzes the cultural attitudes, political decisions, and
institutions surrounding the maintenance of armed forces throughout
American history While traditionally, Americans view expensive
military structure as a poor investment and a threat to liberty,
they also require a guarantee of that very freedom, necessitating
the employment of armed forces. Beginning with the
seventeenth-century wars of the English colonies, Americans
typically increased their military capabilities at the beginning of
conflicts only to decrease them at the apparent conclusion of
hostilities. In Drawdown: The American Way of Postwar, a stellar
team of military historians argue that the United States sometimes
managed effective drawdowns, sowing the seeds of future victory
that Americans eventually reaped. Yet at other times, the drawing
down of military capabilities undermined our readiness and
flexibility, leading to more costly wars and perhaps defeat. The
political choice to reduce military capabilities is influenced by
Anglo-American pecuniary decisions and traditional fears of
government oppression, and it has been haphazard at best throughout
American history. These two factors form the basic American
"liberty dilemma," the vexed relationship between the nation and
its military apparatuses from the founding of the first colonies
through to present times. With the termination of large-scale
operations in Iraq and the winnowing of forces in Afghanistan, the
United States military once again faces a significant drawdown in
standing force structure and capabilities. The political and
military debate currently raging around how best to affect this
force reduction continues to lack a proper historical perspective.
This volume aspires to inform this dialogue. Not a traditional
military history, Drawdown analyzes cultural attitudes, political
decisions, and institutions surrounding the maintenance of armed
forces.
Analyzes the cultural attitudes, political decisions, and
institutions surrounding the maintenance of armed forces throughout
American history While traditionally, Americans view expensive
military structure as a poor investment and a threat to liberty,
they also require a guarantee of that very freedom, necessitating
the employment of armed forces. Beginning with the
seventeenth-century wars of the English colonies, Americans
typically increased their military capabilities at the beginning of
conflicts only to decrease them at the apparent conclusion of
hostilities. In Drawdown: The American Way of Postwar, a stellar
team of military historians argue that the United States sometimes
managed effective drawdowns, sowing the seeds of future victory
that Americans eventually reaped. Yet at other times, the drawing
down of military capabilities undermined our readiness and
flexibility, leading to more costly wars and perhaps defeat. The
political choice to reduce military capabilities is influenced by
Anglo-American pecuniary decisions and traditional fears of
government oppression, and it has been haphazard at best throughout
American history. These two factors form the basic American
“liberty dilemma,” the vexed relationship between the nation
and its military apparatuses from the founding of the first
colonies through to present times. With the termination of
large-scale operations in Iraq and the winnowing of forces in
Afghanistan, the United States military once again faces a
significant drawdown in standing force structure and capabilities.
The political and military debate currently raging around how best
to affect this force reduction continues to lack a proper
historical perspective. This volume aspires to inform this
dialogue. Not a traditional military history, Drawdown analyzes
cultural attitudes, political decisions, and institutions
surrounding the maintenance of armed forces.
The conflict that historians have called King Philip's War still
ranks as one of the bloodiest per capita in American history. An
Indian coalition ravaged much of New England, killing six hundred
colonial fighting men (not including their Indian allies),
obliterating seventeen white towns, and damaging more than fifty
settlements. The version of these events that has come down to us
focuses on Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay--the colonies whose
commentators dominated the storytelling. But because Connecticut
lacked a chronicler, its experience has gone largely untold. As
Jason W. Warren makes clear in "Connecticut Unscathed," this
imbalance has generated an incomplete narrative of the war.
Dubbed King Philip's War after the Wampanoag architect of the
hostilities, the conflict, Warren asserts, should more properly be
called the Great Narragansett War, broadening its context in time
and place and indicating the critical role of the Narragansetts,
the largest tribe in southern New England. With this perspective,
Warren revises a key chapter in colonial history. In contrast to
its sister colonies, Connecticut emerged from the war relatively
unharmed. The colony's comparatively moderate Indian policies made
possible an effective alliance with the Mohegans and Pequots. These
Indian allies proved crucial to the colony's war effort, Warren
contends, and at the same time denied the enemy extra manpower and
intelligence regarding the surrounding terrain and colonial troop
movements. And when Connecticut became the primary target of
hostile Indian forces--especially the powerful Narragansetts--the
colony's military prowess and its enlightened treatment of Indians
allowed it to persevere.
Connecticut's experience, properly understood, affords a new
perspective on the Great Narragansett War--and a reevaluation of
its place in the ongoing conflict between the Narragansetts and the
Mohegans of Connecticut, and in American history.
The conflict that historians have called King Philip's War still
ranks as one of the bloodiest per capita in American history. An
Indian coalition ravaged much of New England, killing six hundred
colonial fighting men (not including their Indian allies),
obliterating seventeen white towns, and damaging more than fifty
settlements. The version of these events that has come down to us
focuses on Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay-the colonies whose
commentators dominated the storytelling. But because Connecticut
lacked a chronicler, its experience has gone largely untold. As
Jason W. Warren makes clear in Connecticut Unscathed, this
imbalance has generated an incomplete narrative of the war. Dubbed
King Philip's War after the Wampanoag architect of the hostilities,
the conflict, Warren asserts, should more properly be called the
Great Narragansett War, broadening its context in time and place
and indicating the critical role of the Narragansetts, the largest
tribe in southern New England. With this perspective, Warren
revises a key chapter in colonial history. In contrast to its
sister colonies, Connecticut emerged from the war relatively
unharmed. The colony's comparatively moderate Indian policies made
possible an effective alliance with the Mohegans and Pequots. These
Indian allies proved crucial to the colony's war effort, Warren
contends, and at the same time denied the enemy extra manpower and
intelligence regarding the surrounding terrain and colonial troop
movements. And when Connecticut became the primary target of
hostile Indian forces-especially the powerful Narragansetts-the
colony's military prowess and its enlightened treatment of Indians
allowed it to persevere. Connecticut's experience, properly
understood, affords a new perspective on the Great Narragansett
War-and a reevaluation of its place in the conflict between the
Narragansetts and the Mohegans and the Pequots of Connecticut, and
in American history.
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