Continuous-Time Models in Corporate Finance synthesizes four decades of research to show how stochastic calculus can be used in corporate finance. Combining mathematical rigor with economic intuition, Santiago Moreno-Bromberg and Jean-Charles Rochet analyze corporate decisions such as dividend distribution, the issuance of securities, and capital structure and default. They pay particular attention to financial intermediaries, including banks and insurance companies. The authors begin by recalling the ways that option-pricing techniques can be employed for the pricing of corporate debt and equity. They then present the dynamic model of the trade-off between taxes and bankruptcy costs and derive implications for optimal capital structure. The core chapter introduces the workhorse liquidity-management model--where liquidity and risk management decisions are made in order to minimize the costs of external finance. This model is used to study corporate finance decisions and specific features of banks and insurance companies. The book concludes by presenting the dynamic agency model, where financial frictions stem from the lack of interest alignment between a firm's manager and its financiers. The appendix contains an overview of the main mathematical tools used throughout the book. Requiring some familiarity with stochastic calculus methods, Continuous-Time Models in Corporate Finance will be useful for students, researchers, and professionals who want to develop dynamic models of firms' financial decisions.

The financial crisis that began in 2007 in the United States swept the world, producing substantial bank failures and forcing unprecedented state aid for the crippled global financial system. Bringing together three leading financial economists to provide an international perspective, Balancing the Banks draws critical lessons from the causes of the crisis and proposes important regulatory reforms, including sound guidelines for the ways in which distressed banks might be dealt with in the future. While some recent policy moves go in the right direction, others, the book argues, are not sufficient to prevent another crisis. The authors show the necessity of an adaptive prudential regulatory system that can better address financial innovation. Stressing the numerous and complex challenges faced by politicians, finance professionals, and regulators, and calling for reinforced international coordination (for example, in the treatment of distressed banks), the authors put forth a number of principles to deal with issues regarding the economic incentives of financial institutions, the impact of economic shocks, and the role of political constraints. Offering a global perspective, Balancing the Banks should be read by anyone concerned with solving the current crisis and preventing another such calamity in the future.

In the 1990s, large insurance companies failed in virtually every major market, prompting a fierce and ongoing debate about how to better protect policyholders. Drawing lessons from the failures of four insurance companies, "When Insurers Go Bust" dramatically advances this debate by arguing that the current approach to insurance regulation should be replaced with mechanisms that replicate the governance of non-financial firms.

Rather than immediately addressing the minutiae of supervision, Guillaume Plantin and Jean-Charles Rochet first identify a fundamental economic rationale for supervising the solvency of insurance companies: policyholders are the "bankers" of insurance companies. But because policyholders are too dispersed to effectively monitor insurers, it might be efficient to delegate monitoring to an institution--a prudential authority. Applying recent developments in corporate finance theory and the economic theory of organizations, the authors describe in practical terms how such authorities could be created and given the incentives to behave exactly like bankers behave toward borrowers, as "tough" claimholders.

The financial crisis that began in 2007 in the United States swept the world, producing substantial bank failures and forcing unprecedented state aid for the crippled global financial system. Bringing together three leading financial economists to provide an international perspective, "Balancing the Banks" draws critical lessons from the causes of the crisis and proposes important regulatory reforms, including sound guidelines for the ways in which distressed banks might be dealt with in the future.

While some recent policy moves go in the right direction, others, the book argues, are not sufficient to prevent another crisis. The authors show the necessity of an "adaptive" prudential regulatory system that can better address financial innovation. Stressing the numerous and complex challenges faced by politicians, finance professionals, and regulators, and calling for reinforced international coordination (for example, in the treatment of distressed banks), the authors put forth a number of principles to deal with issues regarding the economic incentives of financial institutions, the impact of economic shocks, and the role of political constraints.

Offering a global perspective, "Balancing the Banks" should be read by anyone concerned with solving the current crisis and preventing another such calamity in the future.

Almost every country in the world has sophisticated systems to prevent banking crises. Yet such crises--and the massive financial and social damage they can cause--remain common throughout the world. Does deposit insurance encourage depositors and bankers to take excessive risks? Are banking regulations poorly designed? Or are banking regulators incompetent? Jean-Charles Rochet, one of the world's leading authorities on banking regulation, argues that the answer in each case is "no." In "Why Are There So Many Banking Crises?," he makes the case that, although many banking crises are precipitated by financial deregulation and globalization, political interference often causes--and almost always exacerbates--banking crises. If, for example, political authorities are allowed to pressure banking regulators into bailing out banks that should be allowed to fail, then regulation will lack credibility and market discipline won't work. Only by insuring the independence of banking regulators, Rochet says, can market forces work and banking crises be prevented and minimized. In this important collection of essays, Rochet examines the causes of banking crises around the world in recent decades, focusing on the lender of last resort; prudential regulation and the management of risk; and solvency regulations. His proposals for reforms that could limit the frequency and severity of banking crises should interest a wide range of academic economists and those working for central and private banks and financial services authorities.

In the 1990s, large insurance companies failed in virtually every major market, prompting a fierce and ongoing debate about how to better protect policyholders. Drawing lessons from the failures of four insurance companies, When Insurers Go Bust dramatically advances this debate by arguing that the current approach to insurance regulation should be replaced with mechanisms that replicate the governance of non-financial firms. Rather than immediately addressing the minutiae of supervision, Guillaume Plantin and Jean-Charles Rochet first identify a fundamental economic rationale for supervising the solvency of insurance companies: policyholders are the "bankers" of insurance companies. But because policyholders are too dispersed to effectively monitor insurers, it might be efficient to delegate monitoring to an institution--a prudential authority. Applying recent developments in corporate finance theory and the economic theory of organizations, the authors describe in practical terms how such authorities could be created and given the incentives to behave exactly like bankers behave toward borrowers, as "tough" claimholders.

The subprime crisis has shown that the sophisticated risk management models used by banks and insurance companies had serious flaws. Some people even suggest that these models are completely useless. Others claim that the crisis was just an unpredictable accident that was largely amplified by the lack of expertise and even naivety of many investors. This book takes the middle view. It shows that these models have been designed for "tranquil times," when financial markets behave smoothly and efficiently. However, we are living in more and more "turbulent times": large risks materialize much more often than predicted by "normal" models, financial models periodically go through bubbles and crashes. Moreover, financial risks result from the decisions of economic actors who can have incentives to take excessive risks, especially when their remunerations are ill designed. The book provides a clear account of the fundamental hypotheses underlying the most popular models of risk management and show that these hypotheses are flawed. However it shows that simple models can still be useful, provided they are well understood and used with caution.